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ABSTRACT
At the core of the essay that follows is a set of intuitions
that distinguish the mental and subjective from the public and
objective. I call these intuitions Cartesian intuitions even
though Descartes himself ignored some of them. I argue that some
of them survive the best efforts of critics to explain them away.
This, I contend, is the basis of the mind-body problem, which
should be seen as a paradox, in which both materialist and dualist
lines of argument seem conclusive. My aim is thus to clarify and
to bolster what I call the neo-Cartesian half of the mind-body
paradox, to show that there really is a paradox, one that remains
with us, undissolved.
I use two forms of arguments to accomplish this. One is the
Knowledge Argument, according to which there are certain things
which you can know everything physical about but not know
everything about and which, because of that, make physicalism
false. The Knowledge Argument says that your having this extra
knowledge depends on the existence of special properties called
qualia, which are supposed to be separate from any physical or
functional properties. I argue that the Knowledge Argument is
what survives from Descartes's original critique of materialism.
I defend the Knowledge Argument, or at least I defend the claim
that it has not so far been refuted.
The other form of argument is the Absent Qualia Argument. I
use it further to support the case against functionalism, the
approach to the mind according to which mental states are
definable by their causal relations to behaviors, perceptions, and
each other. Against this position, I argue that there might be
so-called absent qualia states which filled the causal roles of
some of our genuine mental states but did not look or feel like
anything. The functionalist response to this position is that
since absent qualia states cause the same beliefs as genuine
states do we could never know whether we were having real states
or absent qualia replicas. I argue that there is no such
skeptical problem.
At the heart of both arguments is an account of our direct
reference to our own phenomenal states. Critics of the Knowledge
Argument have argued that the Cartesian intuitions the argument
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4exploits can be explained away as a result of two distinct forms
of reference: roughly, the direct reference distinctive to the
mental, the descriptive reference distinctive to our
neurophysiological talk. But I argue that we could not refer
directly to our phenomenal states unless we did so by way of
properties distinct from any neurophysiological properties.
Critics of the Absent Qualia Argument can argue that our direct
reference to phenomenal states requires mental processing with
phenomenal aspects, processing that necessarily runs outside any
causal role that might be shared with absent qualia replicas.
These side-effects mean that absent qualia are impossible in us.
I grant that but argue that this would not rule out the
possibility of absent qualia in nonsentient creatures. They might
be similar enough to have states with identical causal roles to
our phenomenal states; but since they would be free of experience,
there would be no chance for the side-effects that make absent-
qualia states impossible to realize in us.
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In a sense, this essay began in September 1975 when I attended a
seminar in Ithaca by Sydney Shoemaker on his just-published
"Functionalism and Qualia." At the time, these ideas were very foreign
to me. I felt that something was wrong in what he said but I also felt
that there was something very important in it. The issues were too hard
for me, however, and on the several times I encountered the paper in the
next ten years I continued to think that they were too hard.
Nevertheless, in the summer of 1985, after abandoning an earlier effort
to write a dissertation on reference, I resolved to devote myself to the
Shoemaker paper and the issues it raised until I could say what I
thought was wrong. What is before you is an interim report on my
progress, nine years later.
Two people deserve particular thanks in helping me complete this
essay. My advisor, Ned Block, has read, discussed and given written
comments on every inch of not only the dissertation itself but also many
earlier drafts of it. His own writings on the mind-body problem and his
clear and insightful thinking about what I have written on it here have
been indispensible. Steve White probably rescued this thesis, while
serving as a substitute adviser at an earlier crucial stage when Ned was
on sabbatical. Although disagreeing with them, he took very seriously
the arguments appearing in Chapter Seven and Chapter Eight, at a time
when I did not know whether I had anything at all to say on these
issues. Now a colleague, he has been always willing to discuss problems
I have had. I have come to believe that his own formulation of the
Property Dualism Argument is fundamental to understanding the mind-body
problem and it informs much of what I have written here.
Other people also deserve thanks. It is due to Noam Chomsky that I
came to M.I.T. and it is due to his writings that I and many others take
Descartes as seriously as we do, and I thank him for both things. Brian
Crabb spent many useful hours discussing Chapte:.: Four and Chapter Five
with me. I have benefitted greatly from the continual resistance to my
views shown by Dan Dennett; it is hard for me anymore to write anything
on these topics without hearing a voice in my head saying, "What would
Dan say?" My other committee members, Bob Stalnaker and Sylvain
Bromberger, read earlier drafts of the thesis and spent many hours with
me. Both gave me encouragement at times of discouragement. I
particularly wish to thank Sylvain for serving as my adviser while I was
working on the earlier thesis topic, and it has been a matter of much
disappointment that we have not had the opportunity to work as closely
together since then.
The same can be said of a number of friends who watched this work
evolve over the years: Jon Church, John P. Kelly, Lisa Schur and Harvey
Simon.
To Janet Chumley, I am grateful for advice and patience. She put
up with a lot as a finished product emerged only in fits and starts. To
Reed, I am both grateful and sorry for time apart as I have done the
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CHAPTER ONE SOME CARTESIAN INTUITIONS
Descartes taught us that there is something to be
learned of the world just from the ways we imagine it to be.
The lesson we get from him is not quite the one he set out
to give but it starts there.
I. Two Cartesian Intuitions, an Explanatory Gap
and the Humean View about Them
From a high position, you peer out upon a body of water
that meets the sky in a long, unobstructed horizon. A
magnificent sunset is slowly unfolding. A warm breeze
rustles the leaves. What you see before you, what you hear
behind you--these are paradigms of what we call "physical."
The light of a tremendous fireball millions of miles away is
refracted and dispersed by the atmosphere through the many
wavelengths of the color spectrum. Energetic air molecules,
moving through the trees and colliding with anything in
their way, create ripples of sound waves in all directions.
This is what goes on around you. But what about what
goes on inside you--what about how this looks and sounds and
feels to you? How could that be anything physical? Looks
and feels may seem not to be the right sorts of things to be
called "physical." After all, can we not imagine them being
pried free of physical things? We seem easily able to
imagine the idea, for example, of leaving our bodies.
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According to a Greek legend, Hermotimus's soul would leave
his body from time to time to visit distant lands, returning
to report things only an observer could have known, until
one day it came back to find that his enemies had burned his
body.' Many primitive peoples have reportedly used the
idea of leaving the body to explain what happens during
dreams. It may even seem to us, in certain flights of
fancy, that we could trade in the physical world completely
and still keep the looks and feels. This we imagine doing
when we entertain the thought that our entire lives are mere
dreams or when, on some accounts, we imagine ourselves going
to Heaven.2
1. See Pliny the Elder, Natural History, Bk. VII, sec.
174; in ed. by H. Rackham, tr. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1942), at vol. 2, p. 623; see also
Lucian's work, The Fly (or Muscae Laudatio) in A. M. Harmon,
tr., Lucian, vol. 1 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1913), at p. 89.
2. For the classic account of primitive explanations of
dreams as disembodied experiences, see E. B. Tylor,
Primitive Culture, 4th ed. (London: John Murray, 1903), vol.
1, pp. 440-445. The philosophical notion that one's entire
life could be a dream is, of course, an old one; see, for
instance, Plato's Republic, Bk. V at 476. One must be
careful in interpreting conceptions of disembodiment as
intuitions of a nonphysical realm. The pre-Socratics, while
seeing the soul as distinct from the human body, each
thought it to be comprised by one of the substances, with
the exception of earth, believed by the Greeks to be
elements (air, water, fire); see Aristotle, De Anima, Bk. I,
ch. 2. Even these vague conceptions of a "tenuous" soul,
"like a wind or flame or ether, which permeated [the] more
solid parts" of the body, to use Descartes's words, are
materialistic enough to clash with his argument; see the
Second Meditation at AT VII 26, in John Cottingham, Robert
Stoothoff and Dugald Murdoch, The Philosophical Writings gt
Descartes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984 and
1985), 2 vols., at vol. 2, p. 17. Throughout, I shall use
the "Cottingham translation."
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Let me call these intuitions of differences between the
mental and the physical Cartesian intuitions. For it was
Descartes who first drew attention to such intuitions and
argued that merely by virtue of our having them we know that
something about them is right. We have all at one time or
another had intuitions about disembodiment like those he
described. But I shall also call Cartesian other intuitions
which Descartes paid less or no attention to but which are
equally familiar.'
Horror films and the folklore of voodoo are filled with
talk of zombies. Some probably think of them primarily as
people robbed of free will, but a more extreme idea is that
they are entirely missing the inner light of consciousness.
Descartes imagined machines that could without consciousness
imitate certain kinds of human behavior. He thought that
all animals but humans were such machines and that, with
none of the looks or feels of experience, they acted
entirely on the basis of programming and stimulus.
On the other hand, it was also Descartes's view that
internal programming and external stimuli were limited in
what they could produce. Neither beasts nor machines, he
thought--much less zombies--could pass what has become known
as the Turing test, producing behavior indistinguishable
3. I take the phrase "Cartesian intuitions" and the
distinguishing of these two categories of them from Saul
Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1980), p. 148.
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from that of normal humans. He argued that beasts and
machines lack the capacity for making creative, unprogrammed
responses peculiar to a e cogitans--a rational mind like
each of us. If this were right, their psychologies and
presumably their physiologies would also differ from those
of normal people. So a still more extreme idea is that
there could be beings who were zombie-like in lacking an
inner light but who were similar to us in every other way--
in behaviors that could pass the Turing test, in their
psychologies, even in their physiologies.
Although I am labeling this notion as a second kind of
Cartesian intuition, it is not a proposal found in
Descartes's writings. He argued that nothing could produce
the behavior characteristic of normal humans without the
inner light of a conscious soul. But this was a conclusion
from philosophical reasoning. Even Descartes would have
allowed that, pre-reflectively, we are at least able to
wonder if other people are zombies or robots or mere
Cartesian beasts. "If I happen to look out my window and
see men walking in the street," he muses in the Second
Meditation, "... what do I really see, except hats and coats
that could be covering robots?"' To wonder this is to
entertain it as a possibility that they are. And this is to
see the world as if it consists of more than just its
physical aspects, as if it has an inner realm of
4. At AT VII 32.
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consciousness beyond its physical aspects that we can at
least imagine to be missing even when all its physical
aspects are present.
According to both these sorts of Cartesian intuitions--
those of disembodiment and those of zombiehood--we have
direct access and make direct reference to a realm apart
from the realm of the physical, to which we only have
indirect access and make indirect reference. It is not from
indirect behavioral evidence that res coaitantes exhibit
that we can deduce this further realm, Descartes argued, but
only from the direct evidence of the cogito--the "I
think.",5
This leaves us with an explanatory gap between our
knowledge of the physical and our knowledge of the mental,
one that cannot be bridged by naive common sense alone.
This much is uncontroversial. I may have physical evidence
about some people from their physiologies or from their
behaviors and still may wonder of them what their experience
is like, or whether they have any experience at all. I may
have direct evidence in my own case of having experience and
of what it is like to have but may still wonder what its
physical basis is. How do we get from the one to the other?
Our intuitions of the physical are very different from our
intuitions of the mental. In fact, they seem
5. If it turns out that all r.a coaitantes are in fact
conscious minds, capable of the coaito, as Descartes
maintained, then this would require a further argument.
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incommensurable.
But can we from such intuitions alone conclude anything
about the world--about whatever these intuitions are
themselves about? For some time, the prevalent position has
been that we cannot. Let me call this the Humean view.
Hume argued that none of our factual knowledge--none of our
knowledge about the real world--is q priori. We cannot know
anything about the way the world is, according to Hume,
merely from the ways we think about it in an armchair,
independently of our experience of it. He argued, for
example, that only through experience can we know how, or
if, such things as thought and physiological activity are
connected. Experience provides knowledge a posteriori, and
there is no other knowledge possible.6
Those who after Hume continue to take the Humean view
6. In one relevant passage, Hume writes: "For tho'
there appear no manner of connexion betwist motion or
thought, the case is the same with all other causes and
effects.... If you pretend, therefore, to prove k priori,
that such a position of bodies can never cause thought;
because turn it which way you will, 'tis nothing but a
position of bodies; you must by the same course of reasoning
conclude, that it can never produce motion; since there is
no more apparent connexion in the one case than in the
other. But as this latter conclusion is contrary to evident
experience, and as 'tis possible we may have a like
experience in the operations of the mind, and may perceive a
constant conjunction of thought and motion; you reason too
hastily, when from the mere consideration of the ideas you
conclude that 'tis impossible motion can ever produce
thought, or a different position of parts give rise to a
different passion or reflection." See A Treatise gL Human
Nature, Book I, pt. IV, sec. V, par. 30. The Cartesian, of
course, holds not that thought is caused by motion but that
it is a form of motion.
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make arguments like his a starting point but supplement them
with others. According to one argument for the position
known as scientific materialism, for example, the best
overall explanation we have for the evidence of the sciences
is a materialist one. This line of thought entails that the
Cartesian intuitions are illusory about the existence of a
further realm beyond the physical but that we only know this
q posteriori, in light of synoptically constructing the best
overall explanation for the evidence of the sciences. If on
some versions there remains some work for philosophers to do
from their armchairs, it is not to establish materialism,
which they purportedly cannot do. The task instead is,
where possible, to reconcile us to our knowledge of
materialism by providing ways in which the Cartesian
intuitions could be illusory.7 Philosophy, if this were
7. In "The Big Idea," Times Literary Supplement, July
3, 1992, p. 5, Jerry Fodor seems to express something like
this view. With a slight exaggeration, he puts it this way:
"... we're all materialists for much the reason that
Churchill gave for being a democrat: the alternatives seem
even worse. The new research project is therefore to
reconcile our materialism to the psychological facts; to
explain how something that is material through and through
could have whatever properties minds actually do have."
Philosophy, he goes on, can join hands with psychology in
this research project. Such a picture as this, initially a
reaction to the anti-synoptic, anti-metaphysical, hands-off
approach to our conceptions of the world, scientific and
otherwise, appearing in Wittgenstein's writings, found early
expression in J. J. C. Smart's Philosobhy and Scientific
Realism (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963), ch. 1, and,
inter alia, in W. V. O. Quine's books like Nord and Obiect
(Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1960) and Ontological
Relativity And Other Essays (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1968). The seminal book-length defense of scientific
materialism is that of D. M. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory
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right, might make it conceivable that phenomenal properties
could be reduced to the physical, or shown to be irreducible
because of limitations on human powers of theory
construction, or eliminated altogether as fictional. But
only the best explanation based on the evidence of the
sciences could provide any grounds for knowledge about the
way the world actually is. Cartesian intuitions could thus
never shift the burden of proof to the materialist.
II. The Neo-Cartesian View, the Mind-Body Problem and
Descartes's Modal Argument for Dualism
The Cartesian rejects the Humean view. At least in the
case of the human mind, the Cartesian claims that we can
know something of the world A priori. For we are human
minds, and because of this, we know we exist. And we know
this a priori. Moreover, according to this alternative
view, we have a special relation to ourselves that we do not
have to the physical world, one revealed in our Cartesian
intuitions about the differences between the physical world
and certain aspects of us. On the basis of these
intuitions, the Cartesian claims, we can rightly conclude
that the world consists of two realms--the physical realm
around us and the phenomenal realm within us.
The orthodox Cartesian (such as Descartes) often
Uf the Mind (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968).
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supplements this account of the world and ourselves with
further claims: that we have privileged access to our own
phenomenal properties, and that our knowledge of them is
certain; that the realm of phenomenal properties is not just
different from but is separable from the physical realm and
could exist without it; that our bodies are lifeless,
mindless machines, that phenomenal properties are borne by
souls or ghosts, and that each of us is no more or less than
a ghost in a machine; that body and soul are distinct
substances. You can, however, accept the weaker Cartesian
claims--that the phenomenal and the physical are two
distinct realms of properties (in a sense I hope to clarify)
and that we know this A pririi--without all the rest which
the orthodox Cartesian may add. I shall call this pair of
weaker Cartesian claims the neo-cartesian view.
The neo-Cartesian does not need a sophisticated account
of the a priori, one of the sort the orthodox Cartesian may
try to provide. Tactically, it is wise to minimize the risk
of being trapped in the spider's web of controversies about
whether any of the terms commonly associated with the a
priori--like self-evident, certain, incorrigible, and so
forth--are true of anything at all. Roughly, we can say
that knowledge is p priori if it can be gained by reason
alone, without appeal to the particular facts of experience.
Beyond that, I want to avoid commitment to any more
substantive account of what the category of the p priori is
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or includes. It is enough for the neo-Cartesian to point
out some form of access to knowledge of the world separate
from those public forms paradigmatic of our access to
physical aspects of the world.
Part of my purpose in this essay shall be to show that
the neo-Cartesian view survives the counterarguments of its
critics, both past and contemporary. I shall not be
claiming, however, that the neo-Cartesian view is true--that
it shall forever survive the counterarguments to it. It is
hard to see, given the worldview we get from the natural and
the biological sciences, how any form of dualism could be
true, since it is hard to see where nonphysical phenomenal
properties could come from or how they could interact with
the physical world. If we ignore for a moment the direct
evidence each of us has which gives the neo-Cartesian view
its pull, then it does seem that some form of the scientific
materialism must be right and that the best explanations of
the world must be materialist ones. This means that there
is currently an explanatory gap in our understanding of how
to put together the physical and the phenomenal, but it
means more than that. Our present epistemological state is
one of paradox, with our having apparently conclusive
arguments supporting both reducibility and irreducibility
between the physical and the phenomenal. A rational, well-
informed observer can be in a fairly stable state of
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reflective equilibrium8 about the makeup of the world, yet
be split between two independent, fundamentally different
accounts, each of which when taken in isolation seems to be
demonstrable. And we do not have even a glimmer of insight
about how to dissolve the paradox.
One writer has labeled as principled agnosticism such
an inability as this to decide between materialism and
dualism.' But the above view is a special case of that.
Here, the inability to decide comes not from inadequate
information or incomplete reasoning but from two sets of
information and reasoning each of which, when taken in
isolation from the other, seems to give a conclusive verdict
but one incompatible with the verdict from the other. This
special case of paradox-inspired agnosticism appears not be
resolvable without moving outside the bounds of common
sense.
8. I borrow this term from John Rawls, A Theory of
Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971),
p. 20, where it is used in a related way to refer to the
state of equilibrium that may follow a process of mutual
adjustment of first-order judgments and higher-order
principles about justice in political structures.
9. Owen Flanagan, Consciousness Reconsidered
(Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1992), p. 1. Flanagan's
example of a principled agnostic about the mind-body
connection is Thomas Nagel; see his "What Is It Like to Be a
Bat?," Philosophical Review 83 (1974), reprinted in his
Mortal Ouestions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1979), p. 176, and his The View from Nowhere (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 47. Nagel, however,
displays none of the sense of paradox I recommend here;
while he holds that there is currently an "explanatory gap"
in getting from the material to the phenomenal (see below),
he does not recommend any form of dualist reasoning.
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This is the most compelling form of what has
traditionally been labeled the mind-bkdy problem: we cannot
fit consciousness into our picture of the world, even though
this seems to be the only picture possible. I will call
this form the mind-body paradox. It is Kierkegaardian in
the way it confronts us. For Kierkegaard, to be religious
is to embrace an Absolute Paradox: that of something
infinite, God, becoming incarnate in something finite, the
person of Jesus Christ. For anyone struck by the
Cartesian's arguments, the problem is how to include
consciousness, something which seems immaterial, within a
world which seems wholly material. The mind-body paradox
should appear much more daunting than Kierkegaard's,
however--while Kierkegaard's God is at best hidden and
Kierkegaard's believer is a mystic, the evidence of
consciousness is all around.
Ordinarily, the mind-body problem is portrayed more
modestly, with none of this air of paradox: What is the
relation between consciousness and the brain? Is the mind
something different from the brain, though connected with
it, or is it the brain?'0 Often it is depicted,
particularly by the optimists or ideologues of contemporary
cognitive science, as being, if not a matter of normal
science, then at least a form of stagesetting for a
10. See, for example, Thomas Nagel's short introduction
to philosophy, Wat Does It AU Mean? (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1987), pp. 27, 28.
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scientific revolution and a new paradigm. The solution is
seen awaiting new mechanical models, more ingenuious than
before. Dualism is considered a form of impatience, the sin
of concluding merely from our present inability to figure
out a physical basis for our phenomenology that it has none.
This is the criticism of even those who conclude that
the explanatory gap is permanent because we will always lack
the conceptual resources to bridge it, such as Locke and
perhaps Hume. Cartesian intuitions, on this so-called
noumenalist view,1 are the best evidence against
materialism but are not good enough because they can be
explained on other grounds--that is, by limitations on human
11. Hume writes that "as the constant conjunction of
objects constitutes the very essence of cause and effect,
matter and motion may often be regarded as the causes of
thought, a far _ w have any notion of that relation" (my
italics). See the Treatise, Book I, Part IV, Section V,
par. 33; see also the Enguiry, secs. 8 and 12, pt. 1.
Noumenalism not only appears to have been Hume's view but is
suggested by the views of Locke, who argued that ideas of
secondary qualities do not resemble the qualities themselves
or any other physical qualities but were arbitrarily
connected to them by God (see the Es•ya, Book II, Ch. VIII,
sec. 13, and Book IV, Ch. III, secs. 12 and 13). Recently,
a noumenalist view has been defended by Joe Levine,
"Materialism and Qualia--the Explanatory Gap," Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly 64 (1983), pp. 354-361; and by Colin
McGinn, "Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?", in his
Problems  t Consciousness (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell,
1991); and it can easily be read into Thomas Nagel, "What Is
It Like to Be a Bat?," g~. it., and The View from Nowhere,
QD. Lit. McGinn (9Q. d±., p. 3) coins the term "cognitive
closure" to pick out the conceptual inadequacy he thinks we
humans have in psychophysical matters. Flanagan, Qp. it.,
is responsible for this use of the term "noumenalism," a
perhaps unfortunate choice, since here, unlike in Kant's use
of the term, "noumenal" properties are known--directly,
through experience.
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conceiving, akin to blindness. Considering the mind-body
problem from this perspective, a person responds to the
question of whether we can solve it with a yes-and-no
answer. We cannot, since the inadequacy of our conceptual
resources are seen to create a permanent explanatory gap,
but actually we can, since from this fact it would follow
that dualists cannot meet their burden of proof and that
materialism is true.12
The Cartesian rejects these assessments. The
Cartesian, orthodox or nouveau, views the explanatory gap as
a gap not in us but in the world. And the inference that
the world contains nonphysical properties comes, according
to the Cartesian, not as a last-ditch resort to mysticism,
an expression of impotence at an intractable problem, but as
a clearcut solution, a conclusion guaranteed by argument; it
comes not by default but by principle. The Cartesian argues
that whatever limitations there may be in our understanding
of the world from limitations in our conceptual resources,
they are irrelevant to understanding the inference to
dualism. That inference is sanctioned, it is held, not by
an inability to explain but by simple, obvious principles
which, even if not themselves easily explainable, are justly
regarded as reasonably certain. But even the Cartesian
should regard the Cartesian conclusion as mysterious."
12. McGinn, -g. git., pp. 17-18.
13. See Flanagan, gp. cit., pp. 9-11.
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The mystery is to reconcile the Cartesian conclusion with
the considerations that motivate scientific materialism, for
the clear-headed Cartesian should recognize the force of
most of them, too. The Cartesian's would not agree that
these considerations defeat Cartesianism, but it is even
open to the Cartesian to see this as a paradox.
What are the considerations Descartes felt to mandate
the inference to dualism? His writings suggest two kinds of
arguments, one more successful than the other." The one
he is most identified with, the less successful one, I shall
call the Cartesian argument. It is a modal argument,
employing a premise linking the conceivability of
differences to the genuine possibility of those differences.
We can conceive of differences between the mental and the
physical because of our intuitions surrounding disembodiment
and zombiehood. We can also conceive of having multiple
physical realizations (although Descartes himself never
wrote of this): having different bodies from those we in
fact have or bodies made of different material. From the
further premise that the genuine possibility of a difference
between two things entails an actual difference, it seems
14. It is typical of many of Descartes's critics to
attack strawman arguments and to ignore his actual
arguments. One of the most flagrant examples of this is
Gilbert Ryle's attack on what he calls "Descartes's myth"
and "the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine" in his Th&
Concept gf Mind (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1949), pp. 11-
24, where none of Descartes's actual arguments are even
alluded to.
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possible to distinguish selves and souls from human bodies.
Clearly, there are naive versions of the first premise,
the conceivability-to-possibility principle, which won't
work. Consider the most unsophisticated version possible.
To claim simply that the mere distinguishability of things
into separate apparent sorts of things entails a real
distinction between them invites the objection that there
are often two ways of picking things out which, even though
they may seem to come apart in imagination, are in fact
necessarily connected. Although it may have once been
conceivable, for example, that water was distinct from
hydrogen oxide, all that follows is that there are two
different ways of referring to water, linked q posteriori.
This problem might not appear fatal to the modal
argument. The Cartesian can take advantage of a more
sophisticated premise by setting a higher standard on what
is taken to deliver genuine possibilities. Descartes' own
standard was that of clarity and distinctness; another,
suggested by remarks by Kripke, requires that the case of
distinguishability not be explicable as an illusion of
contingency. Yet I shall argue below that the more work
this higher standard is given, the more implausible it is.
And the modal argument fails for other reasons."
15. One essential-properties objection is due to Thomas
Nagel, ThI View from Nowhere, Qp. cit. pp. 47-48; the style-
of-reference objection is due to Brian Loar, "Phenomenal
States," in Philosophical Perspectives 4 (1990), pp. 84-85.
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Consider the Cartesian's claim of distinguishing phenomenal
states from physical states. As in the water case, picking
out things in different ways does not mean we have different
things, but for different reasons. There are two kinds,
which I discuss in more detail in Chapter Three. On the one
hand, styles of reference we use in the case of the mental
differ from styles paradigmatic of reference to the
physical. Phenomenal states are ordinarily open to direct
reference; the referring paradigmatic to physical states
ordinarily is not direct. Phenomenal and physical concepts
(and terms that express them) differ in conceptual role and
may be cognitively independent. On the other hand, we have
no reason to conclude from the modal argument alone that the
properties which seem to distinguish a mental from a
physical state are not both essential properties of one and
the same thing. The modal argument, therefore, does not
support the Cartesian's conclusion. It leaves open the
possibility that the Cartesian merely employs different
means--different styles of reference, different essential
properties--to pick out the same things.
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III. Descartes's Epistemological Argument
for Dualism, the Functionalist Response and Two More
Cartesian Intuitions
The other kind of consideration on behalf of dualism
suggested by Descartes's writings was an epistemological
argument. The argument requires careful scrutiny, but in
this case, unlike that of the modal argument, something
substantial survives. Descartes invites us to imagine that
the external world is a mere illusion, that an evil deceiver
is deceiving us about the world in every possible way.
Descartes's thought experiment, exploiting intuitions of
disembodiment, suggests the following argument: I can doubt
everything physical about the world without doubting
everything about the looks and feels in it, since the fact
that it looks and feels to me the way it does is beyond
doubt; therefore, there are features to the world beyond its
physical features.
This argument is akin to a more recent one, derived by
replacing doubt with knowledge. This is the so-called
Knowledge Argument: that since I can knJw everything
physical about the world without knowing everything about
looks and feels there are features to the world beyond its
physical features. But despite its similarities to the
argument suggested by Descartes's thought experiment, the
Knowledge Argument exploits neither kind of Cartesian
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intuitions mentioned so far, of disembodiment or of
zombiehood. While the doubt mentioned in the argument
suggested by Descartes's writings raises the radical
possibility of the absence of the physical world, the
Knowledge Argument does not entertain this possibility or
that of the absence of minds. It is compatible with denying
them. It is based on a set of closely related but separate
Cartesian intuitions. These I shall identify as intuitions
of the duality of information. To know what is like to
somebody to look at or feel something is intuitively a
separate piece of knowledge from any of the knowledge you
have of objects in the external world; the first is direct,
the second is indirect, and either can exist without the
other.
My main task in the essay that follows is to argue that
the Knowledge Argument and arguments like it can be given
more convincing defenses than they have been given, even by
their current defenders. Even if it turns out our
introspectively acquired phenomenal knowledge of looks and
feels picks out the same pieces of the world as does our
physical knowledge, it could only do so by way of properties
of the world different from any of the properties by which
our physical knowledge would pick out pieces of the world.
This argument relies on the Fregean insight that meanings
are separate from referents and provide routes to them in
virtue of properties of the referents. Thus, thoughts
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identifying the phenomenal pieces of the world with certain
physical pieces of the world could do so, according to the
Fregean, only in virtue of different routes to the same
things, routes that would reach their referents by way of
distinct mental and physical properties of the referents.
It is this argument that sanctions the inference from our
Cartesian intuitions of a duality of information about the
world to the dualist conclusion about two distinct realms of
properties in the world.
This is the fundamental dualist insight that survives
the close scrutiny of Descartes's arguments. And later I
offer as a conjecture that this is the dilemma about
consciousness that is the core of the mind-body problem and
makes it persist. This is what provides a rational, well-
informed observer in a fairly stable state of reflective
equilibrium about the makeup of the world with a sense of
paradox by splitting this person between dualism and the
fundamentally different account of scientific materialism.
The overall objective of this essay, then, should be
seen as twofold. First, I try to motivate the conjecture
that showing the Knowledge Argument unsound would be
tantamount to solving the mind-body problem. Second, I
defend the neo-Cartesian approach to the problem by way of
the Knowledge Argument, or at least the claim that it has
not so far been shown unsound and is strongly supported by
common-sense principles.
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I argue that there are two main sorts of common-sense
counterarguments to the Knowledge Argument--a functionalist
one, and what we might call a conceptual-role approach--and
that neither is successful. The conceptual-role approach is
analogous to the counterargument that defeats the modal
argument. According to this non-Fregean line, the two forms
of knowledge, phenomenal and physical, differ not in the
properties by which or to which they refer but in their
styles of representing the world. One style depends on
direct demonstrative reference; the other depends on
descriptive reference. They differ in their conceptual
roles and may be cognitively independent. This form of
counterargument worked against the modal argument for the
following reason. In that case, there was no assurance that
there was anything more to the appearances of contingency
that seemed to make it possible to pull mentalistic and
physicalistic representations apart than the possibility
that two different kinds of reference were picking out the
same things. In the case of the Knowledge Argument, on the
other hand, there is no claim of contingency between pieces
of the world, only of nonidentity between properties of it.
Assume, for the sake of argument, that it is not
possible to pull the two kinds of representations apart,
that they have the very same referents in common. Still, I
shall argue later, the very distinction between direct
demonstrative reference and descriptive reference in those
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cases we human beings are most familiar with--our
introspective, phenomenal knowledge and our nonintrospective
physical knowledge--entails the existence of distinct sorts
of properties. We directly pick out referents in
introspection at least partly in virtue of their looks and
their feels, and these are different from any of the
paradigmatically physical properties in virtue of which we
pick out aspects of our brains, whether we do this
descriptively or demonstratively.
The other common-sense line of counterargument advanced
against the Kpowledge Argument has been to argue that
although there are nonphysical properties they are
functional properties--characterizable entirely by reference
to causal relationships among stimuli, behavioral responses
and psychological states. Thus, they would not be
irreducibly mental. However, the reasoning by which the
Knowledge Argument refutes physicalism also seems prima
facie to defeat functionalism. Just as someone might know
everything physical without knowing everything, so someone
might know everything physical or functional without knowing
everything. If someone were to know that some functional
description picked out the same mental state as some
mentalistic description, the person could only do so by way
of distinct routes, ones that reached the common referent in
virtue of distinct causal properties of the referent
separate from its phenomenal properties. The Knowledge
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Argument at least requires a functionalist to be an analytic
functionalist, but it seems that the analytic functionalist
falls prey too. A blind person, for example, might know
that some mental state satisfies any functional description
you like without knowing everything about it (such as what
it's like to have).
IV. Absent Qualia Intuitions Against Functionalism
and Problems of Skepticism
There are some who will remain analytic functionalists
and resist this conclusion. If dualism is the alternative,
they reason, then there must be a way out of the Knowledge
Argument, however counterintuitive. But there is a further
counterargument backing up the Knowledge Argument. It is
rooted in intuitions that parallel the anti-physicalist
intuitions of zombiehood. This further argument shows not
just that mental properties are distinct from functional
ones but that they don't even supervene. According to
these new intuitions, it is possible for brain states or
states of mind to satisfy a functionalist account of pain
(or any other mental-state type) yet lack qualitative
character. If these intuitions are right, then since it
should by functionalism be like something to have these
states but is not, functionalism is false. I will call
these absent-qualia intuitions, and because of their
resemblance to the others, I will call them Cartesian. The
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nonqualitative functional states they suggest the existence
of I will call absent-qualia states. We now have six














Mental and the Functional
Fig. 1 Six Categories of Cartesian Intuitions
The absent-qualia intuitions proceed from the following
ideas. According to a standard account, the functionalist
is committed to the existence of functional definitions for
each type of phenomenal state. These definitions identify
the states of that type with whatever states are
characteristic effects of those states' characteristic
causes and characteristic causes of their characteristic
effects. Thus, pain, for example, is identified with
whatever characteristically is caused by pain's causes and
causes pain's effects--with whatever, say, is caused by
bodily injuries, etc., and causes grimacing, the desire to
be rid of pain, and so forth.
According to the most defensible of the absent-qualia
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intuitions, whatever functional roles can be filled
phenomenally, say with pain, can also be filled
nonphenomenally, at least hypothetically. Phenomenal
properties, or qualia, by these intuitions, are like the
fluid of a hydraulic computer. If we suppose the
calculations of such a device to be driven by the movements
of fluid, these intuitions suggest that a functionally
equivalent device, one that performed the same calculations
and did this by the same program, could be driven in some
other way, such as by the movements of electrical currents.
In that case, a functionalist theory of fluid would be false
and an "absent fluid" hypothesis, the hypothesis that a
functionally equivalent device might lack fluid altogether,
would be true. Yet the fluid in such a hydraulic computer
would not be epiphenomenal, since its computations would
occur in virtue of the movements of its fluid. By similar
considerations, these intuitions go, there might be
something lacking pain but functionally equivalent to
someone in pain, going through the same pain-related mental
processes but doing so in virtue of something other than
pain. And the pain might be thought of much like the fluid:
crucial to our thoughts and behavior and thus not
epiphenomenal, even though its role could be filled by
something else in a functionally equivalent system.16
16. This example is due to Ned Block, "Are Absent
Qualia Impossible?", Philosophical Review 89 (1980), pp.
262-263.
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It is worth recalling that these intuitions, although I
call them Cartesian, are not Descartes's. Functionalism
would be false for Descartes not because the functional
roles of pains and other states can be filled both
phenomenally and nonphenomenally but because pains and other
mental states have no set functional roles at all."7
Descartes's point is made not for pains but for thoughts:
that humans aren't beasts or machines, since they can think
and act on their thoughts in creative ways that go beyond
the programmed responses of beasts or machines. Pain and
all other phenomenal qualities are supposed to be a kind of
thinking and would receive a similar account.
Rejecting functionalism has seemed to some to entail an
extreme form of skepticism. If the causal connection
between pain and pain belief could be broken and you were
able to believe that you were in pain without being in pain,
how can you ever know that you are in pain at all?
This view seems to assume that knowledge of one's
phenomenal states requires one to distinguish them from all
alternatives. But I shall argue in a later chapter that
knowledge does not require that. It is no more sound to
17. These Cartesian intuitions against functionalism
correspond to the disembodiment intuitions directed against
physicalism. They would be placed in the empty upper-left
space in Fig. 1. I believe that they can be defended as
well, although I do not do so here. Such "madman
intuitions" are discussed in the account of "mad pain" in
David Lewis, "Mad Pain and Martian Pain," in David Lewis,
fhjosophical Papers (New York: Oxford University Press,
1983), vol. 1, p. 122.
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argue this in cases of introspective knowledge than it is in
cases of perceptual knowledge. Since the existence of
Cartesian sorts of radical perceptual error does not
jeopardize claims of knowledge in more ordinary cases, so
long as these other cases are grounded in reliable
mechanisms of belief formation, radical introspective error
would not either.
Moreover, even if one could distinguish one's states
from any alternative, this is not inconsistent with the
existence of absent-qualia states, as the anti-skeptical
argument requires. I can in my own case, I shall argue,
know that I am having the qualitative states I am and not
absent-qualia replicas because I can know a priori that in
me, absent-qualia replicas are impossible. The
psychological mechanisms required for direct references to
qualitative states, I will argue, have side-effects
upsetting any functional isomorphism between them and
absent-qualia counterparts. But this is consistent with the
existence of absent-qualia states in nonsentient creatures
without direct demonstrative reference of an introspective
sort.
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V. The Structure of the Argument to Follow
In the seven chapters which follow, my aim is to
clarify and to bolster the neo-Cartesian half of the mind-
body paradox, to show that there really is a paradox, one
that remains with us, undissolved. I do this by showing in
more detail why the Cartesian intuitions set out in this
first chapter, those underlying the neo-Cartesian view,
remain intact, despite the best efforts of their critics.
To accomplish this, I will more more fully describe and
evaluate the pieces of reasoning set out above in which
these intuitions have been put to use; the modal argument,
the Knowledge Argument, the considerations behind the anti-
skepticism argument, and my arguments against and for the
possibility of absent qualia.
In Chapter Two and Chapter Three, on the modal
argument, I compare Descartes's version of it--or, perhaps
more accurately, one like Descartes's--with the
superficially similar argument against materialism due to
Saul Kripke, which is not dualist but is closer to
agnosticism. The conceivability-to-possibility principle
itself can be modified to escape many counterarguments
against it; still the objection I mentioned remains. That
is the objection that appearances of contingency may be
illusory from picking the same things out both directly and
descriptively, or through separate properties of them. I
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argue that the Kripkean position, while not committed to the
conceivability principle, misunderstands that because of the
overwhelming case for materialism the opponent of
materialism has the burden of proof, and that the Kripkean
agnosticism is inadequate for meeting the burden. By
contrast, I argue that Descartes understood the burden, and
that while he failed to meet it, his effort foreshadows neo-
Cartesian arguments which do meet it.
In Chapter Four, on the Knowledge Argument, I clear the
way for the main argument of this essay by setting aside
some standard objections, focussing on the specific version
of the argument advanced by Frank Jackson. I argue that
although past criticisms of Jackson's version are
unsuccessful, it and its argumentative strategy must
ultimately be rejected, since what they assume, that simply
your knowing everything physical but not knowing everything
is enough to contradict physicalism, is false.
This clears the way for setting out in Chapter Five
what is right about the Knowledge Argument and about the
Cartesian tradition more generally. I develop the
different, stronger version of the Knowledge Argument
according to which, by contrast with Jackson's version, the
knowledge we have of some of our mental states could not be
about those states unless we picked them out in virtue of
properties of them distinct from any physical properties.
Even though our knowledge of looks and feels is
44
distinguished from our physical knowledge in virtue of
different forms of reference, this can only be so by way of
properties different from any by which our physical
knowledge refers. As I stated above, the very distinction
between direct, demonstrative reference and descriptive
reference in cases that are relevant entails the existence
of distinct sorts of properties. If this is right, qualia
provide routes to our mental states distinct from those
provided by any physical properties, contradicting
materialism.
In Chapter Six, I will fill out my argument that
skeptical considerations are not the obstacles to the
Knowledge Argument they may at first seem to be. As I
stated above, there is no general epistemological principle
backing an anti-skepticism argument for functionalism and
against the Knowledge Argument. Even if there are failures
of transparent access and incorrigible access to the
phenomenal characters of our mental states, they do not
threaten our ability in principle to know the characters of
our states in normal cases. Any argument against the
possibility of absent qualia based merely on the threat of
skepticism requires an epistemological principle that makes
our knowledge of our own qualia depend upon evidence more
comprehensive than is justified. I will argue that our
evidence is not as complete as published versions of the
argument require; our evidence would be so complete as this
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if we had transparent access to the phenomenal properties of
our own mental states, but I will argue that we lack it in
crucial ways.
In Chapter Seven and Chapter Eight, on the possibility
of absent qualia, I fill out the position set forth above in
support of that possibility, refuting fuctionalism and
bolstering the Knowledge Argument. Even though there is no
general epistemological guarantee that we can distinguish
our qualitative states from our nonqualitative ones, I still
argue in Chapter Seven and Chapter Eight that we can
nevertheless distinguish our genuine states from ersatz
counterparts on the alternative grounds mentioned above.
However, I argue that this fact is consistent with the
existence of enough absent-qualia states to undermine
functionalism since, as I also said above, absent-qualia
states are possible in nonsentient creatures that do not do
any distinguishing.
CHAPTER TWO DESCARTES'S MODAL ARGUMENT
Descartes's principal argument in the Meditations for
the dualism of mind and body relies on some strong tie
between what can be conceived and what is possible. It is
possible, and therefore actual, he argues, that his mind is
distinct from his body because of what he can conceive about
his mind and his body.
Just what this assumed connection is between the
conceivable and the possible and how general and necessary
the reliance on it is in arguments for dualism is the
subject of this chapter and the next. Descartes's argument
is a powerful one, and it can be made even more powerful by
dropping some of its problematical but unnecessary aspects.
This power, however, has gone largely unappreciated. Part
of the reason for this is a failure to see what Descartes
actually assumed about conceivability and possibility.
Another part is a failure to understand how his argument can
be and has been improved on.
I. From Conceivability to Possibility
Michael Hooker, for example, states that while
Descartes rejected (P"), from the conviction that some
theological mysteries were beyond human comprehension, he




(P') For all p, if R's truth is conceivable, g's truth
is possible.
(P") For all p, if p's truth is possible, p's truth is
conceivable.
"He argues that it is conceivable that the mind exists
without any bodies existing, and from there concludes that
distinctness is actual," Hooker writes.1 But he contends
that there is no notion of conceivability making Descartes's
argument sound.2
Hooker also finds reliance on (P'), or what I shall
call the Simple Conceivability Principle, in the writings of
Saul Kripke. In a passage from Naming and Necessity, Kripke
writes: "One can imagine ... various things in [Queen
Elizabeth's] life would have changed: that she should have
become a pauper; that her royal blood should have been
unknown, and so on. One is given, let us say, a previous
history of the world up to a certain time, and from that
time it diverges considerably from the actual course. This
seems to be possible. And so it's possible that even though
she were born of these parents she never became queen."'
1. Michael Hooker, "A Mistake Concerning Conception,"
in Stephen F. Barker and Tom L. Beauchamp, eds., Thomas
Reid: Critical Interpretations (Philadelphia: Philosophical
Monographs, 1976), pp. 86-87.
2. Michael Hooker, "Descartes's Denial of Mind-Body
Identity," in Michael Hooker, ed., Descartes: Critical and
Interpretive Essays (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1978).
3. Kripke, gp. _it., p. 113.
48
Hooker takes the argument, through tacit appeal to the
Simple Conceivability Principle, to be "that it is possible
for someone to exist without the properties we can conceive
them lacking."
He finds appeal to this principle, too, in Kripke's
attempt at the end of Namini and Necessity to discredit
certain arguments for physicalism, calling it a
"contemporary version of Descartes's argument." According
to Hooker's account of this "contemporary version," Kripke
"argues from the conceivability of mind-body distinctness to
its possibility, and from there, via the necessity of
identity to dualism."'4 If that is right, the reliance on
the Simple Conceivability Principle (P') is transparent.
Clearly, the principle has had supporters. Hooker
appears to be right that Hume in the Treatise endorsed it.
But Hooker is wrong about Descartes. The conceivability
principle on which Descartes's argument for dualism depends
is much more subtle than Hooker's simple principle. Hooker
himself quotes this passage from Comments frQm a Certain
Broadsheet:" "We should note that even though the rule,
4. Hooker, "A Mistake Concerning Conception," o. cfit.,
p. 87.
5. At AT VIIIB 351-352. Even Hume, in two of the three
passages Hooker cites supporting (P'), claims only that
possibility can be derived from clear conceivability or from
distinct conceivability. Hooker's error is made by others
as well. See, for example, Christopher Hill's account of
what he calls the "Cartetsian argument" in his Sensations
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 90, where
he ascribes to Descartes the belief in something like (P').
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'Whatever we can conceive of can exist,' is my own, it is
true only so long as we are dealing with a conception which
i& clear and distinct..." (my emphasis).
I see no reliance on the Simple Conceivability
Principle in Kripke's challenge to physicalism, even if
there is tacit appeal to it elsewhere. I shall argue below
that Kripke does not, contrary to Hooker, rely on quite the
conceivability principle Descartes uses, if he uses one at
all. Rather, Kripke argues only that our Cartesian
intuition of mind-body contingency cannot be explained away
by familiar means and that we should not endorse materialism
until it is explained away.
My aim in this chapter is to set out Descartes's
argument for dualism and, after dispensing with several side
issues, to continue to focus on what is the central problem
for the Cartesian: the nature and role of the
conceivability-to-possibility principle. I will show, by
mapping some of the logical geography in which they reside,
how Cartesian views move beyond Hooker's simple principle to
be subtler views than has sometimes been appreciated. I
will argue ultimately that the Cartesian has a dilemma about
what reading and role to give the conceivability principle,
and that the choice between two alternatives distinguishes a
position something like Kripke's, an agnostic one, from one
like Descartes's, which I will call the orthodox Cartesian
position.
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In section II, I set out Descartes's argument from
conceivability, and there and in section III, amend it to
yield a conclusion directly contradicting psychophysical
event identity. In section IV and section V, I distinguish
clear and distinct conceivability from several other notions
with which it has been confused, and I argue that several
counterarguments to Descartes rest on this confusion. In
section V I set out the Cartesian's dilemma about what
reading and role to give the conceivability principle. I
set out the two alternatives distinguishing the agnostic
from the orthodox Cartesian positions, which I go on to
examine and criticize in more detail in Chapter Three.
II. Descartes's Argument
In the Sixth Meditation, Descartes makes something like
the following argument for believing that the mind is
distinct from the body.6 (I present the argument and the
modifications of it which follow by way of schemata, with
Greek letters as placeholders for names.)
6. At AT VII 78.
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Descartes's Argument from conceivability
(1) If I can conceive clearly and distinctly of a and
B that they are two things existing apart from
each other, then a and B are two distinct things.
(2) I can conceive clearly and distinctly of my mind's
existing apart from my body.
(3) I can conceive clearly and distinctly of my body's
existing apart from my mind.
ErFg, (4) my mind is distinct from my body.7
Nowhere does Descartes explicitly argue that pains, tastes,
thoughts and the like--particular mental features of
him--are also distinct from his body. What he does write,
however, makes it easy to see how such an argument would go.
Thought, according to Descartes, is an attribute of my mind,
one essential to making it a mind and not something else--in
fact, it is the only attribute essential in this way--and my
7. To be precise about this, Descartes would have said
that they are really distinct. According to Descartes,
there are three sorts of distinction: real distinction,
modal distinction and conceptual distinction. The first
holds only between substances (or entities), and it holds of
substances A and B if and only if A can exist apart from B
(which, in the case of substances, entails that B can exist
apart from A). The second holds between modes or between a
mode and a substance; it holds of mode A and mode or
substance B if and only if A can exist apart from B (which,
in this case, does not entail that B can exist apart from
A--Descartes's shape is modally distinct from Descartes,
since he can exist apart from that shape, although
Descartes's shape, he contends, cannot exist apart from
Descartes). The third holds between A and B when neither
can exist apart from the other. Descartes gives the example
of a substance and its duration: they are "conceptually
distinct," although neither can exist without the other.
See Principles 9. Philosophy, pt. I, secs. 60-62, at AT
VIIIA 28-30.
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being in pain is a mode of that attribute. Since my mind is
distinct from my body, and since my being in pain is a mode
of what it is that makes my mind a mind, my being in pain
could not be a mode of my body's attributes, he would argue,
and is thus distinct from my body."
For Descartes, it was essential to proceed this way.
It is not possible, he would have said, to argue that
thoughts are distinct from my body just because I can
clearly and distinctly conceive them existing apart. They
cannot be conceived that way without the mediation of a
mind, a soul. He thought of his mind, his soul, as a
"complete thing," and this allowed him, he believed, to make
certain inferences about it merely from his conception of
it, without knowing everything about it. Particular mental
aspects, on the other hand, he did not view as "complete
things," and without the ability to place them within a
"complete thing," he argued to Arnauld, there was always the
chance that there would be hidden aspects to them outside
his conception of them that would undermine such
inferences.'
I now intend to depart from Descartes's version and
8. See Principles, pt. I, secs. 53, 56, at AT VIIIA
25-26. On the kind of mode pain is said to be, see
Principles, pt. IV, secs. 190-191, at AT VIIIA 316-318.
9. For a discussion of Descartes's use in the argument
for dualism of the notion of a "complete thing" and of the
related notion of a substance, see Bernard Williams,
Descartes (New York: Penguin, 1978), pp. 113-114 and 124-
129. For more discussion, see the end of section IV below.
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discuss an argument for dualism which parallels it but is
slightly different. After Hume's critique of the notions of
self and soul,'0 it would be best to rid the modal argument
of any commitment to self or soul. This is possible and can
be done without any deep cost to Descartes's insights.
Suppose, then, that in contradiction to Descartes's
dualism, it turned out that some neurological theory of pain
were true. In that case, pains would turn out to be
instances of a particular kind of physical process,
presumably a certain kind of stimulation--call it "C-fiber
stimulation." Let us say, then, by stipulation, that the
best materialist theory of pain, a true one if there is one,
identifies pain with C-fiber stimulation, whether or not
there may be other non-materialist theories that would
better comport with the evidence. Thus, by stipulation, if
fny physical thing is identical to some pain, it is a
C-fiber stimulation. The Cartesian would deny the truth,
and even the possibility, of any such neurological theory of
pain." One Cartesian way of continuing the argument goes
10. In A Treatise 2f Human Nature, Book One, pt. IV,
sec. VI.
11. Descartes comes closest to making such an argument
in pt. I, sec. 61, of the Principles at AT VIIIA 30 when he
argues that motion is modally distinct from doubt. For this
reference and other assistance in understanding Descartes, I
am indebted to Paul Hoffman. In her paper "Cartesian
Dualism" (in Michael Hooker, ed., Descartes; Critical and
Interpretive Essays. Baltimore, 1978), Margaret Wilson
suggests caution, on the basis of Descartes's Sixth
Meditation argument that the faculty of sensation does not
belong to his essence and on the basis of several more
obscure passages, in "attributing to him the view that we
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as follows. Assume that (A) and (B) are true.
(A) I am having pain at time L.
(B) I am having C-fiber stimulation at t.
With (1'), slightly modified from (1), as one premise and
the mental-token counterpart to (2) I label (2') as another,
this argument derives the counterpart to (4) which I label
(4').
Descartes's Argument, First Modification
(1') If I can conceive clearly and distinctly of a and
B that they are complete things existing apart
from each other, then a and B are two distinct
things.
(2') I can conceive clearly and distinctly of the
existing of my pain at t apart from my C-fiber
stimulation at t.
Ergo, (4') my pain at t is distinct from my C-fiber
stimulation at t.
can clearly and distinctly conceive our sensations apart
from any physical state or occurrence" (pp. 207-210). Apart
from what I say in the text, however, such caution seems
unwarranted; sensations are non-essential to Descartes, but
so is any other particular LQ of thought. The attribute
of thought is essential to Descartes, but no mode of that
attribute is. Wilson is right to assert that the argument
in Meditation Six "is not intended by Descartes to make any
claim that he can clearly and distinctly conceive his
sensations ... independently of anything physical" but "is
concerned only with the isolation of Descartes's essence as
a thinking thing" (p. 208; italics in original). Yet
neither assertion contradicts my view that Descartes is
committed to the belief that sensations--as modes, or
instances of modes, of Descartes's essential attribute--are,
notwithstanding their own non-essential character, distinct
from his body.
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I will provisionally call (4') the Non-Identity Thesis.
(I will make a slight alteration in the next section.) As a
first approximation, it is fair to think of Descartes's
argument for the Non-Identity Thesis as intended, if sound,
to undermine any sense we have that the world is a wholly
material world. I mean by that a world consisting entirely
of things and stuff that occupy space, of fields of force
that operate through space, and of the objective properties
intrinsic to being something that occupies space or operates
through it. In our own cases, in particular, it is intended
to contradict whatever sense we have--through science,
philosophy or naive common sense--that all explanations of
our mental lives and behaviors are about the workings of
physical parts of our bodies and of the fields of force
passing through them. If the Non-Identity Thesis is true,
not just some specific identifiable physical process fails
to be the process of pain but all actual physical processes
of the brain fail. The term to the right of the identity
sign, by stipulation, names the actual physical process--
whichever one it happens to be--picked out by the true
neurological theory of pain, if there is one. I will use
the term materialism loosely to denote this sense of ours
that the world is wholly material.
I will use the term toQfken physicalism to denote the
view that every individual mental item, or every token of a
type of mental state or process, is identical to an
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individual physical item, or a token of a type of physical
state or process. Descartes's argument is inconsistent with
token physicalism. According to the argument, at least one
mental item, my pain at t, is not identical to any physical
item.
Now, consider two ways that Descartes's argument for
the Non-Identity Thesis could be true. These are two ways
in which premise (2'), that I could conceive clearly and
distinctly of the my pain at existing apart from my
C-fiber stimulation at t, could turn out to be true. The
two ways reflect two distinct Cartesian intuitions I
discussed in Chapter One.
If disembodiment can be conceived clearly and
distinctly and the conceivability principle is true, the
Cartesian reasons, then my pain at t could exist apart from
any body--and thus could exist without my body--and thus
cannot be identical to any physical feature of it. On the
other hand, if multiple realizability can be conceived
clearly and distinctly, then if the conceivability principle
is true my pain at t could once again exist apart from my
body. It could exist without the very body I now have or,
even if I might have this very body, without the
physico-chemical constitution this very body now has, and
thus cannot be identical to any actual physical feature of
it. This, then, is the outline of Descartes's argument.
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III. Caveats About Mental objects and Mental Events
Before I begin to assess the core intuitions underlying
Descartes's argument in the next section, I will modify my
representation of it one last time to sidestep a difficulty
with an assumption underlying this version of it. The
assumption is problematical, but it can be dispensed with
without jeopardy to the argument. Moreover, despite what
some philosophers have claimed, the offending assumption is
not even made by Descartes.
The assumption is that there are "mental
objects"--painful pains, itchy itches, red after-images, and
3o forth--with some of the same observed properties as
physical objects. Sometimes this complaint is made against
"sense data" or "mental particulars" or "phenomenal
individuals," but it can be made against mental parcels or
quantities as well--anything which is essentially mental and
instantiates or realizes observed properties. The complaint
against mental objects is that it is easily conceivable that
nothing mental has the properties they seem to. If my
seeing red requires there to be a red mental object for me
to see, there really must be something red in the universe.
But the fact that I see red does not seem to entail that
there is anything red in the universe, whether outside my
body or inside my nervous system. Brains, after all1, are
gray throughout.
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The materialist might then just concede this much of
the Non-Identity Thesis--that it there is anythina identical
to my pain at t then it is distinct from my C-fiber
stimulation at t. And the materialist might then deny, on
the basis of an argument parallel to the one against red
sense-data, that there is anything satisfying the referring
expression "my pain at t." The materialist could then go on
to assert that materialism requires something different,
event identities rather than object identities. On this
story, it requires only that my having of pain at t = my
having of C-fiber stimulation at t. Here, the materialist
argues that the previous situation does not arise: the event
of my seeing red is not itself red and thus does not have a
property, redness, which my brain may lack, but the event of
my having of pain still has all the properties, such as
hurting, that the event of my having C-fiber stimulation
has.
But the materialist's strategy is of limited utility.
The dualist can modify the argument to escape it. From what
I have said of Descartes's argument for the separability of
pains from the body, it is clear that Descartes did not even
share these problematic assumptions. There are no pains for
Descartes apart from being din p§ain or having 9ain, and there
are no red images apart from having , red image or seeing
red. Both having pain and seeing red for Descartes are
modes of the attribute of thought, an attribute of the soul.
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They are not substances or relations between substances.
Following Descartes in this respect, the dualist can adopt
the ontology of events, replacing references to mental
obiects with references to mental events. Thus, in the
previous statement of Descartes's argument, the
conceivability principle (1') can be replaced by (1"), in
which reference to things is replaced by reference to
events, and (2') and (4') can be replaced by (2") and (4")
in which reference to my pain at t is replaced by reference
to my having pain at t. From here on, it is this more
particular version of the conclusion that I will refer to as
the Non-Identity Thesis.
Descartes's Argument, Fkinal Modification
(1") If I can conceive clearly and distinctly of a and
B that they are two events existing apart from
each other, then a and B are two really distinct
events in this world.
(2") I can conceive clearly and distinctly of my having
pain at t apart from my having C-fiber stimulation
at t.
Ergo, (Non-Identity Thesis) my having pain at t = my
having C-fiber stimulation at t.
Although this argument is closer in spirit to
Descartes's views than the previous one, there is, however,
evidence that Descartes would not have endorsed it. Premise
(1), Descartes's conceivability principle, is true of
complete things--substances --which "depend on no other
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thing for [their] existence"n; 2 events would hardly seem to
be examples of substances or complete things for Descartes.
Thus, premise (1") is not a special case of (1') for
Descartes. I will henceforth make the very un-Cartesian
assumption (one perhaps more acceptible to Hume, who
believed minds to be simple bundles of loosely connected
perceptions) that (1") is true if (1') is true. Descartes
himself could probably have endorsed a slightly altered
version of the argument. By revising the antecedent of (1")
to read that I can conceive clearly and distinctly of fach
without the other, and by adding a new premise (3"), which
bears the same relation to (3) which (2") bears to (2), we
get an argument that should have been acceptible to
Descartes.
IV. Clear and Distinct Conceivability
Let us now return to the subject with which the chapter
began, the relation Descartes assumes to hold between
conceivability and possibility. Much skepticism has been
directed at conceivability principles like (1), (1') and
(1"), but some of it has been misdirected. In this section,
I will show how a version of Descartes's conceivability
principle can be defended against some of this skepticism.
As I showed above, there are critics of Descartes like
12. Principles, pt. 1, sec. 51, at AT VIIIA 24.
I
61
Hooker who have claimed that statements like (1), (1') and
(1") are derived on the basis of a fallacy--one of inferring
possibility from bare conceivability. The mere fact that I
can conceive that such-and-such is the case does not entail,
at least not in the general case, that it is PQssible that
such-and-such is the case. Descartes's contemporary Antoine
Arnauld was another such critic. Arnauld, for example,
argued that some people can conceive of right triangles
without the Pythagorean property of having the square on the
hypotenuse equal to the sum of the squares on the sides."3
But although they may be conceivable, it surely does not
follow that they are possible. In general any principle
claiming that true possibility follows from some nere
subjective sense of possibility is problematical at best.
Earlier, I cited textual evidence to support the view
that, whether or not Descartes is wrong about the relation
he claims to hold between conceivability and possibility, he
is not guilty of the fallacy of simply confusing the two
things. To see this better, consider Descartes's derivation
of the conceivability principle, premise (1").
13. In the Fourth Objections at AT VII 201-202.
Actually, the argument he criticizes has as a premise that
one conceives clearly and distinctly of a right triangle
while being uncertain over whether it has the Pythagorean
property, but Arnauld takes Descartes to believe this
entails that one conceives the right triangle without the
Pythagorean property.
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(1") If I can conceive clearly and distinctly of a and
B that they are two events existing apart from
each other, then a and B are two really distinct
events in this world.
There is considerable textual evidence that he would have
regarded it as coming logically from two further premises,
which I will label (lA") and (lB").
(lA") If I can conceive clearly and distinctly of a and
B that they are two events existing apart from
each other, then there is a possible world in
which a and B exist apart.
(lB") If there is a possible world in which a and B
exist apart from each other, then a and B are two
really distinct events in this world.
Recall Descartes's own words, supporting (1A"), from
Meditation VI:"` "[T]he fact that I can clearly and
distinctly understand one thing apart from another is enough
to make me certain that the two things are distinct, since
they are capable of being separated, at least by God.""15
In remarks supporting (iB"), Descartes explains in the
Principles (pt. I, sec. 60),1" that "things which God has
the power to separate, or to keep in being, separately, are
really distinct." But he adds in Meditation VI that God is
14. At AT VII 78.
15. I will differ from the Cottingham translation
however, in translating as "conceive" what is translated
there as "understand."
16. At AT VIIIA 29.
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unnecessary for the required separation: "The question of
what kind of power is required to bring about such a
separation does not affect the judgment that the two things
are distinct."'7
If Descartes is guilty of the fallacy of simply
confusing conceivability and possibility, it will thus show
up in premise (lA"). To show that he is not, I will
consider Descartes's use of the terms "conceive" and
"clearly and distinctly." The following account of his use
of them, admittedly short of a full explication, is still
enough, I believe, to discredit the fallacy objection.
To say that it is conceivably possible that unicorns
exist or that Santa Claus delivers toys or that an angle can
be trisected with compass and straightedge is not to say
that it is possible but, syncategorematically, that it is
conceivably so. All that is required is that it be
conceivably possible to someone. What the bottom limit on
conceivable possibility is, is hard to say. Presumably,
there is someone to whom it is conceivably possible that the
Pythagorean theorem is false, but it is unclear whether even
Descartes, in the deepest depths of his skepticism, ever
thought it conceivably possible that 2 + 3 p 5. (It may be
that he thought only that he could make errors in even the
17. This is Williams' interpretation of the sentence in
his Descartes, gp. it., pp. 106-107--with the further
result that the existence of God is not required for the
soundness of the Cartesian argument. I follow Williams also
in thinking Descartes congenial to this further result.
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simplest mathematical calculations). Let me suggest at
least this much: for a proposition to be conceivably
possible to someone either it must be true or there must be
a gap between understanding it and knowing whether it is
true.
There is a use for words like "conceive"--and for
related words like "imagine," "suppose," and so forth--that
is incompatible both with the way I will use them here and,
I believe, with the way they are used by Descartes. On this
use, a first-person assertion of conceivability can be
challenged. If I say, "I can conceive of water being
distinct from H20," somebody might reply to me, "You cannot.
You may think you can. But, in fact, whatever you are
conceiving of as distinct from H20 is not water."
Similarly, on this use of "conceive," an anti-Cartesian
could assert, "You cannot conceive at all, much less clearly
and distinctly, that your mind is separate from your body,
or that your pains are distinct from all your bodily states.
Whatever you are conceiving of as distinct from your body is
not your mind and whatever you are conceiving of as distinct
from your pains are not your bodily states, since your mind
and your pains are not distinct at all."
These challenges, however, can be forestalled by using
"conceive" in a different way--by having a "seemingly" built
into it. Clearly, the challenges above are not open to a
critic if I say, "I can seemingly conceive water distinct
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from H20," or, "I can seemingly conceive my mind distinct
from my body." Such first-person uses of "conceive" have a
degree of incorrigibility that make them immune from such
criticisms. I shall use the term "conceive" this way
throughout this essay.
Now, the Cartesian thinks that more is needed in order
to get real possibility. One needs clear and distinct
conceivability. For Descartes, a clear perception is one
"present and accessible to the attentive mind"; a distinct
perception is one "so sharply separated from all other
perceptions that it contains within itself only what is
clear."" One detects clear and distinct conceptions
simply by inspecting the contents of one's mind. But this
is not enough to show that these perceptions are clear and
distinct.
Bernard Williams has suggested paraphrasing the words
"clearly and distinctly" as "however carefully and
clear-headedly one considers the situation."" A
difficulty with Williams' suggestion is that a proposition
which is conceivable "clearly and distinctly" is not
conceivable "however carefully and clear-headedly one
considers the situation" if it is not conceivable at all
when one considers the situation with little care or
clear-headedness. Descartes writes that he can conceive
18. At VIIIA 22.
19. Williams, gp. Lit., p. 112.
66
clearly and distinctly of existing without a body, but it
does not follow that he can conceive of existing without a
body when he considers the situation carelessly."
My own suggested paraphrases for the words "clearly and
distinctly" are "with no humanly possible means of
explaining away as an illusion ...," or simply "without
humanly explainable illusion." According to Descartes's
argument understood this way, possibility follows from
conceivability if the conception cannot humanly be explained
away as an illusion. Descartes's conjecture is that in the
case of every one of a particular class of conceivings--that
is, conceivings that particular mental items are distinct
from particular physical items--the conceiving of something
entails its possibility, since the conceiving cannot be
identified as an illusion in these cases. This is enough to
guarantee real possibility because God can bring into being
anything conceived clearly and distinctly. Otherwise, he
would have been a deceiver for creating us in such a way as
20. In Demons, Dreamers. a Madmen (Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill, 1970), p. 135, Harry Frankfurt, suggests the
paraphrase "without reasonable grounds for doubting"; a
clear and distinct perception that p is a perception without
reasonable grounds for doubting that p. I can see two
difficulties with this paraphrase. First, for Descartes,
there are grounds for doubting even perceptions that are
clear and distinct, removed in the Third Meditation only by
the proof of a benevolent, nondeceiving God. Might they not
be reasonable before the proof? Second, what if there is a
paradox, as I claim there is, in thinking about the mind-
body problem? In that case, there might be reasonable
grounds from the materialist side for doubting dualism even
though the case for dualism was clear and distinct. The
possibility of paradox cannot be defined out of existence.
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to be misled by such apparent possibilities.
There are many cases in which I can conceive that such-
and-such is so even though it is not so, sometimes even
though it is not even possible for it to be so. The
Cartesian would argue, however, that in the psychophysical
case it is not possible to explain away such conceptions as
false conceptions: that it is not possible to appeal to any
kind of illusion to explain away the Cartesian intuitions
that mental states are distinct from physical states. The
distinction, then, between merely conceiving and conceiving
Qlearly and distinctly is a distinction for the Cartesian
between a pre-reflective, merely subjective state and an
intuition subjected to exhaustive critical assessment.
Contrary to the objectors, only states that measure up to
this high standard of assessment are taken to deliver true
possibility. Even if there be doubts whether all instances
of the conceivability-to-possibility principle (IA") are
true, such doubts are distinct from the more mundane doubt
about conceivability and possibility I began with.
How is this standard applied? Descartes believed that
it was humanly impossible to explain his Cartesian
intuitions away as illusions, but he did not need to
establish this by eliminating ways he might go wrong one by
one. That might be endless. He thought he could give an
independent argument for his intuitions, one that already
appeared conclusive on its face.
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Descartes argued that there were two ways of obtaining
a clear and distinct conception. One was through knowledge
of all of a thing's properties. Knowledge so complete,
however, is rare. The other way relied not on complete
knowledge but rather on knowledge of a complete thing. By
this, you will recall, he means something needing nothing
else beyond itself to exist. According to Descartes, minds
and bodies are complete things. Descartes had a clear and
distinct conception of himself, he argued, because he had a
sufficient conception of himself as a thinking thing to
consider himself a complete thing, and thus of something
which needs nothing else to exist, even though he did not
have complete knowledge of himself. It was not part of that
conception that he was bodily although he had a separate
conception of his body as a complete thing that itself
needed nothing else to exist, such as a mind.21
One kind of mistake in interpretating Descartes's
argument results, then, from failure to see that it uses a
two-tier conceivability principlo. On Descartes's model,
one must establish two prior things in order to establish
that a conception rises to real possibility. At the first
ti&r, one must produce a seemingly conclusive argument that
it is a real possibility, one independent of the inability
to explain anything away. Descartes writes of perception
here: we might interpret him to mean that there must be a
21. Objections and Re~lies, AT VII 200-202, 220-225.
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perceptual relation to the conception's logical
relationships." The model is mathematics, where we are
supposed to proceed deductively from axioms that we just
seem o see the truth of. Although I will not ascribe to
this aspect of his epistemology, I will sometimes use
perception as a metaphor in connection with this first
condition. Not until the second tigr do we find that the
conception must be humanly unable to be explained away as a
false conception of possibility. It must be clea2 and
distinct. On Descartes's account, the first condition
entails the second, but it is satisfied independently of the
second. The entailment is not a tautology. Someone might
take there to be a conclusive argument that something
conceivable is a real possibility, while rejecting the
second condition.
Here, then, is Descartes's two-tier model of how a mere
dualist conception rises to the level of real ',ossibility.
Descartes's Model
To establish a dualist conception as a genuine
possibility one must establish that:
(Tier One) it is justified by a seemingly
conclusive argument grounded in
perceptions of logical relationships;
and
(Tier Two) it is humanly impossible to explain
away as an illusion.
22. Here I follow Frankfurt, pO. cit., p. 133.
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Contrast this with Fig. 2, which summarizes
interpretations of the Cartesian conceivability principle
which I discuss in this chapter and the next.
Without a Second With a Second
Tier of Scrutiny Tier of Scrutiny
Bare Hooker Lycan
Conceivability Hill Dennett2"
Intuition of Levine Kripke
Possibility McGinn?
Seeming Perception Williams Descartes
of Possibility McGinn?
Fig. 2 Accounts of What It Is the Cartesian Believes to
Guarantee Possibility
Hooker is, of course, correct that bare conceivability
does not guarantee real possibility, but Cartesians do not
necessarily believe it does."' Joseph Levine is correct
that mere intuitions of possibility do not guarantee real
possibility, but here again, no Cartesian, including Saul
23. See Daniel Dennett, Consciousness Explained
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1991), p. 282. Dennett seems to
take Descartes's conceivability to be bare imaginability.
Although he mentions that it must be clear and distinct to
guarantee possibility, Dennett construes this only as a
vaguely "higher standard": "The force of such an argument
[as Descartes's] depends critically on how high one's
standards of conception are." Dennett is underestimating
Descartes here; the lesson of Goldbach's conjecture is that
it does not matter what you add if the first tier that of
bare imaginability, since one may be able to imagine it both
true and false even after explaining away all illusions.
24. See also Hill, gp. cit.
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Kripke, the target of his criticism, has claimed
otherwise,2"
V. A Dilemma for Descartes: Two Cartesian Views
I shall now argue that even when those mistakes have
been eliminated the Cartesian faces the dilemma of choosing
between two approaches to the conceivability principle that
initially appear to have difficulties of their own.
Descartes is not guilty of confusing conceivability
with real possibility. But it is a further matter, and
quite a different one, whether the conceivability principle
he employs is true. Recall the Cartesian hypothesis I set
out earlier, which I now will dub Descartes's Conjecture and
label as (DC).
(DC) If I can conceive clearly and distinctly (and thus
without any humanly possible means to explain away
as an illusion) of a particular mental event a and
a particular physical event B that they exist
apart, then it is possible that they do.
How should a Cartesian construe the clear and distinct
conceivability which (DC) requires of real possibilities?
25. Levine, Qp. cit., p. 356: "For what seems
intuitively to be the case is, if anything, merely an
epistemological matter. Since epistemological possibility is
not sufficient for metaphysical possibility, the fact that
what is intuitively contingent [like the statement that pain
is the firing of C-fibers] turns out to be metaphysically
necessary should not bother us terribly."
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Consider two options. The difference between the two
options is in how much work there would be for each of the
two tiers of scrutiny to do. The first otion is
Descartes's. It is to let most of the work of the overall
dualist argument be done by the "perceptions" of logical
relationships and the deductive inferences that follow; the
second tier comes in only to guarantee we cannot go wrong
(because of God's goodness) in reasoning that cannot be
explained away.26 The second option is different. It
lacks faith in conclusive arguments for dualism. Thus, it
treats Descartes's evidence as mere intuitions and puts most
of the work of discovering whether they represent a genuine
possibility on determining whether we can explain them away.
The Cartesian faces a serious dilemma at this point.
These seem to be the only two options for a supporter of the
26. See Williams, op. cit., pp. 106-108; for a recent
critique of Williams on these and related matters concerning
the ultimate basis of Cartesian principles and the problem
of the Cartesian circle, see Georges Dicker, Descartes: af
Analytical and Historical Introduction (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1993), pp. 130-133. Williams writes that
"the basic content" of Descartes's dualist position is given
"at the subjective level": by what he conceives. Its being
clear and distinct only guarantees objective truth by God's
goodness. Keep in mind, however, that one can be Cartesian
about mind and body without believing in God. For nontheist
Cartesians, who do not have the general rule linking clear
and distinct conception with objective truth, the link must
be made piecemeal, on a case-by-case basis. This would make
it imaginable that dualist "perceptions" might be wrong even
if other "perceptions" were correct about the external
world. This would leave a larger gap between "perception"
and real possibility than Williams seems to allow but still
a smaller one than that between mere intuition and real
possibility.
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Cartesian form of argument. But the second option appears
to depend on a conceivability-to-possibility principle that
is still unconvincing. And taking the first oQtion,
requiring the dualist conception to be grounded in
perceptions of logical relationships, may seem impossible to
satisfy. Let me say why.
If one takes the second option, one in effect construes
(DC) as asserting that intuitions of possibility not humanly
explainable as illusions guarantee real possibility. (DC)
will then be unconvincing. Nothing will appear inevitable
about (DC). Consider Goldbach's conjecture that every even
number greater than two is the sum of two primes. It is
easy to imagine a mathematician developing conflicting
intuitions about the conjecture's truth value. It is at
least imaginable that these could turn out to be impossible
to disspell as illusions. The conjecture's truth value is
currently unknown. Say that it turns out to be undecidable.
But whichever truth value it has is the only one possible
for it. There is thus no general guarantee that intuitions
of possibility not explainable as illusions are true. It is
hard to see why the special case of (DC) would be immune
from this problem of conflicting intuitions.
On the other hand, if the "perception" option is
chosen, the Cartesian has to provide a story about what it
is that gives it orima facie plausibility independently at
the absence of humanly identifiable illusion. Why believe
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we perceive dualism true--or could deduce it from what we do
perceive? It is fair to say that no c(artesian has yet
managed to give a widely convincing story.
It seems to me that writers that might be broadly
described as "Cartesian" fall into two camps, according to
what they would say about this dilemma. There are those
like Descartes who would continue to adopt the latter
option, of construing Cartesian intuitions as perception-
like. This camp is made up of those whom I labeled in the
last chapter orthodox Cartesians.
Members of the second camp would select the other
option for understanding (DC), that Cartesian intuitions are
just intuitions, but with a caveat. The problem associated
with that interpretation--that (DC) remains unconvincing--
does not arise, because they do not endorse (DC). Instead,
they remain noncommittal about (DC). Still, while making no
claims of knowledge for (DC), they hold that the intuitions
of possibility distinguishing the mental from the physical,
namely the Cartesian intuitions of disembodiment and of
multiple physical compossibility, have not yet been shown to
be illusions. And they hold that until materialism shows
this, it cannot be established as true. The members of this
second camp are among those I labeled in the last chapter as
agnostics.
Agnostics of this sort share with orthodox Cartesians
both a commitment to mental realism and a belief that
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Cartesian modal intuitions, because of which mental realism
is irreconcilable with materialism, cannot currently be
explained away as illusions. They differ in one important
respect: the orthodox Cartesian does, and the agnostic does
not, believe that it followp from an inability to dismiss
the Cartesian intuitions that we know they are true, and
thus that we know (DC) is true.
It may seem that in giving up (DC), the agnostic has
given up the spirit of Cartesianism. But that assessment is
premature. The heart of Cartesianism has always been to
state clearly and persuasively the dissatisfaction that
common sense has with materialism on the basis of intuitions
of contingency between the mental and the physical and to
force materialism to explain that dissatisfaction away. The
agnostic believes that, whether or not one accepts
Descartes's Conjecture, it is still possible to put
materialism on the defensive in this way.
Whether the agnostic's belief about putting materialism
on the defensive is right, however, is another matter. It
is not. In what follows I shall argue that orthodoxy,
despite serious flaws, is a sounder direction to take.
CHAPTER THREE AGNOSTICISM AND ORTHODOXY
The Cartesian's problem is to set out a convincing way
to link conceivability which is clear and distinct--which is
humanly inpossible to explain away--with real possibility.
The Cartesian's dilemma is that there is no obvious way to
do this. Does the Cartesian have an independent argument
for dualism that, as a matter of fact, cannot be humanly
explained away as an illusion? Or does the Cartesian
argument depend entirely on a conception's inability to
explain away? It is unclear how to do the first; nobody has
yet provided a widely accepted independent argument for
dualism. But the second is equally daunting; there are
obvious counterexamples to conceivability principles, and
there is little reason to think that Descartes's fares
better.
In order to include both approaches, I will call an
argument about the relation of the mental to the physical a
Cartesian argument if it has the form of Descartes's
Argument or conforms to the agnostic alternative mentioned
at the end of the last chapter. A Cartesian argument thus
has one of two profiles. It may (a) endorse Descartes's
Conjecture, (DC), (b) entail that the Cartesian's modal
intuitions of disembodiment and multiple compossibility are
irrefutable, and (c) entail that (a) and (b) are together
incompatible with token physicalism. Or it may simply
require materialism to show that no sound argument can
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satisfy (a), (b) and (c), and find materialism wanting.
Cartesian arguments are thus modal arguments, appealing
crucially to intuitions about what is necessary or possible
about the mental or the physical or the correlation between
them. By my definition, there are Cartesian arguments not
Descartes's.
Kripke's anti-materialist argument is one. I interpret
Kripke as taking something like the agnostic response to the
Cartesian's dilemma. However, although Kripke explicitly
disavows Cartesianism, he does not explicitly endorse the
agnostic alternative. Still, the view he sets out falls
under that label or else is a close cousin to views that do.
Unlike Descartes, Kripke does not endorse anything like the
Non-Identity Thesis, the conclusion contradicting token
physicalism. Instead, he concludes only that the familiar
ways of explaining away the intuitions supporting it are
unavailable. But this, he suggests, is enough to put
materialism on the defensive.
In this chapter, I will compare Descartes's and
Kripke's arglaents for the premises supporting the Non-
Identity Thesis. In the first four sections I focus on the
Kripkean approach. In section IV I show that the Kripkean
position does not meet the burden of proof against
materialism required of it. I argue that despite a
misreading of Kripke, Colin McGinn's complaints against his
argument demonstrate its failure to meet its burden of
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proof. McGinn's attempt to make similar criticisms of
Descartes fails, but I go on in section V to make arguments
which do defeat the orthodox Cartesian position. Still, I
conclude by suggesting that the neo-Cartesian line of
thought that I develop in Chapter Four and Chapter Five
evolves naturally out of the orthodox Cartesian's view that
we have conclusive arguments for psychophysical differences.
I. Kripke's Main Idea
Recall again Descartes's Conjecture.
Descartes's Conjecture
(DC) If I can without humanly explainable illusion
conceive of a particular mental event a and a
particular physical event 8 that they exist apart,
then it is possible that they do.
Except for the caveat noted above regarding mental events,
Descartes would have endorsed (DC), as well as the following
more general principle that ranges over everything, not just
events.
The General Principle
If I can conceive clearly and distinctly of a and B
that they exist apart from each other, then there is a
possible world in which they exist apart.
Recall that he would have done both on the basis of a more
general conviction. Since our mathematical reasoning and
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much of our metaphysical reasoning seems to be "perception-
like" and without any grounds for doubt, then if that were
not enough to guarantee truth, God, our creator, would be
guilty of deception, something which moral perfection does
not permit.
Unlike Descartes, Kripke nowhere endorses anything like
(DC) or the more general principle. Thus, there is no
reliance in his argument on God's existence or deceptions.
General views about the relation between indubitability and
truth, or that between conceivability and truth, play no
role. Neither does he take our intuitions about mind and
body to be "perception-like." He grabs the agnostic horn of
the dilemma described at the start of the chapter: he takes
our Cartesian intuitions of possibility to be no more than
intuitions, but places the onus on the materialist to show
why they do not reflect real possibilities. He makes his
task easier by restricting the scope of discussion in two
ways. First, he focuses on cases relevant to assessing
token physicalism--to cases of mental things and physical
things--rather than to produce a general account of
conceivability. Second, he provides explanations in related
cases for why intuitions of possibility would be mere
illusions and shows that these explanations do not apply to
the psychophysical case, but he is content to do this with
just several cases and only one type of explanation.
One would have reasonable grounds for doubting the
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possibility of a seemingly imaginable nonidentity of events,
according to Kripke's now familiar story, if one could find
what Kripke calls an "illusion of contingency,"' one
arising from our picking out instances of the events by
contingent properties of them. If, for some class of
events, identifiable illusions of contingency such as this
exhaust the reasonable grounds for doubt, then something
analogous to a "clear and distinct" conception of
distinctness between events of this class would be one which
excludes such illusions of contingency.
Kripke's argument is that a familiar way we might go
wrong in thinking about theoretical identification is not
available to discredit our intuitions that mental states are
distinct from physical states. Consider the identity
statement "heat = mean kinetic energy." It might seem that
it might have turned out false but Kripke argues this to be
an "illusion of contingency." The reference of "heat" can
be fixed by descriptions of the form "that which causes such
and such sensations" or "that which we sense in such and
such a way," descriptions referring to the sensations or to
the way of sensing which we normally associate with being
made to feel hot. These descriptions express contingent
properties of heat, since we could be constructed
differently and feel something quite different, or nothing
1. Saul Kripke, "Identity and Necessity," in Milton
Munitz, ed., Identity and Individuation (New York: New York
University Press, 1971), pp. 160ff.
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at all, in the presence of what normally here and now does
make us experience heat sensations. Thus, in seeming to be
able to imagine "heat = mean kinetic energy" false, we
imagine not heat to be distinct from mean kinetic energy but
something else, which happens to be picked out the way we
normally pick out heat.
By contrast, there is no such illusion of contingency,
we are told, surrounding our seeming ability to imagine "my
having pain at t = my having C-fiber stimulation at t"
false. The reference of "my having pain at t" is fixed by
way not of contingent properties but of essential
properties. Heat could fail to feel warm, were we built
differently, but having pain, Kripke argues, could not fail
to feel the wa it does.
Kripke elaborates the argument with considerations
reminiscent of Descartes's thought experiment in Meditation
One. Just as Descartes does, Kripke asks the reader to
compare the actual world to an epistemically similar one.
How can the necessity which the physicalist attaches to
"pain = C-fiber stimulation," Kripke asks, "be reconciled
with the apparent fact that C-fiber stimulation might have
turned out not to be correlated with pain at all?" What if
we reply by analogy to the case of heat's identity with mean
kinetic energy? In that case, there might be beings who are
in a qualitatively similar epistemic situation to what we
are, picking out something the way we pick out heat, by the
82
way it feels, even though it's not heat and even though heat
is mean kinetic energy. But we cannot by that analogy
reconcile the physicalist's psychophysical necessity claim
with the contrary way things seem to be. For if we were in
a similar epistemic situation, picking out something the way
we pick out pain, it would be pain; and if there were C-
fiber stimulation without pain, that would contradict the
necessity claim. Either way, there is no reconciliation.
Kripke's point is to put materialism on the defensive.
Someone who wishes to maintain an identity thesis
cannot simply accept the Cartesian intuition[s].... He
must explain these intuitions away, showing how they
are illusory.... Materialism, I think, must hold that
a physical description of the world is a complete
description of it, that any mental facts are
"ontologically dependent" on physical facts in the
straightforward sense of following from them by
necessity. No identity theorist seems to me to have
made a convincing argument against the intuitive view
that this is not the case.2
Materialists cannot establish the materialist position,
according to Kripke, until they show how the Cartesian
intuitions of contingency between the mental and the
physical are illusions.
155.
2. Kripke, Naming and Necessity, gp. cit., pp. 148,
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II. Lycan's Misrepresentation of Kripke's Conceivability
Premise
I want now to compare a commentator's account of
Kripke's argument with Kripke's own account. The comparison
will help shed light on some of the subtle features of
Kripke's proposals.
I shall assume that for all substitutions of singular
terms for placeholders "A" and 'y"-, X is distinguishable from
y" is true if and only if it is seemingly imaginable that
there is a possible world W at which "X o yV is true.
Distinguishability of this sort is a kind of bare
conceivability.
Now consider the following schema; if it were to yield
true statements for all substitutions of rigid singular
terms for placeholders "-' and "h', (DC) would easily follow.
(D) If n and k are distinguishable, then it is
possible that a A k, unless:
(i) someone could be, qualitatively speaking, in
the same epistemic situation as the one I now
am in ir-a-vis a and , and still in such a
situation a qualitatively analogous statement
to the statement that A and k are identical
could be false, or
(ii) there exists some third alternative
explanation of the distinguishability of a
and k.
Principle (D), with several modifications, appears as a
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conceivability premise in William Lycan's reconstruction of
Kripke's argument.3 Even with these modifications that
correct for some obvious defects and obscurities in Lycan's
account of Kripke's argument, (D) is defective. I will
begin with two arguments that show that it does not
represent Kripke's position on how to explain away
intuitions of psychophysical contingency as illusions.
After presenting and defending them, I will present a
modified version of (D) which escapes these arguments.
The first difficulty is that substituting "my pain" and
"my C-fiber stimulation" for -"' and "'t yields, for the
Cartesian, a true version of clause (i)--allegedly Kripke's
account of how illusions of contingency might arise. It is
true for the Cartesian since in an epistemic situation
qualitatively the same as the one I am .ow in, a
qualitatively analogous statement t- the statement "my pain
= my C-fiber stimulation," the Cartesian thinks, could be
false. In fact, on the Cartesian view it is false. For the
analogue to "my pain" picks out the same thing "my pain"
does in the present situation, and that is a different thing
for the Cartesian from what the analogue to "my C-fiber
stimulation" picks out, whatever that is. Since (i) is
3. See his "Kripke and the Materialists," Journal at
Philosophy 71 (1974), pp. 679; and his Consciousness, QP.
gAit., pp. 11-12. I take "unless" to pick out exclusive
disjunction, although Lycan is not explicit about this
himself. Lycan also fails to restrict (D) to rigid singular
terms, but without doing so, the principle's clause (i)
fails to be true solely of illusions of contingency.
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regarded as true, the distinguishability of my pain and my
C-fiber stimulation has to regarded as an illusion of
contingency. But this, for Kripke's Cartesian, is a
paradigm of conceivability entailing possibility, not an
exception.
A second difficulty with (D) is that there actually £&
an illusion of contingency surrounding pain and C-fiber
stimulation, one that would make it impossible to derive
from (D) the possibility that pain o C-fiber stimulation.
The illusion arises not around my sensing of pains but
around my sensing of C-fiber stimulations. Analogously to
the case of heat, there is a situation qualitatively
identical to the present one in which a qualitative analogue
of my C-fiber stimulation is not C-fiber stimulation at all.
Suppose it is A-fiber stimulation, involving not neurons but
shneurons, appearing the same as neurons but with very
different microstructures. But there would be an illusion
of contingency, (i) would be true and it would be impossible
once again to derive the distinctness of pain and C-fiber
stimulation.
To overcome these difficulties, (D) must be revised.
To alleviate the first difficulty, the condition for being
an illusion of contingency must be revised so that the
qualitatively identical epistemic situation being compared
to the present one is a situation lackina the states at
issue--for example, pain or heat. The point to be made
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about pain is that, for Kripke, there is no epistemic
situation qualitatively identical to the present one which
lacks pain.' To alleviate the second difficulty, the
singular terms must be considered one at a time. Illusions
of contingency can arise in connection to each. We have an
illusion of contingency like the one we find in the case of
heat and mean kinetic energy, the case of illusion which
Kripke and Lycan intended to describe, only if the
references of both singular terms are fixed on the basis of
descriptions that pick out a referent by contingent
properties of it.
Thus, I propose the schema (D') as what Lycan meant by
his (D). Principle (D') incorporates both revisions in the
statement of the illusion-of-contingency clause, (i).
4. Lycan apparently intends that the second conjunct of
(i), the illusion-of-contingency clause--namely, that "in
such a situation a qualitatively analogous statement" to the
identity statement "could be false"--takes care of this
matter. It does in the case of heat; it does not, because
of the argument in the text, in the case of pain. The
conjunct can thus be dropped in this revision.
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(D') If a and are distinguishable, then it is
possible that A o k, unless:
(i) there is an aL and there is a kL, such that:
(a) someone could be, qualitatively speaking,
in the same epistemic situation "M-na-yi
ai and , where a n • as the one I now
am in Mis-A-Yi a and hk, A4
(b) someone could be, qualitatively speaking,
in the same epistemic situation Yi-'-mYia
A and b', where h b'f, as the one I now
am in yiý-A-i a and t, 9r
(ii) there exists some third alternative
explanation of the distinguishability of A
and 2.
According to (D'), the possibility that heat o mean kinetic
5. Some considerations suggest that clause (i) of (D')
needs a further conjunct, which I will call clause (c).
Intuitions of contingency between A and B would be explained
as illusions by clause (i) only if (i) included the
condition that (c) there is an epistemic situation which is
identical, qualitatively speaking, to an epistemic situation
xi--vis A and k and in which a qualitatively analogous
statement to the statement that A and 1 are identical could
be true. Clause (c) is not required for the truth of my
(D'), but without (c), principle (D') would have odd result
which Lycan's (D) already has, that the nonidentity of, say,
molecular motion and C-fiber stimulation would not follow
from their distinguishability. There are many examples of
this odd result. The same could be said of heat and color,
heat and water, water and color. But in at least some of
these cases nonidentity seems to follow from
distinguishability. Moreover, without (c), a way Lycan
writes of his version of (D) is flawed and the way I write
of (D) and my (D') would be flawed: instances of clause (i)
in (D) or in (D'), without (c), would not always constitute
"explanations of distinguishability" or "explanations of
illusions of contingency" when (i) was satisfied, since in
the cases of molecular motion and C-fiber stimulation and of
water and color, clauses (a) and (b) of (i) are satisfied
but there are no illusions to explain.
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energy does not follow from their distinguishability,
Someone could be, qualitatively speaking, in the same
epistemic situation M~i-i-vis some thing heat* 0 heat, as we
are in Ia-a-visa heat, and also in the same epistemic
situation yjM-n-yji some thing mean kinetic energy* o mean
kinetic energy, as we are in yis-a-vis mean kinetic energy.
There is thus in that case the possibility of an illusion of
contingency. We must look at the distinctness of both
epistemic counterparts6 heat* and mean kinetic energy* from
their real-life counterparts as (D') requires (deriving an
illusion of contingency by satisfying both subclauses (a)
and (b) of clause (i)) in order to distinguish this from the
case of pain and C-fiber stimulation. Here, there would be
only one epistemic counterpart, C-fiber stimulation*,
distinct from its real-life counterpart. In contrast to
Lycan's (D), my (D') entails that the possibility of pain's
being distinct from C-fiber stimulation follows from their
distinguishability, unless there is an alternative
explanation of it besides the one in clause (i). It is not
possible in the case of pain, in contrast to C-fiber
stimulation, that someone could be, qualitatively speaking,
in the same epistemic situation yis-A-yji something distinct
6. Here I am using the term coined by Colin McGinn in
his "Anomalous Monism and Kripke's Cartesian Intuitions,"
Analysis 37, no. 2 (1977), p. 78, where X is an epistemic
counterpart to A iff, X is "some entity distinct from a
which is such that it puts us in qualitatively the same
epistemic state as a does in the actual world" (McGinn's
emphasis).
89
from pain, some hypothetical state pain*, as we are in
yi-j-visj pain. There is no pain* o pain.
III. Kripke and Descartes's Conjecture
Let us suppose that clause (i) of my (D') is an
accurate explanation of at least some illusions of
contingency: that all seeming possibilities which (i) is
true of are illusions of contingency. Let's also assume
that Descartes's Conjecture follows from my (D') by some
simple additional principles.' Would my (D') then be
true--and, thus, should Kripke endorse it? Does the real
possibility that two things are distinct follow from their
conceivable distinctness when there are no humanly possible
explanations that the conception is illusory?
Lycan does not challenge his principle (D), and I claim
that my (D') improves on (D). But both these principles
have difficulties that I have already discussed, Statement
(D'), and like it Descartes's Conjecture, would follow from
a more general conceivability principle: that every
conception that some particular object or event or
proposition is possible is the conception of a real
possibility unless it can be explained away as a false
conception. This general principle would be to possibility
7. Such as that (D')'s clauses (i) and (ii) exhaust the
ways of humanly explaining away as an illusion the
distinguishability of two events.
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just the reverse of what Occam's Razor is to actuality: the
former would multiply the possibilities it is rational to
posit, while the latter constrains the pieces of actuality
it is rational to posit. We surely do not know this general
principle to be true, for reasons already stated. I can
conceive certain unproven mathematical statements both to be
true and to be false. But since there will be among them
statements with unprovable truth values, where neither the
statements nor their negations can be explained away, it
would follow, if the general principle were true, that these
statements would be both true and false, which is absurd.
Or assume that some scientific proposition about
physical possibility received immunity from reasonable
grounds for doubt as the result of some ideal scientific
theory, a theory which turned out to be the best one humanly
possible. On that basis, we might claim a clear and
distinct conception of the possibility of some specific
instance of the general proposition. If this is not enough
to guarantee true possibility, it might seem that nothing
is. But it seems conceivable that even the best human
science might get it wrong. It seems entirely possible that
the human mind is constructed in such a way that there are
intuitions of possibility which are illusory but which are
also humanly impossible to explain away. For example, are
there faster-than-light velocities in a vacuum? We seem to
be able to tell a story, according to some physicists, by
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which there are such velocities, consistent with the known
laws of physics. Does it follow that there really are such
velocities? It seems entirely conceivable that even though
it would be humanly impossible for us to explain away the
conceivability of such velocities there might no possible
worlds in which such velocities occur.
Does it help to narrow the question from that of
whether the general principle is true to that of whether
Descartes's Conjecture itself is true? It may seem, at
least initially, that it does not. It may aem that while
mental events seem to be distinct from physical events,
perhaps we are just wrong about this. And it surely would
not seem to follow in any obvious way just from our being
wrong about this that there are humanly possible
explanations of why we are wrong. Kripke's argument asserts
that the means we employ in explaining away the illusion
that heat is distinct from mean kinetic energy are
unavailable in the case of psychophysical intuitions because
of differences in our modal intuitions about heat and (for
example) pain. Although we can imagine feeling hot in the
absence of heat, we seem unable to imagine feeling pain in
the absence of pain. But we might come to wonder whether we
have a good enough command of such modal intuitions to make
such judgments. Perhaps, we might think, the human mind is
not constituted in such a way for us to know much about the
modal properties of pain. Or perhaps we are constructed in
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such a way that, even after making every possible relevant
consideration, we have firm convictions about the modal
properties of our qualitative states which are just wrong.
What can be said against such skeptical doubts?
Before continuing, I will distinguish two kinds of
doubts one might have about principles like (DC). On the
one hand, there are the doubts we have in cases like those
of faster-than-light velocities, cases where we may merely
seem unable to rule out some epistemic possibility. Here,
it is reasonable to think that conceivability does not
entail possibility. On the other hand, let us distinguish
doubts about those cases from doubts in cases of a very
different sort, cases where we seem to be able conclusively
to assert the reality of the possibility. For Descartes,
this latter one is the case we are presented with by the
Cartesian argument. To the orthodox Cartesian, it seems
that there is a conclusive argument for the distinctness of
mental and physical events, based on the reasoning that we
human beings have essential properties no physical bodies
could have. This reasoning for the orthodox Cartesian is in
a sense just as conclusive as the reasoning that convinces
us that 2 + 3 = 5, since both forms of reasoning deliver
clear and distinct ideas.
Thus, the orthodox Cartesian views agnosticism about
the distinctness of mind and body as just as extreme a
position as a corresponding kind of agnosticism about the
93
proposition that 2 + 3 = 5. As I said earlier, Descartes
believes that proof of a benevolent God is required to
forestall these kinds of agnosticism, but that is only
because they are so extreme. Processes of nondivine
creation or creation by a malevolent God could conceivably
make us go wrong even in our clear and distinct ideas, he
argues, and only belief in a benevolent God could fend off
skeptical sources as extreme as this. However, although an
extreme position, it is one a God-less Descartes would be
forced himself to assume.
Contrast this case with that of faster-than-light
velocities. Agnosticism here does not seem so extreme. It
may seem strange to think that we could go wrong in even an
ideal science about an undemonstrated-but-not-ruled-out
theoretical possibility. But neither is so strange as to
think that we could seem to have conclusively demonstrated
something but still go wrong, something as firm as the
proposition that 2 + 3 = 5.
Whether the orthodox Cartesian is right to have this
view is the subject of the next section. But this view is
different, as I have said, from Kripke's. What is Kripke's
view? Does Kripke accept or reject Descartes's Conjecture?
I see no evidence in Kripke's published writings of the
commitment to Descartes's Conjecture which Lycan reads into
them. Certainly the arguments about mind and body in Naming
and Necessity do not depend on either. Nowhere does Kripke
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state that he has ever identified all the possible illusions
of contingency that could lead a conception of possibility
astray of real possibility or that we could ever hope to
identify them all. Nor does he state that if he had
identified them all and it in some particular case none of
them obtained then real possibility would be guaranteed. At
least in his published works, he remains noncommittal.
Instead, Kripke's position is simply that it seems that
pains can exist without any brain states and brain states
can exist without any pains. This is the Cartesian
intuition--it is something, Kripke claims, which is
intuitively the case. And materialism, you will recall,
must explain the intuition away. As Kripke writes:
Someone who wishes to maintain an identity thesis
cannot simply accept the Cartesian intuition.... He
must explain these intuitions [sic] away, showing how
they are illusory. This task may not be impossible....
The task, however, is obviously not child's play....
One reason it is not child's play is the argument reviewed
in the previous two sections: that the way of showing our
intuitions of distinctness between heat and mean kinetic
energy to be illusory is unavailable to discredit the
Cartesian intuition.
Thus, the threat is not necessarily that unexplainable
distinguishability would guarantee dualism by some
8. Kripke, gp. cit., p. 148.
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conceivability principle like Descartes's Conjecture, since
Kripke never endorses such a principle, nor even that that
would give a strong reason to believe dualism.' The threat
to materialism for Kripke is that a necessary condition of
establishing materialism is to provide an explanation of how
the modal intuition cited above is an illusion. For Kripke
the materialist has the burden of proof in the face of its
being intuitively possible that mental and physical states
can exist without each other.
Lycan's error is to make Kripke into too orthodox of a
Cartesian. A Kripkean agnostic might eschew commitment to a
conceivability principle altogether within the spirit of
what Kripke writes. Lycan committed the technical errors
which I identified in the last section by jumping improperly
from Kripke's specific examples to a rule linking
conceivability and possibility. Not only did he stumble
while trying to generalize from the examples, but his
enterprise of constructing a rule was hopeless from the
start. For Kripke, or at least the Kripkean agnostic, there
is no rule. His claim is only that the materialist must
9. My being able to imagine a headache existing without
any brain state, as Nagel interprets Kripke's view,
"provides a strong reason for believing" that a headache can
exist without a brain state, since "this can't be explained
as the imagination of something that only feels like a
headache but isn't." See Nagel, qg. gir., p. 46. But in
the absence of a further story perhaps about the content of
what it imagined and why imagining it helps, mere
imaginability of a possibility would not seem to provide Any
reason at all for believing that the possibility is real.
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explain away the Cartesian intuition but cannot in the
familiar way. If the Kripkean agnostic has such a limited
aim, however, then he does not need any conceivability
principle at all. He then escapes the difficulties I have
shown conceivability principles to have. It will seem to
the Kripkean agnostic enough to place the burden of proof on
the shoulders of the materialist.
IV. McGinn on the Agnostic and the Orthodox Cartesian
However, it is here that the agnostic falters. For the
materialist does not have the burden of proof. If what I
earlier called the mind-body paradox is as I have argued--a
clash of two independent but contradictory lines of
argument, both apparently conclusive, for and against
materialism--then it will not do to support the anti-
materialist side with a mere inability to explain away the
modal intuitions. Materialism has, so to speak, already met
a burden of proof; that's what gives us the seemingly
conclusive line of argument for the materialist side of the
paradox. A mere inability to explain away the modal
intuitions would only establish a lapse in us, not a paradox
in our very conception of the world. The agnostic never
shifts the burden of proof to the materialist. He does not
show how our modal intuitions would do that.
These points are closely related to the criticism of
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the Kripkean position made in a recent essay by Colin
McGinn. He is right in much of his criticism of Kripke, but
he is wrong in extending it to the orthodox Cartesian
position. It may help the reader understand the differences
among these three positions--those of McGinn, the Kripkean
agnostic and the orthodox Cartesian--to look closely at the
arguments of McGinn.l°
McGinn defends the view that the mind-body problem
arises "because we are cut off by our very cognitive
constitution from achieving a conception of that natural
property of the brain (or of consciousness) that accounts
for the psychophysical link." Our being "cut off" this way
is an instance of what he calls "cognitive closure," which
he defines as follows: "A type of mind M is cognitively
closed with respect to a property E (or theory F) if and
only if the concept-forming procedures at H's disposal
cannot extend to a grasp of Q (or an understanding of f)."
McGinn argues that realizing that cognitive closure it at
work allows both realism about the mental and a naturalistic
solution to the mind-body problem: "cognitive closure with
respect to P does not imply irrealism about 2. That is
(as we might say) noumenal for H does not show that B does
10. See McGinn, "Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?",
9p. git. A similar argument is made against Kripke (not
Descartes) in Levine, gp. Lit. Here Levine calls
psychophysical identities "epistemologically inaccessible,"
meaning that "we don't have any way of determining exactly
which psychophysical identity statements are true."
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not occur in some naturalistic scientific theory T--it shows
only that T is not cognitively accessible to M."11
These views McGinn employs directly against Descartes,
Kripke and, by implication, the theorist I have called the
"Kripkean agnostic." In response to Cartesian intuitions
"to the effect that the relation between conscious states
and bodily states is fundamentally contingent," McGinn
offers what he calls a "diagnosis." "The reason we feel the
tug of contingency, pulling consciousness loose from its
physical moorings, may be that we do not and cannot grasp
the nature of the property that intelligibly links them....
Not grasping the nature of the connection, it strikes us as
deeply contingent; we cannot make the assertion of a
necessary connection intelligible to ourselves."' 2
McGinn's account is flawed by a misreading of Descartes
and Kripke. There isn't in either writer the connection
between Cartesian intuitions and the inability to grasp the
psychophysical link which McGinn asserts. Obviously,
neither writer holds that it is simply a failure to grasp
the connection between consciousness and "its physical
moorings"--or that it's simply its striking us as "brute and
unperspicuous," as McGinn also writes--that leads him toward
(in Descartes's case, to) dualism. But neither does the
Cartesian intuition that Descartes and Kripke begin with--
11. McGinn, Qf. Lit., pp. 3-4.
12. Ibid., pp. 19-20.
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its being intuitively the case that we could exist
disembodied--seem to be coextensive with a failure to grasp
some hypothetical psychophysical link. Such a failure is
neither necessary nor sufficient in any obvious way for our
having the Cartesian intuition. It is not obviously
necessary, since even if we were to grasp some hypothetical
psychophysical link, that would not seem to rule out having
the Cartesian intuition--the possibility might still be open
for a.l we knew that in some other world we could exist
nonphysically, without the link. It would be one thing to
grasp the psychophysical link but a very different thing to
know that all possible things are physical. Nor is it
obviously sufficient; we can imagine an intelligent-sounding
zombie making a Cartesian argument to us on the basis of its
inability to grasp the psychophysical link, and we can
imagine this even though we imagine the zombie has no
consciousness, and thus no Cartesian intuitions, at all.
However, despite the misreading, McGinn has a
legitimate complaint against Kripke. Even if we allow that
our intuitions of possibility may sometimes arise
independently of what is cognitively closed to us, they are
no general guarantee of genuine possibility, even if there
are no means for explaining them away as illusions. And
this is so for McGinn's reason: we may be kept from
explaining them away not because they are intuitions of
genuine possibility but because explanations of how they are
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illusory are cognitively closed to us. Not only are the
more general conceivability principles which I have
mentioned thus suspect but they provide no support for the
more specific case of Descartes's Conjecture. Kripke's
Cartesian needs (DC) to refute materialism. If it is
unavailable, the Kripkean position collapses.
Not only does an argument like McGinn's rob (DC) of the
support of a more general principle but McGinn also supplies
an argument against (DC) specifically. He argues that any
concept of a psychophysical link is cognitively closed to
us, and that since we can explain away intuitions of
contingency between the mental and the physical in that way,
there is no reason to reject materialism. I shall not
dispute the first part of McGinn's argument. The concept of
a psychophysical link is cognitively closed to us, the
Cartesian would assert, in part for the reason both McGinn
and Descartes before him give. Since the concept of a brain
state is a spatial concept but the concept of a phenomenal
state is not, as both argue, we cannot conceive of
something's being both a brain state and a phenomenal state
except, at best, in a brute fashion. The concept of a
psychophysical link, however, is supposed to make the
connection intelligible, not brute; thus, they conclude, no
such concept exists.
The flaw in McGinn's account comes in the second part--
his claim that our inability to explain away our Cartesian
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intuitions is explained by cognitive closure and that we
thus have no reason to reject materialism. Suppose that it
would turn out that our having these intuitions aoes not
depend •ian our having the cognitively closed concept and
that our inability to explain the intuitions away iS not
itself explained by our having the cognitively closed
concept. Suppose, that is, that both our Cartesian
intuitions and our inability to explain them away arise
independently of any instance of cognitive closure. Then
the cognitive closure of a psychophysical link would not be
any barrier to inferring genuine from seeming possibility.
Now, this is in fact no help to the Kripkean agnostic;
as I have portrayed him, he cannot take this position in
response to McGinn. This is because the Kripkean agnostic
has no faith in our Cartesian intuitions beyond our
inability to explain them away. This is just what separates
him from the orthodox Cartesian, who believes that the
intuitions have prima f~cie validity independently of our
inability to explain them away, which adds very little.
McGinn's argument thus works against Kripke and the Kripkean
agnostic. But in that case it is overkill. For McGinn's
ultimate conclusion is materialist, and as I remarked above,
the materialist's argument against Kripke is more direct
than this. It is simply that the materialist does not have
the burden of proof; the anti-materialist or agnostic does.
Making that point does not require what McGinn goes to such
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pains to provide, a demonstration of how it is that
Cartesian intuitions mislead. The materialist can make the
same kind of counterargument that Hume made against the
Design Argument in the days before Darwin: we may not know
how materialism is true but since we know it is possible and
does not require miracles to be true we have no reason to
doubt that it is, in some fashion or another.
But this means that McGinn has no argument against the
orthodox Cartesian. McGinn notes that Descartes "explicitly
argued from (what he took to be) the essential natures of
the body and mind to the contingency of their connection."
McGinn suggests that if we "abandon the assumption that we
know these natures, then agnosticism about the modality of
the connection seems the indicated conclusion.""' It seems
to be McGinn's view that we should abandon that assumption,
since the essential natures of body and mind are linked in a
way we can never know. Actually, McGinn's cognitive-closure
argument gives us no reason to abandon the assumption, since
it is an open possibility that the assumption was arrived at
without any of the closed-off concepts. Imagine somebody--
call him McGone--who has brain damage in the area of his
brain where he would have developed the conception of the
psychophysical link if there were such a link to develop a
conception about and if it were open to humans to do that.
If there is a psychophysical link it is cognitively closed
13. Ibid., p. 20.
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to McGone, whether or not it is closed to McGinn and the
rest of us unimpaired people. But it would seem to be an
open possibility, at least epistemically, that were dualism,
perhaps counterfactually, true, McGone could "know the
essential natures" of phenomenal states, employing a system
of concepts independent of the damaged area of his brain,
and convincingly argue for dualism on that basis. Nothing
McGinn has argued rules that out.
Still, McGinn's argument places a heavy constraint on
any argument against materialism. The presumption must be
made that, everything equal, materialism is true, and that
if it seems otherwise this is so for McGinn's reason or some
other. That should be the presumption, and any dualist or
even agnostic view has the burden of showing that Cartesian
intuitions cannot be explained materialistically, simply as
outcomes of our having a conceptual deficit in thoroughly
material brains. Any such view must demonstrate how it that
these intuitions arise independently of the conceptual
difficulties which McGinn is right to claim we have. The
Cartesian attempts to do this. Although I argue in the next
section that the orthodox Cartesian does not succeed, I
shall argue in the next two chapters that the neo-Cartesian
does.
104
V. Flaws in the Orthodox Argument:
The Essential-Properties and the Conceptual-Role Problems
The orthodox Cartesian idea is that it seems possible
for me to exist without my body by inspection in my mind of
what is needed to be me and what is needed to be my body.
And its seeming possible is supposedly not just an intuition
but is something for which there seems to be a very good
argument.
Recall premise (2") of my modified version of
Descartes's argument, the premise that asserts that
psychophysical contingency can be conceived of clearly and
distinctly.
(2") I can conceive clearly and distinctly of my having
pain at t apart from my having C-fiber sti;ulation
at t.
As we have seen, Descartes's own argument for it requires
the existence of a soul, depending upon a premise like (2).
(2) I can conceive clearly and distinctly of my mind's
existing apart from my body.
His argument for (2) is something like this. I am
essentially a thinking thing. I know this because I cannot
conceive myself without thinking. I know that from directly
inspecting my idea of myself, my mind. My body is
essentially extended. I know this because I cannot conceive
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of it without extension. Again, I know that from directly
inspecting my idea of body. Thus, since I perceive by
direct inspection that they have different essential
natures, I can conceive in a perception-like way the
possibility of myself, my mind, existing separate from my
body. Descartes assumes here that there cannot be a single
complete thing with two essential properties, one mental,
one physical.
As I stated at the outset, it would be appealing to
keep the Cartesian method of argumentation while avoiding
problematic premises like its (2). It would also be
appealing to drop Descartes's overbroad application of the
concept of thought. An argument that does both things might
go like this. My pain at t is essentially a conscious
mental state. I know this because I cannot conceive of
having it without being conscious. I know that from
directly inspecting my ideas of pain and of being conscious.
My C-fiber stimulation is essentially spatial. I know this
because I cannot conceive of it without its being spatial.
Again, I know that from directly inspecting my idea of a
bodily process. Thus, since I perceive by direct inspection
that they have different essential natures, I can conceive
in a perception-like way the possibility of my pain at t
existing separately from my C-fiber stimulation at t.
Descartes's main argument for dualism appears in
Meditation Six. There, Descartes justifies (2) by asserting
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only that "on the one hand I have a clear and distinct idea
of myself, insofar as I am a thinking, non-extended thing;
and on the other hand I have a distinct idea of body,
insofar as this is simply an extended, non-thinking thing."
Premise (2) would follow straightforwardly, from the
principle of the indiscernibility of identicals. But where
do Descartes's clear and distinct ideas of himself and his
body come from? They presumably come from the thought
experiment of Meditation One and his res cogitans and wax
arguments of Meditation Two. It seems possible to Descartes
that he can exist in the absence of his body, and he cannot
find any source of error in this. Close scrutiny of himself
tells him that only thinking is essential to him; that is
the only one of his former beliefs about himself that is not
subject to doubt. Moreover, thinking about the wax, he sees
that despite all its changes, the one thing that does not
change is its having extension. This he knows from a mental
inspection of the idea of body. Once he knows that, he
argues, he knows that he can clearly and distinctly conceive
himself apart from his body. His reasoning is that this
follows from his knowing that thinking is not essential to
his ady. Since his idea of a body is essentially the idea
of something extended in space, he argues, it does not
contain the idea of thinking.
Elsewhere, Descartes also indicates that he needs the
assumption that his idea of himself is the idea of a
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complete thing. Neither the surface of an apple nor the
properties of a triangle are complete things but are
ontologically dependent upon the existences of apples and
triangles. This is unlike his body and that collection of
his private mental states that he has come to call himself,
according to Descartes, which he thus concludes can exist,
in some sense, in the absence of anything else.
Descartes writes in the passage from the Sixth
Meditation that he has a clear and distinct idea of himself
as "a thinking, non-extended thing," an idea of his body as
"an extended, non-thinking thing." This suggests an
argument Descartes might make: My Ldy is essentially An
extended thing; j am not; thus. I -a istinct from my body.
There is a standard response to this argument. It is to
reject the second premise on the grounds that it is not
possible for anybody to be immaterial. But although this
seems conclusive to many materialists, making this response
is in fact a bad strategy for the materialist. It leaves
the materialist with only a standoff, and the materialist
should want more. All the Cartesian needs is the slimmest
logical possibility--the possibility in just one possible
world. It does not need to be technologically possible or
even possible in nature. It's enough, Descartes would
insist, that God could do it. But he would also insist that
a God is not even needed to do it either, at least
conceptually, so that agnostics and even atheists could
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become dualists. Thus, the Cartesian will always insist
that surely it's at least logically possible, or at least
that the materialist doesn't know that it isn't. The
Cartesian cannot satisfy a burden of proof on this, but it
is hard to see how the materialist could satisfy the
Cartesian.
The materialist, however, has a better argument for
denying the second premise. It is to allow the logical
possibility that somebody might be immaterial but to assert
that as a matter of fact Descartes is not. The problem then
is to explain Descartes's intuition that he himself, not
just somebody, could be immaterial. A Kripkean way would be
to explain the Descartes's intuition as the different
intuition that there could be an immaterial person whose
point-of-view on the world was qualitatively the same as
Descartes's--a Berkeleyan counterpart, we might call him.
To that account, however, Descartes should insist that he
can imagine he himself being immaterial, not just somebody
like him. Thus, the materialist counterargument requires
the following thought experiment.
Let us suppose that we were to invent a process that
makes it possible for people to dematerialize. Let us
suppose, moreover, that in the state of dematerialization
people can continue to function in many normal human
respects. Wells' Invisible Han may come to mind, but I do
not mean that it becomes possible just to become
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transparent. I mean to suppose that one might lose one's
very physicality this way. Suppose that we select as a
guinea pig for trying out our process someone I will call
Ms. X. We place Ms. X in our dematerialization chamber and
throw the switch. At the outset her vision has been
directed away from her body so that while she can continue
to see during dematerialization she is unable to see whether
or not she any longer has a normal human body. Suppose that
she is also able to sense the world throughout the process
through dematerialized versions of her other four senses.
Our process works by gradually replacing Ms. X's
physical features with nonphysical features. At the outset
she weighs 120 lbs. After five minutes, she is down to 60
lbs., and after ten minutes, her weight is zero. It is as
Fig. 3 shows.
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She is now dimensionless, and we can also suppose that she
no longer has a location in any normal sense although she
seems to have one. She is still in the dematerialization
chamber from her point-of-view, waiting for something to
happen. After twenty more minutes, Ms. X is returned to
normal bodily form.
Ms. X's adventure provides a way to account for
Descartes's intuition that he might be immaterial without
contradicting the claim that he in fact is not, since Ms. X
could be entirely physical in the actual world even if she
might become immaterial in some other possible world. The
hard-headed materialist (even the soft-headed one!) may balk
at supposing that such a process as this is possible, but
Descartes should not have any difficulty supposing this. It
seems conceivable, clearly and distinctly, that such a
process is possible, and God can bring about anything we can
conceive clearly and distinctly. And it does not conflict
with Descartes's claim that bodies are necessarily extended,
since once Ms. X is no longer extended she no longer has a
body.
If we shift from talk about mind and body to talk about
mental and physiological states, a similar point can be
made, although it takes a bit more work. Consider this
argument: fly physiological states are essentially extended;
m mental states are nott thus. my physiological states are
distinct from my mental states. Ms. X's adventure does not
ill
so far contradict this argument nor even seem to contradict
it. For none of the physiological states she has in the
story lose their physical character. Still, it is
conceivable that some of Ms. X's states, which just happen
to be physiological, could have been nonphysical. For
consider the nonactual possible world in which as Ms. X
stands waiting in the dematerialization chamber we change
our minds and do not throw the switch. Instead, we go out
for lunch. I have assumed that Ms. X cannot tell whether we
have thrown the switch or not; now assume that there is no
experiential difference at all for Ms. X over which it is.
The materialist should reject the second premise here,
too. Supposing that Ms. X's and Descartes's mental states
are in fact physiological is consistent with the possibility
that those vgry experiences might not be."4 Let's call the
property of giving the very experiences Ms. X has z
mentalizing. Some of Ms. X's actual physiological states X-
mentalize, then, even though there may be nonactual
immaterial states that also X-mentalize; but this is
consistent with all her actual states, including those that
X-mentalize, being essentially physical.
14. Exploiting Kripke's strategy, McGinn ("Anomalous
Monism ... ," g~. Lit.) explains my intuition that my pain at
t # my C-fiber stimulation at & as the conceiving that an
epistemic counterpart of my pain (# it) * my C-fiber
stimulation, allowing that my pain = my C-fiber stimulation.
But this seems not to do justice to Descartes's intuition
that his very states might then and ther have been
immaterial, not just states like them.
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Once again, the materialist may balk at supposing this
possible. But the orthodox Cartesian, at whom the argument
is directed, should not have any difficulty supposing this.
The Cartesian should be able to imagine, for example, that
thig very pain is both in close union with, and in no union
with, a physiological state. But the Cartesian will not be
able to find any evidence to distinguish supposing that from
supposing that the pain is in fact realized physiologically
but might not be.
The orthodox Cartesian assumes that mental properties
and physical properties cannot be essential properties of
the same thing. Thus they are said to be different
properties of different things. The above arguments reject
the Cartesian's assumption. But can the argument work
without appealing to two separate sets of essential
properties which preserve token physicalism but contradict
type physicalism? Materialists have adopted two strategies
to complete their work against the Cartesian. One is
functionalist. The only nonphysical properties are taken to
be topic-neutral functionalist ones. But there are well-
known difficulties with functionalism, which I argue in this
essay to be insurmountable.
The other is the conceptual-role strategy I described
briefly in Chapter One and will described in more detail in
the next two chapters. It exploits the idea that the styles
of representation we use in the case of first-person
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reference or mental representation or in the use of
phenomenal-concept terms differ from the styles we use in
representations paradigmatic of our talk of physiological
states. The former ordinarily involve direct reference in
ways the latter do not. The two sets of representations
differ in conceptual role and may be cognitively independent
without always differing in the properties by or to which
they refer.
Some Cartesian intuitions can be explained away in this
way. The term "I" picks out its referent in virtue of no
properties of the referent. Clearly, it fills a distinct
conceptual role from terms like "my body." Thus, Cartesian
intuitions associated with the terms "I" and "my body" can
be explained in terms of their different conceptual roles,
without invoking any odd properties. The difference between
"my pain" and "my C-fiber stimulation" cannot be explained
so easily, however, and here the orthodox Cartesian is on
the right track. The illusion that they cannot pick out
identical tokens is explained by different conceptual roles,
but the terms seem to pick out tokens by way of distinct
properties of the tokens. In general, concepts with
different roles can refer by and to the same properties, but
in the psychophysical case, the very different modes of
presentation seem to lead to referents in virtue of
different properties. Arguing for this result means leaving
the orthodox paradigm for a rather different argumentative
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strategy, however, one suggested by Descartes's writing but
not exploited by him.
CHAPTER FOUR THE KNOWLEDGE ARGUMENT
According to the Knowledge Argument, there are certain
things which you can know everything physical about but not
know everything about and which, because of that, make
physicalism false. The Knowledge Argument says that your
having this extra knowledge--the knowledge about these
things which you could have over and above your knowledge of
everything physical about them--depends on the existence of
special nonphysical properties. These properties, called
gqualia, are supposed to be properties of your experiences;
it is supposed to be in virtue of them that you can say of
your experiences that they feel a certain way or look a
certain way to you. The Knowledge Argument purports to show
that qualia exist. Moreover, it purports to show that
qualia are nonphysical and nonfunctional and that, because
of this, physicalism is false. The position which it
purports to establish I shall call property dualism.
I agree with the critics of the Knowledge Argument that
this is an unattractive conclusion; it is hard to know how
to fit extra nonphysical properties into the world picture
we get from physics and biology. Nevertheless, my aim in
this chapter and the next is to show that, despite rumors of
its demise and despite the best efforts so far advanced
against it by its critics, the Knowledge Argument remains
alive and well. I shall focus in this chapter and in the
first part of the next chapter on the specific version of
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the Knowledge Argument advanced by Frank Jackson. There I
argue that although previous criticisms of Jackson's version
are unsuccessful, it and the argumentative strategy
underlying it must ultimately be rejected. The assumption
on which they rely--that simply your knowing everything
physical but not knowing everything is enough to contradict
physicalism--is false. I shall then in the next chapter
develop a different, stronger version of the Knowledge
Argument which escapes this and other outstanding
objections. According to it, the knowledge you have of some
of your mental states could not be about those states unless
you picked them out in virtue of properties of them distinct
from any physical properties. If this is right, qualia
provide routes to your mental states distinct from those
provided by any physical properties, contradicting
physicalism. The Knowledge Argument is thus a substantial
obstacle for any defender of physicalism and, if it is to be
defeated, this will happen only with arguments more subtle,
and probably more counterintuitive, than any previously
made.
I. Descartes's Argument from Doubt
On the basis of a passage in the Discourse 1 Method,1
Arnauld attributed to Descartes an argument which he
1. In the Fourth Discourse at AT VI 32-33.
__
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paraphrased thus: "I can doubt whether I have a body.... Yet
for all that, I may not doubt that I am or exist, so long as
I am doubting or thinking. Therefore I who am doubting and
thinking am not a body. For, in that case, in having doubts
about my body I should be having doubts about myself."2 As
Arnauld pcLnts out, this argument is fallacious. It is
also, as Arnauld sets the argument out, equivocal. One
argument that can be constructed out of Arnauld's first
three sentences is as follows.
Arnauld's Representation f ti Argmment ZQm Doubt
I can doubt whether my body exists.
I cannot doubt that I exist.
ErgQ, I am not identical to my body.
Arnauld's fourth sentence is a reductio Ad absurdum
justification for the conclusion. The argument can be re-
phrased thus. Assume that the conclusion is false and that
I am identical to my body. Then, since the first premise is
true and I can doubt whether my body exists, it follows from
the law of the indiscernibility of identicals, were the
first premise wholly extensional, that I can doubt whether I
exist. But this contradicts the second premise. Thus, the
assumption is false and the conclusion is proven true.
This argument for the truth of the conclusion is
invalid because both premises are partly intensional. Thus,
2. In the Fourth Objections at AT VII 198.
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the conclusion cannot be derived from the premises on the
basis of the law of the indiscernibility of identicals,
since the premises do not predicate anything of the
particulars referred to in the conclusion. Thus, the
reasoning of the purported reductio is unsound. From the
falsity of the conclusion and the truth of the first premise
it does not follow that the second premise is untrue and
that I can doubt whether I exist, since the first premise is
intensional and does not allow substitution sal2a veritate
of coreferential expressions that come after the verb.
Arnauld, however, is wrong to ascribe this argument to
Descartes. Nowhere does Descartes argue for dualism on
purely epistemological grounds. The passage from the
Discourse that Arnauld represents as containing this
argument actually has a different conclusion from what
Arnauld takes it to have. The passage's conclusion is not
the conclusion printed above but rather the statement that I
can conceive clearly and distinctly of my mind's existing
apart from my body, the premise of the Cartesian argument I
considered in the last chapter. The passage from Descartes
also has a different and more complicated structure, relying
not on the indiscernibility of identicals but on the notions
of essence and completeness I also discussed there.
Descartes, in fact, acknowledges in the Meditations3 that
an inference of the kind Arnauld ascribes to him would be
3. In the Second Meditation at AT VII 27-28.
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fallacious and correctly asserts that he is innocent of it;
Arnauld cites this passage but inexplicably allows his
complaint to remain.' Descartes's argument for dualism is
based upon modal intuitions about mind and body rather than
the epistemological intuitions Arnauld claims it to be based
on.
This criticism of Descartes has continued into modern
times.5 Although it is not applicable to Descartes, this
and criticisms related to it may be applicable to other,
more recent anti-materialist positions which, unlike
Descartes's, are solely based on epistemological
intuitions.'
Now consider a slightly different argument. This is
not an argument ever given by Descartes but it is suggested
by Descartes's initial thought experiment in the
Meditations. In the end, it cannot be adequately defended
on the basis of Cartesian considerations alone, but I will
argue that it suggests forms of arguments that can be
4. In the Fourth Objections, Qp. fl.
5. Peter Geach, in his God and the SQl (New York:
Schocken, 1969), p. 8, accused Descartes of committing a
fallacy like the "masked man" fallacy discussed by Stoic
logicians: that since I know who my father is but not this
masked man, my father is not this masked man. In his
Pescartes, gn. cif., p. 112, Williams criticized Geach's
assessment of Descartes along lines related to my criticisms
of Arnauld's assessment.
6. See Richard Brandt and Jaegwon Kim, "The Logic of
the Identity Theory," Journal oL Philosophy 64 (1967), pp.
534-535; and Thomas Nagel, "Physicalism," Philosophical
Review (1965), pp. 344-345. They do not provide any
published examples, however, to which their criticisms
clearly apply.
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defended against all common-sense counterarguments. The
argument runs as follows.
A Cartesian Knowledae Arqument
I can doubt everything physical about myself.
I cannot doubt everythingphysical bout myself.I cannot doubt everything about myself.
Era•Q, there is something missing from the physicalist
story about me.
This, you will recall, is the argument I claimed in Chapter
One to survive the scrutiny of Descartes's intuitions about
mind and body and to provide a source for the neo-
Cartesian's case for property dualism. Notice that its
plausibility need not rest on construing the premises
intensionally. Interpret doubt here to be a two-place
purely extensional relation.7
The first premise seems to be validated by Descartes's
thought experiment. In Meditation Two, Descartes seems to
be able to place in doubt everything physical about himself.
It becomes an open possibility for him that God has created
for him the delusion that he has "a face, hands, arms and
the whole mechanical structure of limbs ... called the
body," something having "a determinable shape and a
definable location and [occupying] a space in such a way as
7. This contrast between intensional and extensional
forms of arguments for dualism can be found in Paul
Churchland, "Reduction, Qualia, and the Direct Introspection
of Brain States," Journal oj Philosophyy 82 (January 1985),
pp. 25-26.
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to exclude any other body." He also places in doubt whether
he has a material soul, "tenuous, . permeat[ing his] more
solid parts," by which he was "nourished, [and] moved
about.""
The second premise, on the other hand, might seem to be
validated by Descartes's conclusion that, despite these
doubts about his physical nature, he exists and is a
thinking thing. But it is here that Descartes's support for
such an argument as this starts to run out. These things
can be doubted. It is not just that the pervasive doubts of
Meditation One reasonably introduce in Descartes the
suspicion that all his initial beliefs may be false. "So
what remains true?" he asks at the outset of Meditation Two.
"Perhaps just the one fact that nothing is certain."' The
more important point is that this is not a mere suspicion.
It is a real problem once Descartes realizes at the
beginning of Meditation Three "this slight reason for
doubt": that "it would be easy for [God], if He so desired,
to bring it about that I go wrong even in those matters
which I think I see utterly clearly with my mind's eye."t 0
This source of doubt is eliminated for Descartes once he
proves to his satisfaction the existence of a nondeceiving
God. But two difficulties remain. The first is that this
will not help the general reader who does not accept
8. At AT VII 26.
9. At AT VII 24.
10. At AT VII 36.
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Descartes's proof about God. Recall that Descartes does not
rely upon God to produce the radical error. For those who
suppose that there is no God and that, as he writes, "I have
arrived at my present state by fate or chance or a
continuous chain of events, or by some other means, ...
since deception and error seem to be imperfections, the less
powerful they make my original cause, the more likely it is
that I am so imperfect as to be deceived all the time.""
Without his proof about God, Descartes has no means to
establish the second premise, nor does the general reader
who denies indubitability. The second difficulty that
remains is that once Descartes does establish the second
premise for himself by proving to himself that God exists,
he no longer has reason to accept the other premise, that he
can doubt everything physical. For God's existence makes at
least some of his physical beliefs about himself reliable.
II. Some Other Knowledge Arguments
Consider now a different but related argument
associated with Thomas Nagel. Buried in his writings are
the elements of a more successful version of the Knowledge
Argument than Descartes's. In a well-known passage, Nagel
reminds us that bats seem to have a very different form of
experience than we human beings do, something we find
11. At AT VII 21.
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ourselves unable to fully imagine. This is because they get
around by echolocation, a sensory modality we do not have.
We do not know what it is like to echolocate. We might be
able to imagine some parts of what it is like, but there are
gaps.12 Now imagine a superchiropterist, someone who is
not only the world's authority on bats but knows everything
a chiropterist could ever possibly hope to know about bats.
Since our superchiropterist could not know fully what it was
like to be a bat, there would be gaps in even this person's
knowledge. Now consider the following argument.
A Knowledge Argument Suggleted 2y Nagel's Account
The superchiropterist knows everything physical there
is to know about bats.
The superchiropterist does not know everything about
bats.
Ergg, there are truths that escape the physicalist's
story.
Since this is not an argument Nagel pursues in this
article, I will focus in the remainder of this chapter and
in the next on the account by Frank Jackson, who does pursue
12. For scientific work on bat phenomenology, see
Steven P. Dear, James A. Simmons and Jonathan Fritz, "A
Possible Neuronal Basis for Representation of Acoustic
Scenes in Auditory Cortex of the Big Brown Bat," Nature 364
(August 12, 1993), pp. 620-623, and the references cited
there. Nevertheless, the attempts of Dennett, gp. dit., pp.
441-448, and Kathleen Akins, "What Is It Like to Be Myopic
and Boring?" in Bo Dahlbom, ed., Pennett and lil Critics
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), to imagine some of what it is
like to be a bat, while interesting, are because of the gaps
beside the point.
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an argument of this sort. Although Jackson's version fails,
I will produce a version which succeeds.
Frank Jackson's has probably been the most discussed
version of the Knowledge Argument and the most discussed
recent argument for property dualism." In two papers,"4
he invites us to consider the unusual experiences of
superneuroscientist Mary. Through her neurological
research, Mary is as knowledgeable about as much of the
physical world as you like--on one version, about every
physical aspect of human beings, on another, about the
entire physical world. Let me call her neuro-omniscient.
Confined throughout her life to a black-and-white room and
with access to the outside world only through black-and-
white television, Mary has never experienced anything red.
On her release, she finally does. On the basis of this
story, Jackson makes the following argument.
13. Besides Nagel's and Jackson's versions, see also
the version by Howard Robinson in his Matter fnd Sense
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 4-5, and
his "Introduction" and his "The Anti-Materialist Strategy
and the 'Knowledge Argument,' in Howard Robinson, ed.,
Qbjections to Physicalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1993), pp. 17-18 and 159, respectively. See also the
version by John Foster in his The Immaterial itif (London:
Routledge, 1991), p. 64.
14. Frank Jackson, "Epiphenomenal Qualia,"
Philosophical Ouarterly 32 (April 1982); and "What Mary
Didn't Know," Journal gf Philosonhy 83 (May 1986), p. 291.
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JacksXQns Knowledge Argument
(1) Mary (before her release) knows everything
physical and functional there is to know about
other people.
(2) Mary (before her release) does not know everything
there is to know about other people (because she
learns something about them on her release).
(3) There are truths about other people (and herself)
which escape the physicalist-functionalist
story."
Henceforth, I will call the argument from the two
premises above to the conclusion "Jackson's version."
Although I do not accept Jackson's argument myself, I
believe that the arguments previously advanced against him
have for the most part missed their marks. Before setting
out my own objections in section five of this chapter and my
alternative defense of the Knowledge Argument in Chapter
Five, I will review some of these counterarguments to
Jackson's version in next two sections of the present
chapter and show why they fail."'
15. Jackson, "What Mary Didn't Know," .. Lit., p. 293.
I have added the references to functionalism. While
functionalism is part of Jackson's target, he does not make
that explicit in the argument I quote here.
16. By contrast, see Robert Van Gulick, "Understanding
the Phenomenal Mind: Are We All Just Armadillos?," in Martin
Davies and Glyn Humphreys, eds., Consciousness:
psychological and Philosophical Essays (Oxford: Blackwell,
1993), pp. 138-142. Van Gulick reviews many of these
counterarguments against Jackson and endorses most of those
he reviews.
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III. What Mary Can Figure Out and Imagine
The conclusions that follow from the Knowledge
Argument--that qualia exist and that they are distinct from
physical and functional properties--are inconsistent with
the project Dan Dennett defends in his much-discussed book
Consciousness Explained. That much is clear. "Are qualia
functionally definable?" Dennett asks rhetorically at one
point. "No, because there are no such properties as
qualia.... Or, yes, because if you really understood
everything about the functioning of the nervous system,
you'd understand everything about the properties people are
actually talking about when they claim to be talking about
their qualia."17
Dennett's counterargument against Jackson depends upon
speculation about Mary's powers of imagination. Like Paul
Churchland whom he cites approvingly, he argues that Jackson
underestimates the extent of Mary's knowledge and the
cognitive powers it gives her.
The counterargument seems to be as follows. If Mary
knows everything physical and functional there is to know
about other people, then she can at least figure out or
imagine what it is like to see chromatic color. But if she
can figure out or imagine what it is like to see chromatic
17. Daniel Dennett, o•. git., pp. 459-460.
__
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color, she knows what it is like to do so. And since, by
hypothesis, she knows everything physical and functional
there is to know about other people, then she knows what it
is like to see red. Thus, Jackson's premises conflict.
Endorsing the first requires giving up the second.
Dennett and Churchland have not had many followers.
But at least some of the reluctance to join them in this
position has grown out of a mistaken view of what their
reductionist position requires. Many critics of the
Knowledge Argument would argue that Churchland and Dennett
have taken on an unnecessary burden and that the
physicalist can settle for much less. In this, they exploit
a very natural first reaction to the argument. The idea is
this. The physicalist is committed to the view that my
having experience is just another physical fact which can be
described in paradigmatically physical terms. However, the
pfysicalist, it may seem, is not committed to the view that
my knowing all the physical facts about a certain kind of
experience will gig ma experience of that kind. After all,
things do not often come into existence simply in virtue of
my knowing the principles underlying them.
According to Joseph Levine, the physicalist should not
reject, as Churchland and Dennett do, but embrace the idea
that Mary cannot imagine or figure out what it is like to
see red. "After all," writes Levine, "in order to know what
it's like to occupy a state one has actually to occupy it!"
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From this general principle it follows for Mary that she
"can know which physical (or functional) description a
mental state satisfies without knowing what it's like to
occupy that state." 8 Levine's argument is that "all
Mary's new knowledge amounts to is her new experience," and
that it is thus open to the physicalist to hold that this is
just a different way of knowing the same thing.
But Levine appears to equivocate. It is almost
tautological that in order to know what it's like to occupy
a token state one has actually to occupy it. Every token
state will have its peculiarities and one will not fully
know what occupying any given one is like until one has done
so.o "9 But Mary's knowing what it is like to have the
specific experience she has on her release does not exhaust
her red-related knowledge of what it is like, since she also
comes to have general knowledge of what it is like to see
red, knowledge of what it's like to occupy states of a tp.
When applied to knowledge of types rather than tokens,
18. Joseph Levine, "On Leaving Out What It's Like," in
Davies and Humphreys, o.. Cit., p. 125.
19. In "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" (op. gf., p.
170), Thomas Nagel claims that it is "beyond our ability to
conceive" the "specific subjective character" of the
echolocating experiences of bats. In criticism, Owen
Flanagan (Qp. cit., p. 103), remarks that this is a general
other-minds problem: "If conceiving of the specific
subjective character of the experiences of another means
having the experiences exactly as the experiencer has them,
then this never happens." But, of course, this is not just
a problem about understanding other minds: the experiencer
does not herself have the experiences as she has them until
she has them.
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Levine's principle is not tautological but false.
It would follow, for instance, that since nobody has
ever occupied the state of seeing a unicorn or a golden
mountain nobody knows what it is like to occupy that state.
Not even the most extreme of classical empiricists held that
view. According to Hume, we can create complex ideas out of
simple ones and can visualize unicorns and golden mountains
even though we have never seen such things. And by some
other means, we even know what it is like to see shades of
blue we have never been exposed to.20
Perhaps Levine means to restrict the scope of the
principle to this: that in order to know what it's like to
occupy states of a simple qualitative type one actually has
to occupy one. This is not tautological either, but while
it may be true, it is not obviously so, and it would beg the
question simply to assume it to be. It would be just what
Churchland and Dennett deny.
How could they deny this? It may be helpful to
consider a possible analogy. What is like to ride a roller
coaster? One perhaps need not have actually ridden one to
know. For there may be experiences enough like the various
aspects of riding a roller coaster that someone with enough
experience could piece together what it is like without
actually having done it. Although this would leave out
20. Hume's EnauirQ Concerning Hukm Understanding, ch.
2.
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knowledge of what any specific rides were like, one might
still fully know what it is like in a general way. It is
such general knowledge as this of what it is like that
Dennett believes Mary to be able to figure out in virtue of
her complete knowledge of the physical-functional aspects of
human beings. He might agree with Levine's physicalist that
she learns nothing on her release but would differ in
holding there to be an aspect of her knowledge of what it's
like beyond her unique knowledge of the experience: her
ability to conceptualize it, to place it in a type. She
learns nothing because she can figure out ahead of her
release what it's like in this general way, just like she
might figure out what it's like to ride the roller coaster.
Now let me single out two of the premises of the
Dennett-Churchland counterargument for closer scrutiny.
(Neuro-omniscience to Imaginability.) If Mary knows
everything physical there is to know about other
people, then she can at least figure out or
imagine what it is like to see chromatic color.
(Imaginability to Knowledge.) If she can figure out or
imagine what it is like to see chromatic color,
she knows what it is like to do so.
Both these premises are crucial to Dennett's
counterargument, and at least one is false. Let me look at
each in turn.
The "Neuro-omniscience to Imaginability" Premise.
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Dennett argues that Jackson has given no reason for thinking
that, even if Mary indeed has all the neurophysiological
knowledge Jackson gives her, she will be surprised when
shown a blue object. From this he concludes that Jackson
has not shown Mary to have learned anything. Dennett
assumes that Mary knows what it is like to see black and
white (and presumably gray) objects; the differences between
an object's color and properties like its glossiness and
luminance; and "precisely which effects--described in
neurophysiological terms--each particular color will have on
her nervous system." Thus, he writes, the only remaining
task for her is to "figure out" how to identify "those
neurophysiological effects 'from the inside.'" He suggests
this to be possible by her "figuring out tricky ways in
which she would be able to tell that some color, whatever it
is, is not yellow, or nt red" by means of "noting some
salient and specific reaction that her brain would have only
for yellow or only for red." In this way, she could gain "a
little entry into her color space," and from there "leverage
her way to complete advance knowledge."'2
Dennett, however, fails to make it plausible that Mary
knows the entirety of what it is like to see chromatic
color. Given her wide knowledge, Mary will know most of the
effects on somebody of seeing a normal banana. Some of
these effects will manifest themselves in thoughts and
21. Dennett, eg. R.i., p. 399.
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beliefs of hers I will label "nonchromatic." By that I mean
all her thoughts and beliefs except those by which she
attributes to herself and others what it is like to visually
experience chromatic color. Extending her expertise to
bananas, Mary will know all the nonqualitative effects of
seeing a normal banana. She may know enough of them "from
the inside," to use Dennett's phrase--for instance, through
the nonchromatic thoughts she has about the banana--for her
to be able to tell that she is seeing something aberrant
when she is shown a blue banana. Let me for the moment
accept several of Dennett's suppositions about Mary's
knowledge. She knows in advance that there is a way things
appear, whatever it is, which people label "blue." She
knows in advance the thoughts she would have on seeing
something appearing this way. She knows on seeing the
banana that she is having those thoughts, and that those
thoughts are sufficient for her to know that the banana is
blue. On the basis of such knowledge, let us say that she
recognizes the banana as blue. I will even concede to
Dennett that having the recognitional ability to do all this
would be sufficient for Mary to know what it is like to see
blue.2  Still, it would not follow that Mary knows
22. In his "What Experience Teaches," in William G.
Lycan, ed., Hind and Cognition (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1990), p. 516, David Lewis claims that according to
his Ability Hypothesis "knowing what an experience is like
just ia the possession of these abilities to remember,
imagine and recognize." In his Metaphyasicsn Consciousness
(London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 157-158, William Seager
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everything. For even though she might have the
recognitional knowledge of what it is like in advance of
seeing red, she still might lack what we could call
imaginative knowledse of what it is like. Having this
requires the ability in advance of seeing and recognizing
red to anticipate seeing it by calling to mind something
which seems to resemble seeing it.
Dennett does not explicitly discuss imagination, but
Churchland, whom Dennett cites favorably, does. Supporting
his second premise by Mary's color ignorance commits
Jackson, Churchland argues, to "the claim that Mary could
not even imagine what the relevant experience would be
like." Like Dennett, he contends that Jackson has not
"adequately considered how much one might know if, as
premise (1) asserts, one knew everythina there is to know
about the physical brain and the nervous system."
In particular, suppose that Mary has learned to
conceptualize her inner life, even in introspection, in
terms of the completed neuroscience we are to imagine.
So she does not identify her visual sensations crudely
argues that one can know what an experience is like without
any of these abilities. In a forthcoming review of Seager
in the Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Christopher Hill
argues that a recognitional ability is required. I will
assume here, contrary to Hill's view, that any of the three
abilities--to remember, to imagine or to recognize--is
sufficient. Consider, for example, someone who, never
having seen anything red, is nevertheless wired neurally to
imagine seeing red, although she cannot ever hope to
recognize anything as red, let us suppose because of visual
difficulties.
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as "a sensation-of-black," "a sensation-of-gray," or "a
sensation-of-white"; rather she identifies them more
revealingly as various spiking frequencies in the nth
layer of the occipital cortex (or whatever). If Mary
has the relevant neuroscientific concepts for the
sensational states at issue (viz., sensations-of-red),
but has never yet been in those states, she may well be
able to imagine being in the relevant cortical state,
and imagine it with substantial success, even in
advance of receiving external stimuli that would
actually produce it.23
But despite all that Churchland supposes about Mary in
this science-fiction future, he has not yet given any reason
for thinking Mary might have something in her imagination
that seems to her to resemble red. What Churchland appears
to invent is a possible world in which reference to
phenomenal properties has dropped out of the language and
has been replaced with reference to objective, public,
paradigmatically neurophysiological properties. I will
grant that we can imagine such a world. If you were asked
in such a world to imagine being in a state characterized
physically, one which correlates with sensing red, you could
perhaps do so without much effort, if you were the
neurophysiologist Mary is and accustomed to characterizing
your own occurrent qualitative states in physical terms.
But it is n further task to imagine being in a state
23. Churchland, Qa. Ait.
135
conceived of not physically but phenomenally.
Imagine feeling the way one normally does while being
in a rapidly dropping roller-coaster car. Can somebody
imagine this without having been through the experience of
rapidly dropping while riding a roller coaster? In a sense,
yes--one need only imagine that one is in a roller-coaster
car, rapidly dropping and feeling the way one normally does
in such circumstances. " Let me call this a case of
descriptive imagining--a case of imagining that one
satisfies a certain description, "being in a rapidly
dropping roller-coaster car and feeling the normal way."
But there is a further kind of imagining that seems in order
here, which I will call direct imagining--in which one calls
to mind something which seems to resemble the feeling 9a
rapidly dropping. Even if one were to do the first kind of
imagining, there would still be the task of doing the second
kind.
Similarly, we still have reason to think that there is
way in which Mary before her release would be unable to
imagine what it is like to see red even if she could also do
so in Churchland's way. Labeling it "crude," as Churchland
does, does not contradict Jackson's assumption that the
normal way is a different way. Only if Churchland can make
plausible that this difference in ways of imagining does not
entail a difference in what is known does his argument
24. I am indebted to Robert Stalnaker for this point.
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succeed.
This is perhaps what Churchland intends to do when he
suggests that sensations of color might be analogous to
musical chords. He suggests that both are "structured sets
of elements" and that Mary might be able to imagine red just
as musicians gain access to musical chords they have never
heard before by constructing them "in auditory
imagination.""2 If that were right, then by descriptive
imagining alone Mary could literally gain access to
something that seems to resemble red and thus could fully
know what it is like to see it without actually seeing it.
However, there is an obvious disanalogy which Churchland
must contend with. The musician has heard the elements out
of which musical chords are structured, or he at least has a
way of generating the elements out of what he has heard.
Even if there is, as Churchland writes, "excellent empirical
evidence to suggest that aor sensations of color are Indeed
structured sets of elements" (his emphasis), still Mary,
raised since birth away from color, has not experienced
enough such "elements" to generate any structures of color-
sensation.
The "Imaginability to Knowledge" Premise. But there is
a deeper problem with the argument. Suppose, contrary to
common sense, that she has access to "elements" out of which
she can imaginatively construct color-sensations. Then
25. Ibid., pp. 26-27.
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consider the case of another superneurophysiologist,
Marilyn, who does not. Suppose that Marilyn is blind,
although she later learns what it is like to see red when
she acquires vision. Why believe that the blind Marilyn,
who knows everything physical, has access to elements out of
which she could construct what it is like to see red in
"visual imagination"? For any putatively structured
sensation, it would always seem possible, hypothetically, to
come up with someone who (1) masters all the propositions of
neurophysiology but also (2) lacks enough raw elements of
experience to generate the sensation structures which
Churchland supposes to exist. Such a someone might even be
Mary herself--say, in some possible world in which she is
congenitally blind. In fact, the Knowledge Argument does
not require that it is always possible to come up with such
a person; one case is enough.
This insight defeats Dennett's counterargument. One
might fail to notice that it does by equivocating between
the two premises of Dennett's counterargument to Jackson
which I have been examining. The equivocation is on the
phrase "can imagine." Construe it to mean "c1n have the
ability to imagine," and the "Neuro-omniscience to
Imaginability" premise might well be judged true by
considerations like Churchland's. But then the
"Imaginability to Knowledge" premise is surely false. By
the argument above, merely having the ability to imagine red
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in some possible world does not entail having any particular
knowledge of red in the actual world. Mary can
hypothetically have the ability to imagine red in some
world, one in which her mental powers are intact, without
having knowledge of what it is like in the actual world, let
us suppose because of the congenital blindness. On the
other hand, construe the phrase to mean "would have the
ability to imagine" and the second premise is true: if Mary
would actually have the ability to imagine red, then she
would know what it is like. But then the first premise is
surely false (or at least unsupported by anything Dennett or
Churchland argue): neuroscientific omniscience does not
alone entail that one would have the ability to imagine red.
For people's powers of imagination vary; rank the
powers of imaginatively bringing to mind the sight of red,
consider the worst case of such powers in an otherwise
normal human being, and select the possible world in which
such worst-case powers happen to be Mary's. It is surely
plausible that there are worst cases of these powers that
are consistent with Jackson's assumption that Mary does not
know before her release, and therefore was factually unable
to have imagined, what it is like to see red.2"
26. Owen Flanagan (Qp. cit., p. 104) offers this
possibility about how Mary might grasp what it is like to
see red without actually having seen it: "Suppose that she
discovers a novel way to tweak the red channel. She
discovers that staring at a black dot for a minute and then
quickly downing a shot of brandy produces red
hallucinations." In his Color £.. Philosophers
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A related point can be made about Dennett's "figuring
out." Dennett may seem to have improved on Churchland's
argument by eliminating the flaw just noted. Mary's vast
neuroscientific knowledge may seem to guarantee that she
would be able to figure out everything that can be figured
out, even if (as I just argued) it does not guarantee that
she would be able to imagine everything that can be
imagined. Any improvement, however, is illusory. As I
claimed before, if figuring out what it is like to see red
in Mary's situation does not require imagining it, then
figuring out will not be sufficient to gain her complete
knowledge of what it is like. Some form of acquaintance
with the appearance of red is required and perception of red
objects is unavailable to her. If, on the other hand,
figuring out does require imagining, then Dennett confronts
the same problems I argued to face Churchland.
Clearly Dennett needs more than just that Mary
figure out or imagine. Even if Mary could figure out what
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1988), pp. 91-92, C. L. Hardin
offers other ways in which one might do this. But, again,
all this is beside the point. A friend of the Knowledge
Argument can acknowledge the possibility that in creatures
like us the neuroscientific expertise Mary has would enable
her to grasp phenomenal red, even without seeing it
exemplified in objects. The critic of the Knowledge
Argument, however, must take the position that her
neuroscientific expertise would not just enable her to do
this but would constitute the grasping of phenomenal red,
and this is implausible. For it seems easy to imagine a
person in Mary's shoes, someone perhaps unlike Mary
biologically, who doesn't have the powers of hallucination
Flanagan supposes but about whom we would say the things
Jackson says of Mary.
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it was like from Dennett's reasoning, still she has to
figure it out. That means that her knowledge of what it is
like to see red is something over and above her
neurophysiological knowledge of the factors Jackson and
Dennett cite. That is all Jackson needs to reach his
conclusion. Dennett's conclusion that she learns nothing
new requires that Mary must know what it is like given her
physical knowledge--in fact, that her physical knowledge
constitutes her knowing what it is like. But then, there is
no longer any need for her to figure anything out.
Dennett's position ought to be that the
neurophysiological omniscience Jackson assumes of Mary
requires that she has already figured out what it is like to
see red. But what she must already have figured out
includes not just recognitional but also imaginative
knowledge, and it is this that makes Dennett's view
untenable. Suppt., that Mary ware nbIa tQ imagine what it
is like to see red due to her neurological knowledge. More
is needed. Just as Dennett's argument requires that she
must hay figured it out, it also requires that she muast
have been able to imagine it."27 Only this, on the story
Dennett must make, would complete Mary's knowledge.
27. If Churchland is correct that Mary can sometimes
construct what it is like in her visual imagination,
however, then it is not true that Mary miaat imajine or ma§Z
have imagined it, no more than she must imagine what it's
like to see a golden mountain in order to know what it's
like to do so.
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Churchland, however, does not argue that she musat have Dgn
able to imagine it, only that she ca ha been, and it is
hard to see how he could make the stronger claim plausible.
Once again, it seems possible for there to be Marys who are
poor at imaginatively calling to mind the ways things appear
even though they are good, in fact omniscient, at gaining
explicitly physical knowledge of things. "28
28. There may well be a further difficulty. Previously
I distinguished between recognitional knowledge and
imaginative knowledge of what it is like to see red. A
point similar to the one I make for imaginative knowledge
may well equally be made against Dennett's case for
believing that Mary has complete recognitional knowledge.
The fact that Dennett requires that Mary, in order to know
what it is like to recognize red or blue in advance of
seeing chromatic color, "figure out a way of identifying
neurophysiological effects 'from the inside'" suggests that
there is a first-person aspect to the concepts she uses.
She thus must correlate what she conceives "from the inside"
on the basis of introspection with what her objective
neurophysiological theory tells her about the workings of
the human nervous system apart from any such correlations.
But then the same point works against the recognition
argument: Mary may be poor at correlating her "inside" with
her "outside" while still knowing all the neurology Jackson
supposes. Dennett oupaht tQ ho that Mary can recognize red
or blue in virtue of her third-person neuroscience alone.
If she could do that, she would not need any "tricky ways"
of correlating third-person talk with secondary qualities,
which she has an impoverished view of, but would instead
correlate it with primary qualities, which she conceives
normally. Of course, just what the boundary is between
primary and secondary qualities is part of what is at issue
here, but Dennett's position surely loses much of any
initial plausibility it had as the "inside" Mary can use as
a basis to figure out the rest shrinks.
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IV. Knowing How, Knowing That and Knowing About
I have devoted as much detail to the Dennett-Churchland
position as I have because I believe it to be an extremely
important one. My counterargument shows that unless there
is a defect in the mechanics of the Knowledge Argument or a
deep flaw in our common sense about Mary's experiences, then
the standard positions about the nature of the mind are
untenable. This is true not only of physicalism but of
functionalism. The intuitions that Mary will not know what
it is like to see red just on the basis of knowing physical
properties of herself seem clear-cut. But the intuitions
against analytic functionalism ought to be just as strong.
The analytic functionalist asserts an k priori connection
between mental terms or properties and functional
characterizations, but it would seem that Mary might know
every functional characterization without knowing what it is
like to see red. Functionalists have developed ingenious
strategies against the standard anti-functionalist
arguments, such as the argument from the possibility of
spectrum inversion. They have argued, for example, that our
dispositions are intrinsic to our color experiences and that
because of that spectrum inversion is impossible.2" Even
29. Dennett argues this, ap. Lit., pp. 375-389. See also
C. L. Hardin, "Reply to Levine," Ptilosohical Psxcholoav 4
(1991), pp. 41-50.
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if they were right about this, Mary's experiences show that
functionalism is still prima facie untenable, since knowing
everything about these dispositions (and any other causal
properties you include) seems insufficient for generating
knowledge in Mary of what it is like to see red. Again, the
truth of functionalism (or physicalism) would require that
our common sense about Mary is deeply flawed or that there
is a defect in the very strategy of appealing to Mary's
experiences.
Consider now a complaint against the Knowledge Argument
different from Dennett's and Churchland's. This is that the
argument goes wrong when it assumes in the second premise
that Mary before release is ignorant of information--
something propositional or intentional. Sometimes called
the Ability Hypothesis, this view has it that Mary, before
her release, is not ignorant of information but rather
lacking in ability--that Mary lacks know-how that she could
not get just by obtaining information. On this view,
Jackson's premise (2) is unsupported. The Ability
Hypothesis plays on the intuition that some of our
knowledge--such as Roger Clemens' knowledge of how to throw
a 95-mile-per-hour fastball wherever he wants it to go--is
not knowledge of some body of information, or "knowledge
jhat ...," but rather is ability, or "knowledge bQW...."
This does not mean that Clemens is inarticulate about his
fastball--in fact, he has plenty to say about it. It means
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rather that his accurate throwing of the fastball is not
causally dependent, at least not entirely, on the kind of
prior information he might report when speaking it."
Although I share Jackson's view that the Ability
Hypothesis is an incorrect assessment of Mary's situation,
Jackson's own counterargument to the Ability Hypothesis is
unsatisfactory. He contends that since Mary not only gains
knowledge of what it is like to see red for herself but
comes to know more about the experiences oL others as well,
it follows that she gains more than abilities. If she were
a skeptic about other minds and doubted that she had gained
knowledge of others, he argues, she would not be doubting
abilities, which "were a known constant throughout. ,31 But
why can it not be said that, in such a case, what Mary
doubts is just another ability--her ability to peer into
other minds, since she doubts there are any?
The real problem with the Ability Hypothesis is the
intuition underlying it that draws a firm line between
"knowing that" and "knowing how." Sometimes the two forms
of knowledge are much closer than the intuition allows.
Generally, if Roger Clemens knows hkw to throw his accurate
fastball, then he will have "knowledge that" he can report
with sentences like, "I know that my accurate fastball is
30. See Lawrence Nemirow's review of Thomas Nagel's
Mortal Ouestions, Philosophical Review 89 (1980), pp. 475-
476; and Lewis, gp. gic., esp. pp. 514-518.
31. Jackson, ag. cit., p. 293.
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thrown like this," demonstrating with an accurate throw. If
I know how to play golf, then generally I have knowledge I
can report in forms of words like, "I know that golf is
played like this." The main exception to the general claim
that "knowledge hQW" entails "knowledge that" is the kind of
case in which I fail to realize that tis ability is the
ability to play golf or in which Roger Clemens, suffering
amnesia, forgets what his pitching ability is fLg. In such
a case the exception is shown by the fact that I can say of
Clemens, for example, that he still knows 3Q to throw a
fastball for a strike over the inside corner of the plate
but he no longer knows t•tA his ability can be described
this or any other way. But this exception is irrelevant to
the case at hand. It makes no sense to say of someone that
she knows how to recognize color but has forgotten that
recognizing color is like that. As Brian Loar writes,
"Knowing how a state feels is knowing that it feels a
certain way."32 The claim that Mary before her release
lacks information--that is, lacks "knowledge thbf"--and
subsequently gains it thus remains untouched, since the
Ability Hypothesis does not offer a genuine alternative to
it.
32. Brian Loar, og. Lit., p. 85. This way of
assimilating knowing hbw to knowing that does not commit the
fallacy, which Ryle rightly points out, of assuming that
intelligent performance requires observance of rules or
application of criteria; see ThM Concept Qt Hindd, gp. it-,
p. 29.
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Now consider an argument along a different line.
Churchland asserts that Jackson's argument is "a prima Lakie
case of an argument invalid by reason of equivocation on a
critical term." The term he questions is "knows about."
(1) Mary (before her release) knows everything
physical and functional there is to know about
other people.
(2) Mary (before her release) does not know everything
there is to know about other people (because she
learns something about them on her release).
(3) There are truths about other people (and herself)
which escape the physicalist-functionalist story.
Premise (1), he writes, is "plausibly true," given Jackson's
story about Mary, "only on the interpretation of 'knows
about' that casts the object of knowledge as something
propositional, as something adequately expressible in an
English sentence." Premise (2) is plausible only on the
interpretation casting the object of knowledge "as something
nonpropositional, as something inarticulable, as something
that is non-truth-valuable. 3""
But are there really two such separate interpretations
of "knows about"? Churchland gives us no reason to think
there are, besides pointing out two kinds of knowledge. But
that is no more reason for thinking "knows about" equivocal
33. Paul Churchland, A Neurocomputational Perspective
(Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1989), p. 68.
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than the existence of paperbacks and hardbacks is reason for
thinking "book" equivocal. Even were I to grant that, if
premise (1) is true, then it is true in virtue of Mary's
having mastered something propositional ad articulable, and
that, if premise (2) is true, it is true in virtue of Mary's
missing something nonpropositional gr inarticulable,
Churchland's point would not follow. Why are these not just
Mary's having some "knowledge," understood univocally, and
lackina same other "knowledge," understood the same univocal
way? Why should we believe "Mary" is the subject of a
different verb in premise (1) and premise (2)? After all,
it is perfectly intelligible to claim that Mary comes to
know about other people oth every physical characterization
true of them aD what it is like for them to experience
chromatic color. Following Loar's suggestion, we can
regiment this claim to read that, for all other people, Mary
knows two sorts of one-place open sentences to be true of
them: that such-and-such a physical characterization is true
of them, and that experiencing such-and-such a chromatic
color is for them like that. (Here the demonstratum is a
paradigm experience of the such-and-such chromatic color at
issue).
Churchland challenges Jackson to provide a univocal
interpretation of "knows about" that makes the premises
plausibly true at the same time. Churchland constructs his
own nonequivocal argument, replacing Jackson's premises with
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(1') and (2') and Jackson's conclusion with (3').
Churchland's "Nonequivocal" Argument
(1') For any knowable X and for any form £ of
knowledge, if X is about humans and X is physical
in character, then Mary knows by f about x.
(2') There is a knowable X and a form of knowledge
such that X is about humans and Mary does not know
by f about x.
(3') There is a knowable X such that x is about humans
and x is not physical in character.3"
The "nonequivocal" argument is unsound, Churchland tells us,
because "there is something about persons (their color
sensations, or identically, their coding vectors in their
visual pathways), and there is some form of knowledge (an
antecedently partitioned prelinguistic taxonomy), such that
Mary lacks that form of knowledge of that [physical] aspect
of persons." This is supposed to be what it is for her to
be unacquainted with what it is like to see red. Of course,
she purportedly has another form of knowledge, knowledge by
description, of this same physical aspect of persons. Thus,
premise (2') is true and premise (1') is false.
Initially, Churchland's supposition that Mary has
knowledge by acquaintance and lacks knowledge by description
of one and the same thing may not seem troubling. After
34. For ease of exposition I replace Churchland's
expression "knows(L) about" with the more conventional "knows
by i about."
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all, consider a characterization of the following sort.
(4) To notice that a tomato is red has that
property."3
At least initially, one can make sense of the claim that
Mary knows (4) to be true by description although not by
acquaintance: to specify the referent of the demonstrative,
one goes on to give a detailed physio-anatomical
description. And one might think that Mary could know one
and the same thing by acquaintance (instead of by
description) by specifying the referent of the demonstrative
through producing a paradigmatic experience of seeing red.
If the first demonstration could pick out the same state as
the second demonstration, then it would be possible to say
that the same object of knowledge was picked out by
different forms of knowledge in virtue of the two
demonstrations.
But it is not enough for Churchland to produce only a
single case like this. Churchland's account of why the
"nonequivocal" argument is unsound requires that everything
knowable by acquaintance be knowable, in principle, by
description. What, then, is it like to know (5) by
35. As Michael Tye does in his "The Subjective
Qualities of Experience," Kind 98 (July 1986), pp. 12-13,
footnote 19. Tye's example is closely related, and his
account of it, a response to Horgan (see below), is much
like the one that I entertain here.
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description?
(5) To be in that state (demonstrated by giving a
physio-anatomical description) is to be in that
state (demonstrated by a paradigm phenomenal
experience).
As a materialist, Churchland must hold that on her release
Mary will know (5) to be true. But for Mary to know (5) to
be true is not for her to know by a new form of knowledge
something she already knew by physio-anatomical description.
She must know something new, and not just by a new form of
knowledge.
The point is a familiar one since Frege.'6 Let "R" be
a referring expression the reference of which I fix with a
physio-anatomical description. Let "S" be a referring
expression the reference of which I fix by ostending, so to
speak, a phenomenal experience as a paradigm. The following
two statements have different cognitive significance.
(6) R = R
(6') R = S
It is a matter of some dispute why (6) and (6') differ in
cognitive significance, but there is no dispute that to know
36. See Gottlob Frege, "On Sense and Reference," in P.
T. Geach and Max Black, eds., Translations from the
Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege (Oxford: Blackwell,
1952), p. 56.
151
(6) true is to know something in some sense emnty, while to
know (6') true is to know something substantive. In any
case, to know (6)
true and to know (6') true is to know tw Mifferent things
and not to know the ama thina by different forms Lf
knowledge.
Thus, Churchland's first "nonequivocal" premise is
false as Churchland claims but for a different reason. It
is false that Mary before her release knows every physically
characterized item of information by every form of
knowledge, for there is a physically characterized item of
information--different from any (not, as Churchland claims,
the same as at least one) of which she has knowledge--which
she does not know by acquaintance.
Still, while Churchland is correct that his argument is
unsound, he overlooks a different "nonequivocal" argument
which derives the same conclusion (3') from two true
premises. Before her release, Mary knows every item of
information characterized physically by at least some form
of knowledge, whether by description or by acquaintance.
But there is an item of information she does not know by any
form of knowledge. Thus, (1") and (2") are both true, and
(3') follows.
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A Sound "Noneauivocal" Argument
(1") For any knowable x there is a form f of knowledge
such that if x is about humans and X is physical
in character, then Mary knows by £ about x.
(2") There is a knowable x such that for every form of
knowledge f, if X is about humans then it is false
that Mary knows by £ about x.
(3') There is a knowable X such that x is about humans
and X is not physical in character.
V. The Real Problem with Jackson's Conclusion
The real problems with Jackson's argument concern not
Jackson's premises but his anti-physicalist conclusion.
Some of these are problems first identified by Terence
Horgan, and I will build here on his original presentation.
If we take Jackson's premises, contrary to Churchland, to be
about the presence and absence in Mary of knowledge of
different things, we can take these different things to be
different items of information. In that case, we have an
argument for a dualism of information into paradigmatically
physical information and the introspective information Mary
comes by on her release. But, as Horgan argues, a dualism
of information does not guarantee a dualism of properties,
since distinct items of information can be about the same
property. Thus, he argues, we have no reason to conclude
that physicalism is false because of an excess of
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properties.
Horgan illustrates his case by considering two
statements: "Superman can fly" and "Clark Kent can fly."
These statements express different information even though
they predicate the same property of the same individual.
Horgan argues that it is similarly open to the physicalist
to allow that statements made in language paradigmatically
mental (and, thus, in language not paradigmatically
physical) express different information from statements that
explicitly predicate physical properties and relations of
wholly physical entities. For Horgan holds that the mental-
language statements still predicate the same physical
properties and relations of the same wholly physical
entities as do the explicit siE&tements. Horgan illustrates
his point with the following statement which I label (7).
(7) Seeing ripe tomatoes has this property.
Assume that Mary, in using (7) to express new knowledge
acquired after her release, uses the demonstrative "this
property" to designate a color-quale, a phenomenal property,
instantiated in experience contemporaneous with her
statement. There may be a question, given that Mary has all
relevant physical information, how a physicalist can make
sense of further information expressed in language which (a)
is not paradigmatically physical but (b) predicates physical
properties and relations of physical entities. From where
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would the further information come? Both statements about
Superman, even though they express different information,
express physical information after all, constructed of
language paradigmatically physical. Any uncontroversial
pair of statements Horgan could find to illustrate his point
about the intentionality of information would be constructed
of language paradigmatically physical or topic-neutral.
Doesn't it just beg the question simply to assert, without
argument, that the same point can be made across modalities
of information--that two statements expressing,
respectively, mental and physical information can predicate
the same properties and relations of the same ontities? But
according to Horgan, it is not merely open to the
physicalist to assert that the entities referred to and the
properties and relations expressed by (7) are physical--it
is true.
Sentence [(7)] expresses new information because Mary
has a new perspective on phenomenal redness: viz., the
first-person ostensive perspective. Her new
information is about the phenomenal color-property a
experienced. Thus she could not have had this
information prior to undergoing relevant experience
herself. But these facts are compatible with
Physicalism; there is no need to suppose that when she
acquires experiential awareness of phenomenal redness,
she thereby comes into contact with a property distinct
from those already countenanced in her prior physical
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account of human perception."7
The account he provides of his assertion that Mary could not
have had the information she expresses by (7) until being
released from the room is inadequate. Horgan's explanation
that one cannot have information about a phenomenal property
"as experienced" before experiencing it is false. Before
experiencing it, Mary can, at least by being told this, know
of the phenomenal property of seeing ripe tomatoes--the
"phenomenal property as experienced"--that it is like the
phenomenal property of seeing bright sunsets. What Horgan
should hayx written is that Mary cannot have knowledge by
acquaintance before having the relevant experience--
knowledge, that is, by what he calls the "first-person
ostensive perspective." Mary can know that the phenomenal
property as experienced has certain properties but she
cannot know, if Horgan is right, what it is like to be
acquainted with the phenomenal property as experienced
before experiencing it. Or, to put it differently, Mary
cannot, before experiencing it, have the first-person
knowledge of the phenomenal property she expresses by
directly referring to the property, if Horgan's account is
correct.
37. Terence Horgan, "Jackson on Physical Information
and Qualia," Philosophical Ouarterli 34 (April 1984), pp.
150-151. Similar points are made by Flanagan, 9p. git., pp.
98-99.
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It seems to me that Jackson has no reply to this
position. In fact, I do not see any possible reply within
the argumentative strategy behind Jackson's version of the
Knowledge Argument. Where exactly, then, do the formal
versions of Jackson's argument which I have discussed--one
with (1) and (2) as premises, the other fuller
representation with (1") and (2") as premises, both with
Jackson's (3) as the conclusion--go wrong? As I have argued
already, not in the premises." Thus, the problem must lie
in the inference to the conclusion. It should be obvious
that both versions are enthymemic. Let me focus on the
fuller version from (1") and (2") to (3).
(1") For any knowable X there is a form t of knowledge
such that if x is about humans and K is physical
in character, then Mary knows by f about X.
(2") There is a knowable K such that for every form of
knowledge f, if x is about humans then it is false
that Mary knows by £ about X.
rQg, (3) there are truths about other people (and
herself) which escape the physicalist story.
The terms "truths about other people" and "the physicalist
story" appear only in the conclusion, not in the premises.
Thus, if a conclusion is to be derived from (1") and (2")
38. Flanagan, Qp. .it., p. 99, makes a mistake about
this. He insists that the error lies in premise (1), but
elsewhere he accedes to Jackson's assumption that Mary knows
the truth of every relevant statement that is explicitly
physical, which is all Jackson says (ibid.) he means by (1).
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using only principles of logic, either (a) it must be
different from (3), or (b) one or more further premises must
be added to the argument.
First, consider option (a), that of altering the
conclusion. The strongest conclusion that can be derived
from (1") and (2") on the basis of principles of logic alone
is Churchland's (3').
(3') There is a knowable X such that X is about humans
and x is not physical in character.
But on its face, (3') is not strong enough to accomplish
Jackson's anti-physicalist aims. It is open to a critic
such as Horgan to insist that although phenomenal knowledge
is not characterized physically--that is, is not explicitly
or paradigmatically physical--it does not provide contact
with any nonphysical property. If the critic is correct,
then there is a gulf between what follows from logic alone,
(3'), and Jackson's anti-physicalist conclusion (3).
Thus, Jackson is left with option (b). In fact,
Jackson means the argument to have a further premise."
eF£urther r"e1se, Version One
If physicalism is true, then if you know everything
expressed or expressible in explicitly physical
language, you know everything.
Jackson's fullest argument for Version One goes as follows.
39. Jackson, gp. g ofi , p. 291.
___ __
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Physicalism is not the noncontroversial thesis that the
actual world is largely physical, but the challenging
thesis that it is entirely physical. This is why
physicalists must hold that complete physical knowledge
is complete knowledge simpliciter. For suppose it is
not complete: then our world must differ from a world,
W(P), for which it is complete, and the difference must
be in nonphysical facts; for our world and W(P) agree
in all matters physical. Hence, physicalism would be
false at our world [though contingently so, for it
would be true at W(P)]. '0
From what Jackson writes here, it is evident that he means
by Version One something like the following.
Version QOne, Jackson's Interpretation
If physicalism is true, then if you know everything
expressed or expressible in explicitly physical
language, you have all states of knowledge you could
have.
Jackson's error should now be apparent. The reductio
does not succeed. Jackson asks us to suppose, contrary to
Version One, that physicalism is true but that, as I have
already argued, complete physical knowledge is not complete
knowledge simpliciter. Contrary to what Jackson writes, it
is not then true that our world must differ from a world
W(P) which agrees in all matters physical with our world and
in which complete physical knowledge is complete knowledge.
40. ThIbid.
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There is no world, W(P), even moderately similar to ours
physically in which complete physical knowledge is complete
knowledge. For in any world containing "knowledge taw" not
characterized physically--at least part of Clemens'
knowledge of how to throw his fastball, for example, is not
physically characterized knowledge--complete physical
knowledge comes up short of complete knowledge. Even after
Clemens might learn everything explicitly physical about
throwing a 95-mile-per-hour fastball accurately, there would
still be something further for him to learn--the doing of
it. This would be so whether or not such "knowledge how" is
a form of "knowledge that." It begs the question then to
suppose that this incompleteness of physical knowledge is
incompatible with physicalism. No reason has been given yet
to suppose that Clemens' knowledge of how to throw the
fastball is not simply some physical state of his brain; to
suppose otherwise would be to assume the dualism that the
advocate of the Knowledge Argument seeks to demonstrate.
A recent defense of Jackson's argument might be thought
to overcome this difficulty, but actually it stumbles in a
similar way. Geoffrey Madell argues that criticisms of
Jackson which rely on a distinction between knowledge by
description and knowledge by acquaintance, as do the
writings of the Churchlands and others, are self-defeating,
since "it must be clear this is not a distinction which is
open to the physicalist to make." This distinction, he
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argues, "amounts to the claim that knowledge must be
grounded in something which eludes description." Whatever
such a thing is, Madell writes, the physicalist must hold
that "it is some configuration of physical elements, and as
such it must be describable. The physicalist cannot
therefore accept that even the most complete physical
description one could give would nevertheless fail to
capture an aspect of what is described."'14 Nor, therefore,
if this were right, could the physicalist even distinguish a
form of knowledge by acquaintance. This criticism, if it is
sound, is general in its impact, defeating Horgan and Lewis
as well. But it is not sound. The Churchlands et al.
accept that states of knowledge by acquaintance are
configurations of physical elements and thus "describable,"
to use Madell's term. The contrast with knowledge by
description is made not on the basis of differences in the
physical describability of the havings of the two forms of
knowledge. Having knowledge by description and having
knowledge by acquaintance, according to physicalists like
the Churchlands, are both physically describable. The
contrast with knowledge by description is instead made on
the basis of differences in the ways in which the two forms
of knowledge represent their objects. Roughly, we can say
41. Geoffrey Madell, "Neurophilosophy: A Principled
Sceptic's Response," Inauiry 29 (1986), p. 155. See also
his Mind And Materialism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press, 1988), pp. 80-83.
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that knowledge by description represents objects of
knowledge in virtue of definite descriptions, whereas
representations employed in knowledge by acquaintance refer
directly and express singular propositions. Or, to use the
Churchlands' different formulation, knowledge by description
is mastery of a "set of descriptive propositions," knowledge
by acquaintance is "prelinguistic representation." In
asserting that knowledge by acquaintance must be
"describable," Madell fails to distinguish between the
assertion that the state itself must be representable in
virtue of definite descriptions, with which the Churchlands
would agree, and the assertion that the state's style of
representation must be that of definite descriptions, which
is false. Because it is false, there is a prima facie
distinction between the two forms of knowledge.42 If one
forgets about this prima facie distinction and assumes that
this exhausts our forms of knowledge, as Madell seems to,
then one arrives at Version Two.
42. Related forms of criticism have been directed at
the Knowledge Argument. Christopher Hill notes, rightly,
that two items of knowledge might have different character
(in Kaplan's sense--see Chapter Seven), as Mary's items of
knowledge do, but have the same content. See his review of
Seager, gp. cit. Christopher Peacocke notes, rightly, that
indexical knowledge can differ from non-indexical knowledge
but have the same propositional content; see his "No Resting
Place: a Critical Notice of The View f•Qm Nowhere, by Thomas
Nagel," The Philosophical Review 98 (1989), pp. 70-71.
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Thm Further Premise, Version Two
If physicalism is true, then all knowledge is knowledge
by description.
So Madell is also off the mark when he assesses physicalism
by Version Two. Nor is it a given--and it is something that
neither Jackson nor Madell choose to demonstrate--that the
physicalist has any problem with distinguishing knowledge by
acquaintance from knowledge by description in virtue of the
former state's style of representation.
To this objection to Madell, there is a natural but
unsuccessful response. If complete knowledge of physical
theory does not give Mary knowledge of what it is like to
see red, it will not give anyone else knowledge of what it
is to h& the state of knowledge of what it is like to see
red. The Madell partisan may object that the same deficit
that exists in Mary's knowledge will be duplicated in all
higher-level knowledge of her knowledge and that the
physicalist can never overcome that deficit. This response
is unsuccessful because while it may be true that if there
is a deficit in Mary's knowledge there will also be one in
all higher-order knowledge of it, it begs the question to
suppose, without further argument, that the physicalist must
overcome that deficit. It ought to be the physicalist
position that he or she is no more required to do that than
to derive knowledge of how to throw the fastball from
complete knowledge o* physical theory.
CHAPTER FIVE PROPERTY DUALISM ARGUMENTS
Even though Jackson's argument begs the question and
Madell's is unsound, a version of the Knowledge Argument can
be constructed that succeeds against the physicalist where
these two fail. It is, however, an argument somewhat
different in form and inspiration. This final section will
be taken up with constructing and defending this alternative
version.
In the first section, I set out the main idea behind
this successful version of the Knowledge Argument, drawing
on the argument for property dualism first discussed in
print--and rejected--by J. J. C. Smart. In the second and
third sections, I try to set out a version of the argument
Smart rejected that is immune to counterexamples. In the
fourth section, I complete my defense of the Knowledge
Argument in terms of this argument. And in the fifth
section, I reply to common-sense objections against both
these forms of argument.
I. The Knowledge Argument and the Property Dualism Argument:
The Main Idea
I have suggested that some knowledge provides routes to
the objects of knowledge distinct from every route provided
by knowledge by description and that at least some of these
cases, too, are entirely compatible with physicalism. These
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are the cases of knowledge by direct reference that I have
just discussed in connection with Jackson and Madell. I
shall presently focus on some cases of knowledge by direct
reference which, by contrast with those just discussed,
appear not to be compatible with physicalism at all.
The point that I shall make is a familiar one. In a
slightly different form, it goes back at least to Smart's
1959 essay "Sensations and Brain Processes," and Smart
contends there it originated with Max Black. Black's point
was something like this. If singular terms are to pick out
referents, they must do so in virtue of properties of those
referents. If the concepts expressed by two singular terms
cannot be known a priori to co-refer (whether it is because
they do not co-refer or because they co-refer A posteriori),
then the singular terms must pick out their referents in
virtue of different properties. Concepts expressed by
singular terms referring to things paradigmatically mental
cannot be known a priori to co-refer with concepts expressed
by singular terms referring to things paradigmatically
physical. It follows, according to this argument, that they
refer in virtue of different properties--it follows, that
is, that mental properties are not physical properties and
that physicalism is thus false. I will call this argument a
Property Dualism Argument.'
1. The clearest and fullest statement of the objection
is that of Stephen White, "Curse of the Qualia," Synthese 68
(1986), pp. 351-353. Labeling it with the name "the
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By illustration, consider first a nonmental case. The
definite descriptions "the 41th President of the United
States" and "the last governor of Arkansas" refer to the
same person, Bill Clinton. Each description refers to
Clinton in virtue of properties of him: he satisfies the
first description in virtue of being the 41th President of
the United States and he satisfies the second description in
virtue of having been the last governor of Arkansas before
the current one. Since the concepts expressed by these
descriptions cannot be known a priori to co-refer (they are
known to co-refer, of course, but only a posteriori) they
refer in virtue of different properties of him. Thus, I
will say that they follow different routes to the referent.
In this way they differ from the descriptions "the 41th
President of the United States" and "the President following
the 40th President of the United States." Here, the
concepts expressed by the two descriptions can be known p
priori to co-refer and pick out Clinton in virtue of iAAe
sgme properties of him.
Nothing so far requires us to abandon physicalism about
persons, presidents or Arkansas governors. It is consistent
with what I have written so far that every one of the
Property Dualism Argument" is due to White. It was first
reported by J. J. C. Smart and linked to Black in Smart's
"Sensations and Brain Processes," in V. C. Chappell, ed.,
The Philosophy of Hind (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-
Hall, 1962), pp. 166-167.
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properties in virtue of which these three descriptions refer
is a physical property and that each of these descriptions
follow one of two different physical routes to the referent.
Contrast this case with the case of a description which
picks out something mental. Assume that both "Clinton's
headache at tiee t" and "Clinton's C-fiber stimulation at t"
uniquely refer and that, moreover, they refer to the same
thing. Since the concepts expressed by the two descriptions
cannot be known a priori to co-refer, it seems reasonable to
conclude that they refer in virtue of different properties.
But the concept expressed by the first cannot be known a
priori to refer to the same thing as ny concept expressed
by any description referring to things paradigmatically
physical (and in this way differs from the concept expressed
by "the 41th President of the United States"). Thus, it
follows that the properties in virtue of which the mental
description refers are distinct from any properties in
virtue of which any paradigmatically physical description
refers. Unless the mental description has a topic-neutral
translation, the properties in virtue of which "Clinton's
headache at t" refers are not physical at all but
irreducibly mental. And pri1nn£§Qie, the topic-neutral
option is unavailable: not only does it seem not be A priori
that mental descriptions co-refer with topic-neutral
translations, but it also seems, on the basis of other
qualia-based counterarguments to functionalism, to be false
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on independent grounds.2
I shall argue that something like this is going on in
the case of the Knowledge Argument. The knowledge Mary had
before she had first seen red and the knowledge Mary came to
have on first seeing something red represent, I will say,
distinct routes to the same thing: the neurological process
of seeing red. Because these two forms of knowledge are not
linked a priori, there must be independent routes to their
common referent in virtue of separate properties of the
common referent. The Knowledge Argument is correct because
of the soundness of a Property Dualism Argument.
First, however, I want to look more closely at Property
Dualism Arguments to see why they work when they do.
II. Black's and White's Versions
Smart represented Black's position this way:
Now it may be said that if we identify an experience
and a brain process and if this identification is, as I
hold it is, a contingent or factual one, then the
experience must be identified as having some property
not logically deducible from the properties whereby we
identify the brain process.... If the property of
being the author of Waverly is the analogue of the
neurophysiological properties of a brain process, what
is the analogue of the property of being author of
lvanhQe? There is an inclination to say: "an
2. See the references cited in footnote 18.
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irreducible, emergent, introspective property."'
Why are psychophysical identities assumed by Black and
Smart to be contingent? It is because they are identities A
posteriori, discoverable by science. Black is assuming as
premises to the argument principles of the following forms
(where "A" and "B" are placeholders for singular terms).
First form. For all A and B, if it is not true a priori
that A = B, then it is false or contingently true that
A = B.
Second frm_. For all A and B, if it is false or
contingently true that A = B, then being A is a
different property from being B.
The remainder of the argument must go something like this.
The statement IA = my having pain at t1 is A posteriori, if
true, for any substitution of a singular term for the
placeholder 1A' that refers in virtue of paradigmatically
physical properties. Thus, being a case of my having of
pain at t either is, or at least involves having, a
nonphysical, irreducibly mental property.
There are two difficulties with Black's argument on
Smart's version. The obvious one, the one which got Smart's
attention, was the inference that experiences have
irreducibly mental properties. All this argument shows, if
3. J. J. C. Smart, Philosophy And Scientific Realism
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), p. 94.
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anything, is that experiences have nonphysical properties.
It does not yet show that all nonphysical properties are
irreducibly mental; it is at least conceivable that some may
be "topic neutral" between the mental and the physical. A
weaker conclusion is thus called for.
The second problem Smart did not see. It is the idea
that psychophysical identities are contingent. This is, at
best, controversial. The argument provides no support for
the idea, since not all statements of the first form are
true. There are identity statements which are not a ri2ri
but which are neither false nor contingent, such as the fact
that heat is mean kinetic energy, which is necessarily true
but known _ posteriori.'
A different and more subtle presentation of this kind
4. Block once suggested (although he apparently no
longer believes this) that Black's argument depends on the
existence of mental objects and that it can be escaped by
replacing reference to mental objects with reference to
mental events, in a manner such as I used in sec. III of
Chapter Two. See Ned Block, "What Is Functionalism?", in
Ned Block, ed., Readings in thIe Philosophy oQ Psychology,
vol. 1 (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1980), p.
182. On this point, Block cites Jaegwon Kim, "Phenomenal
Properties, Psychophysical Laws, and the Identity Theory,"
Monist (1972), pp. 177-192. It may be true that there is no
need to posit a mental property of sharpness, which no brain
state would seem to have, if we reject mental realism about
paina and confine our ontological commitments to the havings
of pains. Those can be identified with the havings of brain
states without our dangling mental properties of sharpness.
Kim and Block are right in this. But it does not follow
that all dangling of mental properties can be dispensed with
this way. For it remains true, priima frcte, once we have
ascended to realism about havings, that we identify events
as havings of mental states differently--by different
routes--from the ways we identify them as havings of
physical states.
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of argument--one that escapes these difficulties--is made by
Stephen White.5 White writes the following.
We are assuming, for simplicity, that a person's
qualitative state of pain at L, say Smith's, is
identical with a physical state, say Smith's brain
state X at t. Even if this is the case, however, not
only do the sense of the expression 'Smith's pain at t'
and the sense of the expression 'Smith's brain state X
at t' differ, but the fact that they are coreferential
cannot be established on a priori grounds. Thus there
must be different properties of Smith's pain (i.e.,
Smith's brain state X) in virtue of which it is the
referent of both terms.
The general principle is that if two expressions
refer to the same object, and this fact cannot be
established a priori, they do so in virtue of different
routes to the referent provided by different modes of
presentation of that referent.... [T]he natural
candidates for these modes of presentation are
properties....
Let us stipulate that a property which is neither
physical nor mental is topic neutral. Since there is
no physicalistic description that one could plausibly
suppose to be coreferential A xriori with an expression
like 'Smith's pain at t', no physical property of a
pain (i.e., a brain state of type X) could provide the
route by which it was picked out by such an expression.
Thus we are faced with a choice between topic neutral
5. Stephen White, op. git. Other presentations of this
kind of argument appear in Richard Rorty, "Incorrigibility
as the Mark of the Mental," Journal at Philosophy (June 25,
1970), p. 399; Ned Block, gp. ait., pp. 179, 182; and
William Lycan, Consciousness (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T.
Press, 1987), p. 9.
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and mental properties....
This argument ... shows that unless there are
topic neutral expressions with which mentalistic
descriptions of particular pains are coreferential A
priori, we are forced to acknowledge the existence of
[irreducibly] mental properties."
White depends on a premise something like the following
one. For a premise with a slightly different form but a
very similar role, Brian Loar uses the label, the Semantic
Premise, and I will borrow that label here.'
The Semantic Premise, Version Qg
For all referring expressions R, and R2, if R, and R2
are coreferential but not known to be a priori, then
there exists a property P by which we pick out the
referent of R1, which is distinct from any the
properties by which we pick out the referent of R2.
Actually the Semantic Premise is derived from two separate
further principles.
One of them is found in Frege and is closely connected
to the Fregean point about cognitive significance used in
Chapter Four against Churchland. It can be put as follows.
The Fregean Premise
For all referring expressions RV and R2, if R& and R2
are coreferential but not A priori,7 then R, and R,
6. Loar, "Phenomenal States," gp. cit., p. 83.
7. Notice that this is untrue if we replace the if-
cluase with "if R, and R2 are not coreferential A priori."
For then it would be inconsistent with Twin Earth cases.
Let us assume that Twin Earth is a world (1) evidentially
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pick out their referent by different modes of
presentation.
In Chapter Four, I pointed out that statements of the form
R = RI ordinarily express different pieces of knowledge
from statements of the form 'R = Si, where 1R1 and IS'
differ. This is so, Frege wrote, because the object
referred to is ordinarily picked out by two different modes
of presentation. When the referring expression 1R' differs
from the referring expression 'SI "only ... by means of its
shape," he writes, then the cognitive value of the two
statements is "essentially equal." In that case, the mode
of presentation is the same. A difference arises "only if
the difference between the signs corresponds to a difference
in the mode of presentation" of the referents."
Frege's account of what modes of presentations
themselves are is left a bit sketchy, and I will leave it
that way, too. Sometimes I will follow Evans and speak of
"ways of thinking" about an object, but we might still
like our world in every respect and (2) materially like our
world in every respect except in the physical composition of
some of its substances. There thus might be a Twin Earth
word "water" which (1) would be phonologically identical to
our word "water" and which (2) has its reference fixed in
virtue of the same superficial properties as those fixing
our word but which (3) would be satisfied by a substance
with a physical microstructure different from H20. Thus,
the Twin Earth referring expression "the water in the solar
system" and the phonologically identical Earth expression
pick out their referents in virtue of the same properties,
but they are not coreferential. Of course, Frege was not
aware of examples of this kind.
8. Frege, Op. gfl., pp. 56-57.
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wonder what those are.' It is sufficient to say that a
mode of presentation is whatever explains the difference in
knowledge between knowledge of the form 1R = RI and
knowledge of the form 'R = S i, where 'R' differs from S'S in
more than shape. Another way to put it is this. Assume
that a subject has a belief of the form 'R 'si and
disbelieves or withholds belief from a statement of the form
'S r'si, where IR1 and 'Si corefer. We might say that a mode
of presentation is whatever explains the subject's
difference in attitude without attributing irrationality to
the subject.
Frege allows that even knowledge A priori of the form
'R = Si such as we find in mathematics will use different
modes of presentation, so long as it is not of the form 'R =
R i. Since pieces of knowledge a posteriori of the first
form will always differ from knowledge of the form 'R = R ,
according to Frege's account, the A posteriori will always
introduce distinct modes of presentation.
The argument needs another principle beyond the Fregean
Premise to derive the Semantic Premise. Only with a further
principle can there be a property difference. That
principle, which White does not spell out, might go like
this.
9. Gareth Evans, The larxeties at Reference (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 14-22.
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The Property Difference Premise, Version Qne
For all M., M2, if it is true but not a priori that MH
and M2 are different modes of presentation of some
object 6, then there exists a property P by which MH is
a mode of presentation of 6 distinct from any property
by which M2 is a mode of presentation of 6.
White's argument for this assumes that if there were two
modes of presentation of some object not linked a priori,
then there is a possible world in which subjects
epistemically identical to us might find the modes
presenting different objects. But if there are different
objects, they must be picked out in virtue of distinct
properties, which in the actual world belong to the same
object. The two modes of presentation associated with
"heat" and "mean kinetic energy," for example, can come
apart in a world epistemically like ours and lead to two
different things. That means that in the actual world heat
has distinct properties in virtue of which the different
things in the other world could be picked out separately.
The remainder of this version of the Property Dualism
Argument, then, goes like this. No physicalistic
description is coreferential A priori with the term "my
having pain at t." But if the term "my having pain at t"
picks out its referent in virtue of properties of the
referent, though not physical ones, then it picks it out in
virtue of either mental or topic neutral properties. Thus,
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if there is no topic-neutral description coreferential a
priori with the term "my having pain at t", I pick out the
expression's referent in virtue of irreducibly mental
properties.
This version of the Property Dualism Argument does not
have the difficulties I pointed out in Smart's account of
Black's argument. It follows Smart in recognizing that the
initial argument leaps too quickly to the conclusion that
nonphysical properties are irreducibly mental, since there
are "topic neutral" properties that are nonphysical but not
irreducibly mental. Further, Smart's contingent-identity
premises are replaced with the one Semantic Premise. Thus,
by this modification, there may be singular terms not linked
a priori which are coreferential by necessity, yet pick out
their common referent by way of distinct properties. This
is enough for the property dualism argument Black intends.
III. Direct Reference and the Property Dualism Argument
Now, a physicalist line of counterargument to the
Property Dualism Argument goes this way. Why, it might be
objected, must one of the independent Fregean routes to
mental pieces of the world be by way of nonphysical
properties? Why can't the mental and physical routes be
distinct but both physical, reaching their referents via
mental and physical properties which are distinct but koth
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physical properties of the world? Why isn't it open to the
physicalist to claim that there is a physicalistic
description coreferential a priori with the referring
expression "my having pain at t"--namely, "my having pain at
The objector may grant that "my having pain at t" is
not a paradignatically physicalistic expression; it does not
appear to be a physicalistic description. But the objector
argues that it does not follow from the expression's not
being coreferential with a paradigmatically physicalistic
expression that it is not coreferential a priori with any
physicalistic expression at all. The proponent of the
Property Dualism Argument, according to the objector,
neglects two possibilities. One is that paradigmatically
mentalistic expressions are a species of physicalistic
expressions (though not of paradigmatically physicalistic
ones). The other is that mental properties are a species of
physical properties. Neglecting these possibilities, the
argument begs the question, since the absence of these
possibility is, in effect, what the argument tries to show.
The objector can also point to paradigmatic property
identities from the physical sciences--such as the identity
of heat and mean kinetic energy--as models of how mental
properties might just ke physical properties.
The reply to this objection is that the mental route
cannot be by way of paradigmatic physical properties,
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whether they be properties identified by theoretical science
or by more familiar means. We pick out mental pieces of the
world in ways distinct from any of the ways paradigmatic to
our picking out physical pieces. The point of the Knowledge
Argument can therefore be made with respect to any
paradigmatically physical properties you choose. If we try
to suppose that the mental properties just are physical, the
problem remains. To suppose mental and physical properties
identical, we require two separate kinds of routes to t
via distinct sets of properties, one set irreducibly mental.
Thus, even if "pain" and "C-fiber stimulation" were
coreferential on the model of "heat" and "mean kinetic
energy," we would still expect what Loar calls "higher order
reference-fixers" to provide separate routes to their common
referent by way of separate properties.10
There is, however, an inadequacy in the account so far.
The referential potential of descriptions like "Clinton's
headache at t" actually depends on the referential potential
of expressions that refer directly--noninferentially,
without the mediation of individual concepts or Fregean
senses or satisfaction conditions or any other mediating
sort of thing. Thus, if the description "Clinton's headache
at t" is to pick out a headache then there must be some
device for picking out such things1 directly, as Clinton
10. Loar, gp. cit., pp. 83-84.
11. Although not necessarily Clinton's headache at t--
perhaps Clinton has been struck dumb at t.
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himself does in focussing on the feeling running from his
left temple to his right and thinking to himself, "11il
hurts." Otherwise, there would always be, when somebody
used a description to pick out something phenomenal, the
further question of what tl was or of what that was like.
Now, a natural objection to the kind of argument for
irreducibly mental properties just advanced is one that
parallels Horgan's reply to the Knowledge Argument. Horgan
argued that it was conceivable that referring expressions of
separate types could refer to the same property. This new
objection is that they also might refer by wfy g either the
same properties or no properties of the referent at all.
Thus, the two descriptions, mental and physical, would
differ not in the categories of properties they refer in
virtue of but in the two routes their referring takes, both
of which could be wholly physical. It is natural to think
that some phase of the routes some singular terms take in
referring to qualitative mental states is a direct
reference. This will be true of both phenomenal-concept
terms like "pain" or "headache" and demonstratives like the
grammatical subject of the statement "This hurts." On the
other hand, no phase of the routes theoretical singular
terms of, say, neurophysiology take in referring to physical
states is ordinarily a direct reference. The objector thus
asserts that it begs the question to suppose that these
routes cannot be wholly physical. The objector explains
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that we can be misled to believe that two mutually exclusive
sorts of properties exist by the existence of the two very
different sorts of routes to the referent.
The objector has located a flaw in even this latest
version of the Semantic Premise. So long as two referring
expressions represent a referent by different styles of
reference, they may pick out the referent in virtue of the
same properties of it. Say I look down and to the left,
identifying the red pen sitting here, and utter to myself a
sentence of the form, "That is D1," where the Q-position is
filled by a definite description. Suppose that the
demonstrative picks out the pen perceptually, in virtue of a
set of the pen's properties 9~, through P%. Now let the
definite description be the expression that makes explicit
these properties Q, through 6, and picks the pen out in
virtue of them. Given normal human ways of knowing such
things, it might be a posteriori that that--the pen--was the
thing jointly satisfying the set of properties. Even though
I pick it out demonstratively by those properties of it, I
do not know explicitly that I do, as I would if the
reference were to occur by way of senses or satisfaction
conditions. It might be by way of a perceptual gestalt.
Thus, it might be a substantive item of information and
not A priori that the thing I pick out has them. Still, it
would be untrue that the two expressions picked out the
common referent in virtue of distinct properties. It might
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aeem because of the way I pick out the pen perceptually that
there could be an epistemically identical situation in which
a counterpart definite description could fail to pick out
the same thing as a zounterpart to my demonstrative, but
this is an illusion.
This is an unusual case. Yet the objector's point is
well-taken. A wholly physical creature could make separate
references, linked a posteriori, to some aspect of itself
not in virtue of distinct properties of the aspect but
rather in virtue of distinct styles of reference to it--
demonstrative, say, versus descriptive. Reference to it
might be fixed by a higher-order reference fixer which
exploits the same properties of it in picking it out that
the creature does explicitly in picking it out
descriptively.
While the objector is correct about this general point,
however, the case of qualitative states is special. While
it may be true that demonstrative reference to qualitative
states does not depend upon Fregean senses or intervening
concepts or any other mediating entities, it does not follow
that we can understand it without appeal to phenomenal
properties. Not only are phenomenal properties required to
make sense of direct demonstrative reference to qualitative
states but irreducibly mental properties are prima fjcie
required.
The success of demonstrative reference depends upon the
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demonstratum's being picked out for demonstrator and
audience by a mode or manner of presentation. Following a
standard account of how this happens for demonstrative
reference, I suggest that the presentation must have at
least three aspects. These are a cene• of which the
demonstratum is a part, a directing intention on the
demonstrator's part for what is to be demonstrated in the
scene, and an externalization of this directing intention
for conveying it, such as a pointing. Cases where arguably
no mode or manner of presentation is needed to fix
reference, such as standard uses of the pure indexicals "I,"
"now" and "here," are not uses of "true demonstratives," to
use Kaplan's words. Such cases would seem to be irrelevant
anyhow to questions concerning normal demonstrative
reference to qualitative states.
In those cases in which demonstrative reference picks
out a demonstratum by a mode of presentation, this is
possible only in virtue of properties of the demonstratum
which the demonstrator indicates to an audience.12
Demonstrative reference to a public audience would not be
12. The term "manner of presentation" and most of the
rest of the terminology that appears in this paragraph comes
from David Kaplan, "Demonstratives" and "Afterthoughts," in
Joseph Almog, John Perry and Howard Wettstein, eds., Themes
Lrom Kaplan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp.
489ff., 514f., 526f. and 582f. My one addition is my
technical use of "scene" in place of Kaplan's non-technical
use of the term "picture." His use conceals, I think, the
fact that the demonstratum is normally demonstrated in
virtue of a perspective on it in the world, not indirectly,
in virtue of some representation of it.
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successful--or would at least be faulty--unless the
demonstratum were (1) part of a scene, (2) the object of a
directing intention, and (3) the target of an
externalization. None of these three conditions could be
satisfied except in virtue of properties of the
demonstratum. In the case of direct demonstrative reference
to a qualitative state,13 where demonstrator and audience
are identical, the properties of the state in virtue of
which the demonstration individuates it must be mental
properties, since only mental properties are available to do
this. It is the state's mental properties in virtue of
which the state is part of a scene and is singled out in
that scene by a directing intention.
That these properties are irreducibly mental is shown
by an argument like the one employed above with respect to
descriptions. It follows prima facie from the fact that
modes of presentation associated with direct demonstrative
reference to qualitative states cannot be shown p priori to
be of the same demonstrata as modes of presentation of
things paradigmatically physical or modes of presentation
employing topic-neutral forms of demonstration. In the
latter case, I observe again that this appears not only not
13. As opposed to indirecf demonstrative reference to a
qualitative state, in which case the demonstrator need not
have knowledge by acquaintance of the qualitative state and
does not display such knowledge in the demonstration, as
when I point toward a grimacing Clinton and say, "Thft
headache."
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A priori but, given the absent-qualia argument against
functionalism, false.
The physicalist might object that it is not helpful to
compare demonstrative reference of a phenomenal sort and
demonstrative reference of a physicalistic sort, as the
prima facie argument above does, since demonstrative
references of the latter sort could never even rise to the
level of demonstrative references of the former sort. The
reason the two are not linked A priori, the physicalist
might object, is not that direct demonstrative references to
things paradigmatically physical take place in virtue of
distinct properties; the reason, it is said, is that there
are no direct demonstrative references of a physicalist sort
at all.
The reply to the physicalist's objection is that the
physicalist has the direction of explanation reversed.
There are no direct demonstrative references of a
physicalist sort because direct reference of the normal sort
makes use of phenomenal properties beyond those employed in
physical reference. There could not be direct reference of
the familiar sort without access to phenomenal states in
virtue of special properties of them distinct from their
physical properties.
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IV. A Different Interpretation of the Knowledge Argument
The defense of the Knowledge Argument now goes like
this. We know our qualitative mental states by
acquaintance, picking them out by direct reference as states
"like Lhia," so to speak, ostending to ourselves some
occurrent state.
If physicalism is true, then all routes to the
referents of the singular terms we use to refer to aspects
of ourselves run via physical properties or topic-neutral
properties, properties neither physical nor mental. Thus,
if physicalism is true, then all routes from the knowledge
we have of our qualitative mental states to the states
themselves that are the objects of that knowledge run via
physical or topic-neutral properties of those states. That
is, if physicalism is true, then all routes from such states
of knowledge to the objects of such states of knowledge are
of one kind--let me call it a physical-functional kind. But
there are at least two kinds. Besides routes of a physical-
functional kind, there are also routes that run via
irreducibly mental properties.
Thus, while Horgan is correct that the intentionality
of Mary's knowledge is consistent with the possibility that
the physical knowledge she has before her release has the
same objects as the phenomenal knowledge she comes to have
after release, he is wrong that this is compatible with
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physicalism. Mary could only come to possess the "first-
person ostensive perspective" on her qualitative states--the
new perspective in virtue of which she makes the discovery
of what it is like to see red and can refer to it directly--
if she could pick those states out in virtue of irreducibly
mental properties of them. The physicalist cannot at this
time say how it is that Mary comes to have, if she does, a
second kind of knowledge via a second referential route to
her phenomenal states--that is, why it is that there is a
"first-person ostensive perspective" at all--and it is hard
to see how the physicalist could ever say how.
It is not because there is a form of knowledge beyond
the paradigmatic forms of scientific and everyday knowledge
we have of physical things that the physicalist story is
incomplete--there are forms of such knowledge fully
compatible with physicalism. Nor will it do to claim, as
Madell does, that the physicalist cannot distinguish the
knowledge by description we have of physical things from the
knowledge by acquaintance we have of our phenomenal states--
these differ at least in their forms of representation.
Rather, physicalism runs aground for different reasons.
If Mary has phenomenal knowledge that picks out its
objects in virtue of different properties from any in virtue
of which her physical knowledge picks out its objects, then
physicalism is false. The fact that Mary discovers what it
is like to see red after knowing everything physical about
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seeing red assures that Mary's phenomenal knowledge picks
out its objects in virtue of different properties--
irreducibly different ones. Thus, physicalism is false.
This is the true version of the Knowledge Argument. It
requires as a premise not the claim that Mary, despite her
neuroscientific omniscience, lacks some knowledge or other
but that she lacks the very specific knowledge of what it is
like to see red. The further premise that is required by
the Knowledge Argument, then, is something like this.
The Further Premise. Final Version
If physicalism is true, then if Mary knows everything
expressed or expressible in explicitly physical
language about what it is like to see red, she knows
everything about what it is like to see red.
And this is true because of a Property Dualism Argument. It
is true because physicalism would require that her knowing
everything expressed or expressible in explicitly physical
language about what it is like to see red would be knowing
by every route there normally could be--that is, the only
route there normally would be--about what it is like to see
red. But, of course, there is at least one other route for
Mary, as Mary discovers on her release.
This answers critics who would argue that whatever
difference between knowledge by description of matters
physical and knowledge by acquaintance of matters mental
leads some to infer a difference in types of facts and
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properties is nothing more than a difference in styles of
representation. It is true, as such critics suggest, that
somewhere along the reference chain there is a divergence in
styles of representation, matters physical being represented
in virtue of definite descriptions, matters of a mental
nature in virtue of direct reference. But these forms of
representation would not succeed in picking out their
referents, the objects of knowledge, unless there were a
further difference. The form of representation picking out
qualitative mental states does so in virtue of properties
distinct from the paradigmatically physical properties in
virtue of which neurophysiological descriptions refer.
Now consider the argument of Brian Loar, who attempts
to meet this objection to physicalism by giving a detailed
description of how one might refer to or have knowledge of
physical properties of one's own experiences through what
Horgan calls the "first-person ostensive perspective." He
suggests that we can be led through the first-person
ostensive perspective of what he calls "recognitional/
imaginative concepts" to the very same physical properties
of our brains that we are led to by way of the third-person
perspective of the theoretical concepts of neuroscience.
Given a normal background of cognitive capacities,
certain recognitional or discriminative dispositions
suffice for having specific recognitional concepts,
which is just to say, suffice for the capacity to make
judgments that depend specifically on those
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recognitional dispositions. Simple such judgments have
the form: the object (event, situation) . is neg 91
that sin4, where the cognitive backing for the
predicate is just a recognitional disposition, i.e. a
disposition to classify objects (events, situations)
together, that often but not inevitably is linked with
a specific imaginative capacity.
If a recognitional/imaginative concept is linked to the
ability to class together things with the same objective
property, Loar says that the property "triggers"
applications of the concept. In that case, Loar writes,
"the property that triggers the concept is the semantic
value or reference of the concept; the concept directly
refers the property, unmediated y 2 4higher order
reference-fixer" (my emphasis). And nothing, he argues,
prevents the property picked out by some theoretical concept
also triggering some recognitional/imaginative concept, "so
the two concepts can converge in their reference despite
their cognitive independence....",,4 They would do this
without introducing separate properties, since there would
be no higher-order reference-fixer on the phenomenal-concept
side at all to introduce new, further properties. This, if
Loar is right, would refute the Semantic Premise.
We can think up cases for which Loar's point is well-
taken, but these are cases very different from those that
generate the mind-body problem. Imagine someone, for
14. See Loar, pg. Lit., pp. 84, 87-88.
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example, who can, without physical evidence, report and
categorize many of her own brain states, even states that
lack qualitative character. Call her Marcy. For Marcy,
there will be states lacking qualitative character, toward
which she has what Horgan calls "the first-person ostensive
perspective" and which she may refer to, both to herself and
to others, using demonstratives. She reports her own brain
states, but she does not do so in virtue of physiological or
phenomenal evidence. Imagine also that Marcy sometimes goes
through very disunified states of mind. In these states,
Marcy may be undergoing brain states associated with pain
but unable to report the pain by its feel. Still, in these
states, let us suppose, Marcy can employ her ability to
report her brain states without evidence to report her being
in pain. In these cases, she reports without physical or
phenomenal evidence being in pain.
Marcy has access to her states through separate routes
that could create the illusion of dualism. Connections
between states lacking qualitative character but
demonstrated from the "first-person ostensive perspective"
and states picked out through explicitly physical properties
of the person could only be known a posteriori. Here it
would not follow from someone's having two distinct forms of
knowledge, forms not linked a priori but following distinct
routes to the object of knowledge, that each route of
knowledge would pick out its object in virtue of entirely
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distinct properties of or facts about the object.
In this case, the direct reference would not pick out
the object of reference, the brain state in question, in
virtue of any properties of the referent of which the
subject is aware. Instead, Marcy would "iutf Jnow" she was
having the brain state and would not make reference to it in
virtue of evidence about it. The direct reference might
succeed in picking out its object by physical properties of
the referent of which the subject is unaware, properties
that might also figure into the route by which some
neurophysiological descriptions pick out the object. Still,
this would be a separate route from the route by which
neurophysiological descriptions picked out states of her,
and a separate route still from any phenomenal one.
To use Loar's terminology, Marcy has a recognitional/
imaginative concept that is triggered by, and thus has as a
semantic value, the very same property referred to by some
theoretical concept of neurophysiology. The two concepts
are linked _ posteriori. But it would be wrong to conclude
they introduce distinct properties. Clearly they do not.
This example, however, is very much unlike us and thus
beside the point when it comes to understanding creatures
like us. The case of Marcy and the kind of case where
Loar's argument most obviously works are cases with "just
known" routes, in which predicates are applied in virtue of
no properties of the referents. In those cases, we do not
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require "higher order reference fixers." But the normal
case of demonstrative self-reference to one's own phenomenal
states or phenomenal properties would seem to require higher
order reference-fixers--those phenomenal properties in
virtue of which one picks out one's own states, properties
distinct from any other properties. Although it is
different perhaps for other recognitional concepts, so-
called "phenomenal/recognitional concepts" could not pick
out referents At all unless they did so in virtue of
properties distinct from the physical or functional
properties by which so-called "physical/functional
theoretical concepts" refer."
Notice that the critic's line of argument is analogous
to a counterargument that actually does defeat the modal
argument. On this non-Fregean story, our Cartesian modal
intuitions of a contingent connection between the phenomenal
and the physical are explained not by ontological
differences in parts of the world but rather by distinct
styles of representing the world--that is, direct,
demonstrative reference versus descriptive reference. This
15. Loar, op. Jit., pp. 97-98, seems to concede that
there might be someone like Marcy and that not all
recognitional concepts are phenomenal concepts. What more
is required, then, to be a phenomenal concept? It seems to
be "the ability to re-identify and perhaps to imagine a
feeling of a certain type, for example, feeling like this."
But now Loar has conceded too much: phenomenal concepts can
only refer this way in virtue of a mode of presentation that
re-introduces phenomenal properties. (I owe this point to
Ned Block.)
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form of counterargument worked against the modal argument.
In that case, one could explain the appearances of
contingency that seemed to make it possible to pull
mentalistic and physicalistic representations apart by the
possibility that two different kinds of reference were
picking out the same things. By contrast, the Knowledge
Argument makes no claim of contingency between pieces of the
world, only of nonidentity between properties of the world.
Thus it does not work in this case.
Assume, for the sake of argument, that it is not
possible to pull the two kinds of representations apart,
that they have the very same referents in common. Still,
the very distinction between direct, demonstrative reference
and descriptive reference in cases we are most familiar
with--our introspective, phenomenal knowledge and our
nonintrospective knowledge of the things we identify in
paradigmatically physical ways--entails the existence of
distinct sorts of properties.
What makes this initially plausible is the clear-cut
intuition that we directly pick out referents in
introspection at least partly in virtue of their logqq and
their feels, and that these are different from any of the
paradigmatically physical properties in virtue of which we
pick out aspects of our brains. It does not matter whether
we do this descriptively or demonstratively. My argument in
this chapter, however, does not simply rely on what is
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merely plausible but undertakes the work of creating an
explanatory model that guarantees that the distinctness of
the direct, introspective route cannot be accounted for on
other grounds.
Thus, by ruling out cases of just-known referents, not
picked out in virtue of any properties of them, and by
requiring similarity in styles of reference, we arrive
finally at a common-sense argument for property dualism.
This argument makes use of a version of the Semantic Premise
which withstands the objections raised above and can be set
forth as follows.
The Semantic Premise, Final Version
For all pairs of referring expressions R, and R2 of the
same style of reference, except those R1 whose
referents are just known independently of properties of
the referents,"6 if R, and R2 are coreferential but not
a priori, then there exists a property P which we pick
out the referent of R, in virtue of and which is
distinct from any the properties we pick out the
referent of R2 in virtue of.
There are thus three sorts of routes to referents, as Figure
4 shows. Suppose that there were someone who was like Marcy
in actually picking out internal states of hers in each of
these three ways. She might state identities in this way.
16. Here I include pure indexicals, such as "I," if we
refer with them independently of properties of their
referents.
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Fig. 4--Three Kinds of Route to the Referent
If we exclude picking out referents in ways that are just
known and if we exhaust ways of picking them out along
physical-functional routes, then any ways of picking them
out that rn-main must do so in virtue of irreducibly mental
properties.
This, then, is the fundamental basis of the Property
Dualism Argument, and thus of the Knowledge Argument. It is
the source of what is right about the Cartesian approach to
the mind-body problem. And it provides some sense to
Descartes's idea that our Cartesian intuitions represent
perceptions of distinct mental properties. For the
phenomenal routes we have to our mental states are routes,
in contrast with what is inst known, which run by way of
616 J6 P-f %.PA. 6.P %w A6 A% 11 %-A A- %-A %im 6 %ýff A A.W g.a- w =
195
properties that impact on our experience, but also impact
differently from any physical-functional route. Thus let me
make this conjecture.
A Conjecture
Refuting the Knowledge Argument would be tantamount to
solving the mind-body problem.
Phenomenal consciousness provides us with evidence of
our internal states, in contrast to the no-evidence route of
what is justJ known. By the Knowledge Argument, this
requires irreducibly mental properties over and above our
physical and functional properties. The Knowledge Argument,
then, raises many questions. How can anything provide
evidence by this route of phenomenal consciousness? Why
aren't the contents of our internal states justJinQwn. How
can there exist something which provides us with evidence?
Moreover, why is phenomenal consciousness needed at all?
Why can't something else provide this evidence? Why, for
example, can't there be a physical mechanism causing self-
knowledge of the contents of brain states by way of evidence
but nonqualitatively--that is, by physical means that
reproduce the effects of phenomenal consciousness? Or, to
return to the even more extreme Cartesian intuition, why
can't the body do everything it does by way of its
physiological properties alone--why are further phenomenal
properties required?
It is not a weakness of the Knowledge Argument that it
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does not provide answers. The Knowledge Argument only
sanctions the Cartesian side of the mind-body problem; it
does not solve the problem. It is clear that very different
considerations, probably far outside common sense, will be
required to do that.
V. No Common-Sense Way Out
Arguments like the Knowledge Argument and the Property
Dualism Argument have been thought to be vulnerable to
several kinds of common-sense objections. But none of them
seem adequate to the arguments advanced in the preceding
section.
One option for the physicalist might be like the one
that McGinn argued against Kripke. McGinn never discusses
Jackson, but it is clear how this form of argument might go.
On this view, psychophysical reductions are "cognitively
closed" to us, and the best the anti-reductionist can do is
to show that phenomenal properties are physical but
noumenal, beyond any humanly possible psychophysical
reduction. But this is no more successful against the neo-
Cartesian strategies of the Knowledge Argument and the
Property Dualism Argument than it was against the orthodox
Cartesian. We do not accept the Semantic Premise on the
grounds an argument from cognitive closure would require.
There is no place in the argument where we jump to property
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dualism merely by an inability to come up with an
alternative. Rather, the argument proceeds from very
general considerations about knowledge and reference that
have wide application. It is based on clear, well-tested,
theory-based intuitions. Nothing seems to be cognitively
closed. Thus, there is no more reason here than with the
orthodox Cartesian to think that the central ideas are
plausible only because of the cognitive closure of them.
This leaves the two options I cited at the beginning of
Chapter Four, section IV. One was that there was a problem
with the mechanics of the Knowledge Argument. I argued that
there was such a problem with Jackson's version. In this
chapter I have tried to construct a version in which there
are no such problems. Against this version, the physicalist
might continue to pursue Loar's strategy of showing that
phenomenal-concept terms pick out referents without higher
order reference-fixers. I have not discussed all the ways
someone might follow this strategy, but none seem very
promising to me. A suggestion I have not considered, for
example, is that these terms behave more like pure
indexicals, contributing to truth values in virtue of the
appropriateness of their circumstances of use. This option,
however, runs up against the fact, noted in the literature
and discussed in Chapter Seven,1 7 that pure indexicals are
17. See, for example, Stephen Schiffer, "The Basis of
Reference," Erkenntnis 13 (1978), pp. 171-206, and the reply
by David Austin, What's the Meaning 21 "This"? (Ithaca:
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very different from demonstratives and descriptions.
The other common-sense option against the Knowledge
Argument has been to argue that although there are
nonphysical properties they are functional properties. on
this view, they are characterizable entirely by reference to
causal relationships among stimuli, behavioral responses and
internal psychological states--and thus are not irreducibly
mental. This line of counterargument is defeated by the
absent-qualia argument defended in the next three chapters.
However, as I have argued, it is already independently
defeated by the Knowledge Argument and the Property Dualism
Argument. They advance considerations that, unlike those of
the modal argument against physicalism, weigh against
functionalism as well." Even if some functional
description were to pick out the same mental state as does
some mentalistic description, it seems that it could only do
this by way of a distinct referential route, reaching the
comnon referent by distinct causal properties of the
Cornell University Press, 1990), ch. 3. See also Michael
Bennett's view set out in Kaplan, gp. cit., pp. 527-528.
18. The development out of Smart's response to Black's
argument of one line of functionalist writing is traced by
Ned Block, "What Is Functionalism?", in Ned Block, ed.,
Readings in the Philosophy at Psychology, volume 1
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 179.
The difficulties functionalism faces in accounting for
qualia are well-known. They are reviewed, among other
places, in David Lewis, "Mad Pain and Martian Pain," and Ned
Block, "Troubles with Functionalism," both reprinted in Ned
Block, ed., og. cit., pp. 216-222 and 268-305, respectively.
Once again, the considerations against functionalism that
come out of the Knowledge Argument are additional ones.
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referent, separate from any of its phenomenal properties.
Mary might know everything knowable by a physical-functional
route to the brain about what it is like to see red without
knowing by the phenomenal route. By the previous argument,
this is to know by properties distinct from those by which
she lacks but gains knowledge. The analytic functionalist's
claim of an D priori link between functional and phenomenal-
concept terms, one that makes us pick out mental aspects of
the world by way of a single type of properties, is thus
inconsistent with common sense."
This suggests that any solution to the mind-body
problem will carry us far outside common sense.
19. This seems to be the lesson, though unintended, of
Ned Block's homunculus-headed and China examples. In the
first thought experiment, we create a system that produces
behaviour like yours through a Turing-machine-simulation of
your psychology, using many little men located in its "head"
each responsible for one state instruction from the Turing
table the system uses, corresponding to your psychology; in
the second, we convert the government leaders of China to
functionalism and convince them to enlist that country's
billion-plus inhabitants to realize a human mind for an
hour. See Block, gp. Dit., p. 276. Block's conclusion that
there is no consciousness in either system begs the question
against the functionalist, a point correctly noted in Lycan,
~. cit., pp. 26-27. Nevertheless, although one cannot
conclude from Block's examples, as Block appears to, that
consciousness does not supervene on the two systems, it is
quite clear that if there were any phenomenal properties
that did supervene on functional properties of the systems,
they would prima facie be distinct properties from any
functional properties, since there would surely be no A
priori connection between the phenomenal and the functional
properties. Nothing we could be told about either system in
functional terms would ky itself constitute telling us that
it had phenomenal properties. This is enough to undermine
functionalism.
CHAPTER SIX FUNCTIONALISM AND SKEPTICISM
According to the functionalist, terms denoting
qualitative mental states can be defined descriptively, as
those states which have such-and-such causes and such-and-
such effects. The Knowledge Argument contradicts
functionalism, since it requires that functional properties,
just as physical properties do, provide distinct routes to
referents from the ones phenomenal properties provide. In
case the functionalist thinks that there are ways out of
that argument, the Cartesian will want to bolster the case
against functionalism by a further argument.
If sound, the Knowledge Argument would establish the
nonidentity of functional and phenomenal properties. The
further counterargument to functionalism I will now develop
shows that phenomenal properties do not even supervene upon
functional ones. The strategy is familiar: to argue that
there might be a state which would have all the causes and
effects of a typical qualitative mental state but would lack
qualitative character altogether. Such a state, were it to
exist, would be said to be an absent qualia or ersatz state.
Ersatz counterparts for such types of genuine qualitative
mental states as pains and the havings of red after-images
would said to be ersatz pains and ersatz havings of red
after-images.
A fairly obvious kind of functionalist reply is as
follows. It might seem, were the counterargument sound,
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that we could not know we were having the qualitative mental
states we do actually have. For if there were absent-qualia
states, it might seem, they would have no causes or effects
to make it possible for a subject to distinguish having them
from having their non-ersatz counterparts. Surely if we
know anything, we know that we are having the qualitative
mental states we are having. Since we do know that, it
might seem, absent-qualia states are impossible and the
argument does not work against functionalism.
This defense of functionalism against the possibility
of absent qualia need not be verificationist, and thus it
need not suffer the faults usually associated with
verificationism. So far, it makes no explicit mention of
meaning, nor need it rely on covert assumptions connecting
meaning and verifiability.
It goes awry in a different way, however, by relying on
a false theory of knowledge. The argument seems to depend
on some version of the principle, suggested by some of
Descartes's reasoning in the Meditations, that an individual
cannot know a proposition to be true unless the individual
has evidence to distinguish the case of its truth from all
cases of its falsity. The problem with such an
epistemological principle as this is that it would make
impossible (at least without something like Descartes's
eventual certainty of the good intentions of a morally
perfect Creator) various kinds of knowledge that we in fact
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possess. In the case of our knowledge of the external
world, for example, we never have comprehensive evidence
distinguishing actual perceptions of the external world from
those cases in which an evil deceiver causes qualitatively
identical perceptual states that bear no relation to the
external world. Still, we do have knowledge of the external
world. It seems to be enough that our beliefs result from
belief-producing mechanisms that reliably discriminate the
truth from relevant, although not necessarily all,
alternatives to it.
I shall argue that the anti-skepticism argument against
the possibility of absent qualia, which is directed at our
common sense, in fact goes well beyond common sense. This
is because it appeals to a supposedly common-sense
epistemological principle that makes our knowledge of our
own qualia depend upon evidence more comprehensive than
common sense sanctions. The argument makes such knowledge
depend upon our distinguishing the actual qualia our mental
states have from more alternatives to our qualia than common
sense tells us our knowledge of them depends.
The case I am making in this chapter against the anti-
skepticism argument I intend to be a modest one. It is
important for the reader to bear that in mind to prevent
misunderstanding. I do not deny that for all we know we
might come up with empirical evidence supporting the
epistemological principle on which the anti-skepticism
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argument relies. Rather, I make only these two different
claims: that if we were to find such evidence it would
contradict common sense, and that the anti-skepticism
argument therefore cannot rely merely on common sense. In
the final chapter, I shall argue that the anti-skepticism
argument is, in fact, correct that if absent qualia states
were possible we could not distinguish genuine qualitative
states from their ersatz counterparts. But this is true, I
shall argue, not because of the general epistemological
principle at issue here but because of more peculiar reasons
that invalidate the remainder of the anti-skepticism
argument.
In the present chapter, after setting out some
background in sections one and two, I will show in sections
three and four that current versions of the anti-skepticism
argument appearing in the literature have this difficulty.
I will argue that it is not at all obvious that our evidence
is as complete as these published versions require. Our
evidence would be so complete as this if we had transparent
access to the phenomenal properties of our own mental
states, but I will argue that there is a strong common-sense
case that we lack it in crucial ways. In the final section,
I shall argue that no improvement of the anti-skepticism
argument will escape this problem and that any apparent
virtues to the anti-skepticism argument that remain are
illusory and can be explained away.
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I. The Anti-Skepticism Argument
As a first approximation, I will represent the anti-
skepticism argument against the possibility of absent qualia
as follows.1
The Basic Argument
(1) If absent qualia are possible, then we cannot
know of our qualitative states that we are having
them.
(2) We do know of our qualitative states that we are
having them.
ErgLo, absent qualia states are impossible.
How might a defender of the argument support its
premises? Sydney Shoemaker and Earl Conee provide
considerations of the sort discussed above.2 If absent
1. This kind of argument was first advanced in print by
Sydney Shoemaker, "Functionalism and Qualia," Philosophical
Studies 27 (1975), pp. 291-315; this is reprinted as chapter
9 of his Identity. Cause, andhind (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1984), pp. 184-205. Shoemaker continues
to endorse his original conclusions; see his "Qualia and
Consciousness," Mind 100 (1991), p. 507. It has also been
advanced recently in Georges Rey, "Sensational Sentences,"
unpublished manuscript, July 1989, and in Dennett, op. cit.
2. A very different way of defending the first premise
is considered and correctly rejected by Ned Block in his
"Are Absent Qualia Impossible?", Philosophical Review, April
1980, pp. 257-274. The view considered is that (1) the
possibility of absent qualia would entail the
epiphenomenality of qualitative character to the mental
states having it, but that (2) that would entail, by the
causal theory of knowledge, the unknowability of qualitative
character. Block's response is that (2) is only non-
question-begging if one's picture of a property's being
epiphenomenal to a mental state is such that genuine states
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qualia were possible, it might seem that the presence or
absence in a mental state of qualitative character would
make no difference to the functional causal role of the
mental state--that is, to its causal relations with
perceptions, behaviors and other mental states. If it would
make no difference, then it would seem to lack distinctive
evidence for the presence of qualitative character. You
could not tell if you had it. But if we know that some p is
true, then we do have distinctive evidence for its truth,
distinguishing R's truth from any possible case of p's not
being true. From this, it would follow that the argument's
first premise would be true--that if absent qualia were
possible, then we would not know of our qualitative states
that we are having them.
From these considerations, Conee, a critic of
Shoemaker, reconstructs Shoemaker's argument against the
possibility of absent qualia along the following lines.3
and ersatz counterparts have all the same effects (not just
all the same psychological ones), but then (1) is question-
begging against a physicalist story about how to create
ersatz states.
3. Earl Conee, "The Possibility of Absent Qualia," Ti
Philosophical Review, July 1985, pp. 345-366.
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Conee's Reconstruction of the Anti-Skepticism Arqument
(EP) If ersatz pain is possible, then it is not
possible to distinguish cases of genuine pain from
cases of ersatz pain.
(K) It is possible to distinguish cases of genuine
pain from cases of any possible state lacking
qualitative character.
Ergo, ersatz pain is not possible.'
One brief comment about distinguishing. For the purposes of
this chapter, I will suppose that if one can do the
distinguishing (K) requires one can correctly sort a set of
occurrent states into genuine pains and states lacking
qualitative character. In the next two chapters, however,
an ever looser condition on distinguishing will be
consistent with what I say. There, all that is required is
the detection of a difference, one that might even fail to
be transparent to the subject.
Conee's accounts of both why K is needed and how it can
be supported are flawed.5 First, consider the former.
4. For ease of exposition, I have eliminated parts of
Conee's versions of EP and K that are irrelevant to my
account.
5. As stated above, Conee's version of the argument is
a reconstruction. Shoemaker acknowledges that, while he
accepts it himself, the very step from EP to the conclusion,
whatever premise is employed, is unconvincing to some. Its
controversial character motivates him to propose a second
argument against the possibility of absent qualia that does
not depend on this step or any other epistemological
premise. The second argument is based on the idea that
since anyone functionally identical to us will use "pain,"
for example, with the same meaning as us (since the causal
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Conee is correct about the need for something like K but
wrong about the reasons. Why not derive the impossibility
of absent qualia from EP by a modus tollens argument such as
the one above but by taking as the minor premise of the
argument K*, the denial of EP's consequent, instead of K?
(K*) It is possible to distinguish cases of genuine
pain from cases at ersatz pain.
(K) It is possible to distinguish cases of genuine
pain from cases1 o•fly pQssible £tQ lacking
qualitative character.
K entails K*; K ranges over much more distinguishing than
does K*. Conee incorrectly maintains that it is not open to
Shoemaker on logical grounds to derive the impossibility of
absent qualia from K* and EP. He writes that K* implies
"that it is possible to distinguish cases of genuine pain
from cases of ersatz pain" and that "[t]his is something
that Shoemaker would have to deny, since he holds that there
stories connecting reference and referents with be the
same), a functional duplicate will refer to the same thing
we do in using the term. But this is to assume erroneously
that functional identity determines identity of meaning and
reference. Putnam has cast doubt on this view; see "The
Meaning of 'Meaning,'" in K. Gunderson, ed., Lannuaae, Mind.
and Knowledge (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1975).
Other counterarguments appear in Stephen White, "Curse of
the Qualia," p_. Lit., pp. 340-350, and in Conee, 2p. at.,
pp. 364-366. Nowhere does Shoemaker explicitly endorse K as
the step from EP to the conclusion, but Conee has argued
both that K is defensible along the lines set out above and
that the anti-skepticism argument requires something like
it. He reserves his criticisms for EP.
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cannot be any case of ersatz pain."'6 But Shoemaker no more
must deny this than he must deny that it is possible to
distinguish cases of elliptical pegs from cases of round
square pegs; both sarts of distinguishing are possible, even
though there cannot be any case of a round square peg and
even though he argues there cannot be any case of ersatz
pain.
There is a rationale for this step in the argument but
it is different. It is this: the case against believing
absent qualia possible does not rest on an epistemological
premise limited to difficulties with ersatz pains alone. It
must be principled, drawing on more general facts about
mental states that would include facts about ersatz pains,
if there were any. Thus K. The aim of the opponent of the
possibility of absent qualia is to find a step from EP to
the impossibility of absent qualia which distinguishes
genuine pains from every one of a set of mental states wide
enough to include ersatz pains but not so wide that the
principle lacks plausibility.
II. The Theory of Knowledge the Argument Depends On
Let us now consider more closely the theory of
knowledge on which the argument depends to determine whether
K is, in fact, defensible, as Conee claims it to be. The
6. Conee, QD. Lit., p. 351.
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step from EP to the anti-absent-qualia conclusion might seem
to depend on the problematical principle cited above in
defense of the anti-skepticism argument. By that principle,
a subject cannot know that a proposition p is true if there
is no evidence that distinguishes, in principle, p's truth
from p's falsity.
Such a principle conflicts with the natural idea that
knowledge is possible because a subject knows a proposition
to be true, if it is true, in virtue of using reliable
belief-forming processes, processes that reliably produce
true beliefs. It is possible for there to be reliable
belief-fixing mental processes even if there is no evidence
so comprehensive as to distinguish actual perceptions from
all possible cases of deception. This kind of view is known
as reliabilist. All sides would seem to accept reliabilist
constraints of some type on an adequate theory of knowledge,
although they might differ in the details. I will follow
them in this respect.7
Thus, a straightforward refutation of this way of
justifying the anti-skepticism argument is that it is no
more plausible than parallel arguments against skepticism
about the external world. I seem to be wearing a wristwatch
as I write this at 3 p.m. on July 4, 1989. A skeptic might
7. The reliabilist approach is in large respect due to
Alvin Goldman; see his "What Is Justified Belief?" in George
Pappas, ed., Justification and Enowledge (Dordrecht: Reidel,
1979).
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say that it is possible I am not wearing one. It is surely
not an adequate reply to the skeptic to assert that that
cannot be so since then I could never JDN I am wearing a
wristwatch, even if I were. It is not a good reply because
in the case of wristwatches, and in the case of the external
world more generally, the possibility of knowledge is
compatible with the possibility of unremediable deception.
For there are processes of belief fixation that reliably
generate the belief I am wearing a wristwatch when I am (and
fail to generate the belief that I am wearing a wristwatch
when I am not), and thus provide justified true belief, or
knowledge, to that effect. Absent wristwatchhood--satisfied
by states of affairs that have all the evidentiary relations
of normal wristwatches in the absence of any actual
wristwatches--is not ruled out because it would lead to the
impossibility of knowledge. Why should absent qualia be
ruled out on a similar basis?
This has suggested a different strategy to opponents of
absent qualia: searching for a more limited epistemological
claim anchoring the step from EP to the anti-absent-qualia
conclusion but not sanctioning skepticism about the external
world. According to this line of thought, the case of K is
a very special case since the difficulties with
distinguishing appearance from reality that undermined the
problematical general principle above need not plague K.
The truth of K requires no distinguishing of appearance from
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reality but only the distinguishing of appearance from
appearance. Conee suggests that K is supported by the
principle R*.
(R*) For all k and for all S such that k is a report of
the content of a's experience to the effect that
it has phenomenal quality phi, then a knows ) true
only if S has evidence that distinguishes a's
experience's having phi from any possible case of
S's experience not having phi.'
Taken together with some further Knowledge Premise like the
following--
Knowledge Premise
We know our experiences to have the qualia they do.
--R* would provide adequate support for K's claim that we
can distinguish our pains from states lacking qualia. Taken
together with EP, the anti-absent-qualia conclusion would
follow directly.
To Conee, supporting R* is a more manageable task. R*
does not lead to skepticism by setting unsatisfiable
conditions on knowledge of the external world, since it does
not apply to such knowledge. R* makes a more modest
epistemological claim. It is based on the insight that the
reality/appearance distinction collapses when it comes to my
8. Conee, o9. giL., p. 353. What I call R* Conee calls
R, but I reserve this latter label for the revision of R*
which is the subject of much of the rest of the chapter.
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own experiences. Here, the knowledge is direct, unmediated
by further appearances that could potentially deceive me
about an independent reality. Surely, it may seem, there is
a difference between being in a certain phenomenal state and
not being, and surely we are directly aware of this
difference.9 Thus, R* requires what I will henceforth call
"comprehensive evidence"--evidence which distinguishes the
truth of a known proposition from all possible cases in
which the proposition does not obtain--but only in cases of
knowledge in which it may seem unproblematical to do so.
In fact, R* does not fully satisfy the aim of shutting
out the problems. It leaves the door open just a crack on a
world external to appearances where these skeptical
difficulties continue to arise.
Consider Jones, who sees on a cerebroscope (a
biofeedback device giving him contemporaneous
representations of states of his brain) that he is having
experiences with a particular phenomenal quality. Jones
knows this because the cerebroscope, while not telling him
which phenomenal quality it is, does show neurological
activity in an area of his brain characteristically
associated with his phenomenal experience. There is a
pattern to what the cerebroscope displays to him about this
phenomenal quality of his experience, one that repeats
itself several more times; Jones introduces the name "phi"
9. Ibid, p. 353.
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to refer to the phenomenal quality picked out by this
pattern exhibited on the cerebroscope. Throughout this
period of time, as Jones watches phi on the cerebroscope, he
notices introspectively several phenomenal properties--A, B,
C, D--that phi might be. However, Jones does not know of
these phenomenal qualities that he introspectively finds in
his experience--A, B, C, D--which one is the one he has
identified with the cerebroscope as phi. Jones thus has a
peculiar kind of knowledge of the phenomenal quality of his
experience, a kind of knowledge that is not direct
knowledge.
Let b be Jones' report to friends of the content of his
experience to the effect that it has phenomenal quality phi.
Jones has fixed the reference of the term "phi" for his
friends in the same way as he had previously done for
himself, but b does not, let us suppose, convey to his
friends any more than it does to Jones himself about what it
is like to go undergo experience having phi. Surely Jones'
knowing b to be true does not depend, contrary to R*, on his
having comprehensive evidence distinguishing the case of his
experience having phi from every possible case of his
experience not having phi. Surely he need not distinguish
it from the case in which there is no cerebroscope but only
a hallucination of one caused by an evil deceiver. Here the
difficulty with R* is that it quantifies over all beliefs
about the phenomenal qualities of experiences. Yet some of
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those beliefs, even though knowledge, are not immune from
the possibility of deception about the external world, since
they pick out the phenomenal qualities nonphenomenally.
Now consider a case in which Jones sees on a
cerebroscope that someone is having experience with
phenomenal quality phi although he knows not whom. By now,
let us suppose, he knows what it is like to have phi-
experiences; thus, his belief ascribing experiences with phi
to someone picks out the phenomenal quality phenomenally.
He does not know whom the cerebroscope is reporting to have
phi-experiences but he is able to pick the person out
descriptively, whoever is it, as the person being monitored
by the cerebroscope. In fact, but unbeknownst to him, the
person is himself. Now let k be a qualitative belief of
Jones' about Jones' experience to the effect that it has
phi. Surely, once again, Jones' knowing k to be true does
not depend, contrary to R*, on his having comprehensive
evidence distinguishing this case of Jones' experience
having phi from the case in which the cerebroscope is a
hallucination. The trouble with R*, once again, is that it
allows the beliefs to which it applies to depend upon
information about the external world--this time, information
from the cerebroscope concerning whom is being monitored.
These two kinds of difficulties with R*, however, are
not faced by the following principle. R quantifies not over
third-person public reports--which a subject can be wrong
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about even when they refer to the subject's own experience,
in much the same way as the subject can be wrong about the
experience of others--but over first-person beliefs by
acquaintance, which a subject cannot be wrong about in that
way.
(R) For all k and for all & such that k is a self-
ascribing qualitative belief of S's about the
content of S's experience to the effect that it
has phenomenal quality phi, then is knowledge
for a only if S has introspective evidence that
distinguishes S's experience's having phi from any
possible case of g's experience not having phi.
Beliefs of the kind to which R applies cannot misfire over
extraordinary facts about the external world. The
difficulties over knowledge about oneself and knowledge
about the phenomenal qualities of one's experiences that
plagued R* are outside the range of R, since the knowledge
to which R applies is all direct and by acquaintance with
one's qualia and one's ownership of them. The door on the
outside world has been closed all the way.
Before proceeding, let me review the structure of the
argument based on R. First, recall the Knowledge Premise.
Knowledge Premise
We know our experiences to have the qualia they do.
If R and the Knowledge Premise are true, supporting K, then
since ersatz pains, if they exist, are among the possible
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states lacking the qualitative character of genuine pain,
EP's consequent is contradicted. Recall EP.
(EP) If ersatz pain is possible, then it possible to
distinguish cases of genuine pain from cases of
ersatz pain.
R and the Knowledge Premise together directly contradict
EP's consequent; K is, in fact, unnecessary to the argument.
As stated earlier, these facts are true in part because
of the relation between R, K and EP's consequent. In those
cases of phi-experiences which make the Knowledge Premise
true, R and K depend on their truth upon, respectively, DR
and DK.
(DR) It is possible to distinguish experiences having
phi from every experience lacking phi.
(D,) It is possible to distinguish states having phi
from every state lacking qualitative character.
The denial of EP's consequent likewise depends on D,.
(DN) It is possible to distinguish phi from every
ersatz state.




Stated more simply, what is ersatz lacks qualia, what lacks
qualia lacks any given phenomenal property phi.
III. Counterarguments to the Theory of Knowledge
But even R is too strong; and without R, K and the
anti- skepticism argument as a whole are unsupported.
Contrary to R, there are cases of my knowing that I have
experiences of a particular phenomenal character where I
don't have evidence distinguishing my experiences with that
character from any and all experiences without it. In fact,
it would seem that no experience is such that I have
evidence distinguishing it from any and all experiences
which lack the phenomenal character it has, even though it
surely does not follow that I never know the phenomenal
character of my experiences.
The point can be illustrated by the following case.
Case 1. Misconfirmation of ain. A sensation prompts
me to say, "I am in pain." That judgment, however, is
incorrect, caused by a sudden sensation of extreme gjl
in the context of an expectation of pain.'0
10. Keith Lehrer, Knowledge (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1974), p. 96; Stephen L. White,
"Transcendentalism and Its Discontents," in his Th_ Unity at
Self (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1991), p. 129.
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In the normal course of events, my expectations of what I
will feel are confirmed or disconfirmed by the feeling that
follows; misconfirmed expectations are neither. A case of
misconfirmation is like confirmation except for relating me
to a false proposition, and like disconfirmation except in
requiring my belief in the proposition's truth; in this, it
is akin to misremembering or to misperception. Now, would
it be correct to say of me, on other occasions when I report
being in pain accurately and with justification, that I do
not know I am in pain, merely because a counterfactual case
exists in which I do not have evidence that distinguishes
pain from cold, such as in this odd case?"
11. In related cases, phenomenal qualities are non-
transparent not because we get them wrong but because we
cannot decide which they are; such cases also refute R
because these odd cases of non-transparency do not
jeopardize normal cases of phenomenal knowledge. I taste
something I have never tasted before. Moreover, it tastes
like nothing I have ever tasted. I am unable to categorize
it. It is not transparent to me that this experience falls
into the phenomenal category it does; thus, I may be unable
to distinguish it from experiences of a different phenomenal
category, even though I do normally know, contrary to R,
when I am having experiences of this latter category.
In tests for what is called color agnosia, subjects are
given skeins of wools of different colors and asked to sort
them according to color categories. The assortments
produced appear to be random. Yet we may satisfy ourselves
on other grounds that such subjects have normal color
perception and are impaired neither in the ability to recall
object colors nor in the ability to use color names. In
such cases, which several investigators report finding in
connection with brain damage, we can justifiably say that
the subjects have no transparent access to the phenomenal
color properties they see. Again, subjects may be unable to
distinguish what they see from experiences of a different
phenomenal category, even though I, contrary to R, know when
I am having experiences of this latter category.
The locus classicus on color agnosia is 0. Sittig,
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This is a counterexample to R. Surely I can
knowledgeably ascribe a phenomenal quality to my experience
even though I cannot distinguish my experience's having that
quality from every single case of my experience not having
the quality, such as this odd one. It will not do to defend
R by claiming that, even in the odd case, the sensation of
pain is "evidently different" from the sensation of cold if
that means that the existence of a difference is supposed to
be, as Conee writes in support of R, "evident on the basis
of immediate awareness."' 2 Th2 t there is a difference is
not evident on the basis of immediate awareness. If it
were, it would have to be something in immediate awareness,
but all that is in immediate awareness in the odd case is
cold, not both pain and cold, and thus never anything making
evident a difference between them. Since sensations of pain
differ from sensations of cold, they do have different
properties, and whenever pain or cold is in awareness, some
among these differing properties are in awareness and are
evident from awareness. But it would be wrong to conclude
from this that the £a that there are different properties
is also evident from awareness.
"Stbrungen im Verhalten gegen~ber Farben bei Aphasischen,"
Monatsschift fr Psychiatrie und Neurologie, vol. 49 (1921),
pp. 63-68, 169-187. Sittig distinguishes
Farbennamenanmesie, which is referred to by (among others)
Jules Davidoff, Cognition through £olor (Cambridge, Mass.:
M.I.T. Press, 1991), as "color anomia," from Farbenagnosie,
or color agnosia.
12. Conee, 9R. cit., pp. 353-354.
220
We do not have a reality/appearance problem here as in
the case of the Gedankenexperiment concerning the evil
deceiver; one cannot be misled about the reality by the
appearance of it since, in a sense, the appearance ia the
reality. Still, anti-skeptical intuitions paralleling those
that weigh against taking the possibility of an evil
deceiver too seriously as a threat to knowledge of the
external world seem to have some force here as well in
protecting the possibility of knowledge of appearances. It
would seem that here, as before, it is possible to have
knowledge, even if there is always the possibility of going
wrong. The reliabilist's intuition is that stable and
reliable processes of belief fixation make it possible for
there to be justified beliefs, and thus knowledge, even in
the face of hard cases in which what is known is
indistinguishable from other things. That intuition seems
as applicable here as it is in hard cases about our
knowledge of the external world.
The reliabilist can say of the odd case described above
that it is fully consistent with having knowledge in non-odd
cases since the mental process that fixes belief in the odd
case is a different mental process than that operating in
most other cases. In the odd case, a pain-belief is
triggered by feeling cold while expecting pain. In non-odd
cases, pain-beliefs are caused by feeling pain while
expecting pain or by feeling pain independently of
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expectations. In non-odd cases, knowledge is possible since
there is a belief-producing process which reliably produces
true beliefs.
The argument against R also works because the odd case
represents a failure of transparent access to our mental
states, and R requires some transparency to our mental
states. I can only distinguish cases of some phenomenal
property phi from all incompatible alternatives to it, as R
requires for me to have knowledge of phi, if it is
transparent to me for each alternative that it is not a case
of phi. Thus, in the present case, if R is true, then when
I know I am in pain I must be able to distinguish my being
in pain from incompatible alternatives to my being in pain,
such as my misconfirming being in pain on the basis of
feelings of cold. But this would require me to have
transparent access to my failure to feel pain in this case,
and I do not have such transparent access. Thus R is false.
An opponent of this common-sense argument might try to
preserve transparency in one of two ways. First, the
opponent might argue that it does not follow from your
calling a state of yours "painful" that you believe you feel
pain and not cold. This route does not seem promising. Of
course, it is possible to misspeak, but it is easy enough to
modify the case to rule that out, so that I not only say, "I
am in pain," but also wince, make efforts characteristic of
being in pain to eliminate the source of the feeling, and
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display other pain-related thoughts and behaviors.
Moreover, it is a common-sense principle that you believe
what you sincerely express, and surely it is no more
reasonable to give up that common-sense principle than it is
to give up the principle of transparency.
Second, the opponent might claim that if I say I am in
pain and wince and register other pain-related thoughts and
behaviors, then I Amn in pain, that that is what it ia to be
in pain. This, it might seem, is what the functionalist
ought to hold. But this is a functionalism that would not
even allow the possibility of a failure of transparency, and
that is going too far. An anti-skepticism argument must
appeal to principles that rule out absent qualia while at
least allowing the common-sense possibility of a failure of
transparency. It could turn out A posteriori that
transparency was always preserved, but appealing to such a
principle would go outside common sense. The anti-
skepticism argument, however, is presented as an argument
from common sense.13
33. Stephen White, in his "Transcendentalism and Its
Discontents," g•. i±., p. 119, constructs a functionalist
theory that allows failures of transparency. White takes
his departure from David Lewis' suggestion (in "Mad Pain and
Martian Pain," gp. cit.) that the functionalist define
psychological terms by their roles in the folk-psychological
theory consisting of common-sense platitudes about human
psychology. If among these platitudes was that transparency
fails, then the functionalist could allow that. Such a
move, however, would force an advocate of the anti-
skepticism argument to find an epistemological principle
that rules out absent-qualia cases while allowing other
transparency failures in, and I am unconvinced that this is
223
One might believe that Descartes ignored the skeptical
problem that functionalism is alleged to solve. While
Descartes is the source for our appreciation of the threat
of skepticism in modern philosophy and reviewed many
imaginable ways in which our belief-producing mechanisms
could and do go wrong, he never claimed a skeptical threat
to knowing the phenomenal contents of one's own mental
states. Still, despite what some writers have claimed,4
the evidence is not conclusive that Descartes believed
judgments about phenomenal contents to be incorrigible.
He does allow another imaginable kind of deception
about something as seemingly incorrigible as qualitative
character: deception concerning the truth of simple
mathematical propositions. How could God perpetrate that
deception? one might wonder. Descartes does not say. One
does not have to assume, as some readers of Descartes do,
that it is by His making the world one in which the simple
mathematical formulae we take for granted fail--e.g., by His
making a world in which 2 + 3 o 5. Rather, one can imagine
that it is by His making our minds go wrong when we
contemplate mathematics. He might make us going wrong
without knowing it when we add 2 and 3. Perhaps he might
possible to do.
14. See Rorty, g9. Lit.; Flanagan, ap. git., pp. 30-31;
Dennett, oQ. Qjt., pp. 67, 363; Georges Rey, "A Reason for
Doubting the Existence of Consciousness," in Richard J.
Davidson, Gary E. Schwartz and David Shapiro, eds.,
Consciousness and Self-Regulation, vol. 3 (New York: Plenum,
1983), pp. 3-4.
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also make it hard for us to compare what we think with what
is said and written by others by making us go wrong in the
meanings we attach to mathematical language.
In this regard, Descartes himself asserts"" that "many
people do not know what they believe, since believing
something and knowing that one believes it are different
acts of thinking, and the one often occurs without the
other." Might Descartes, on grounds similar to this
rejection of the transparency of belief, also have rejected
the transparency of qualitative character?
There was also for Descartes always the general
possibility of God's deception in matters that seem clear
and distinct, even apparently including the cogito. This
suggests that it would have been the existence of a
benevolent God that ultimately for Descartes would have
ruled out the possibility of being wrong about one's
occurrent states. The skeptical problem about the contents
of one's own mind is thus a real one for the Cartesian and
the non-Cartesian alike. It can be solved, however, without
embracing theism or functionalism.
IV. Two More Kinds of Failure of Transparency
Before turning to the two additional arguments against
transparency, let me say something more about transparent
15. At the outset of the Third Discourse, at AT VI 23.
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access itself. I have transparent access to properties of
my mental states (so it is enough to say for present
purposes) if I believe that my states have them when they
do. Normally, this is enough for knowledge of them.
Transparency fails when there are mental states I am in
without believing I am. This failure could conceivably come
about through an incorrect belief or simply through an
absence of belief. Both kinds of failure would seem to be
possible, and both kinds, as I will show, are relevant to
refuting R.
Transparent access is thus distinct from incorrigible
access; for present purposes, if I have incorrigible access
to my mental states, then when I believe a mental state of
mine has a property, it does. It is controversial whether
we have incorrigible access to properties of our mental
states, but questions of transparent access can in some
cases be less controversial. Jackson's Mary provides such
an example. Before her release Mary's phenomenal states are
non-red phenomenally but she lacks knowledge by acquaintance
that they are. This is a transparency failure through an
absence, rather than an error, of belief. There is no
counterpart failure of incorrigibility here, although there
are, of course, other transparency failures in other cases
which do entail failures of incorrigibility.1 "
16. Of the kinds of transparency failures I claim to
contradict R, only the first, Case 1, invariably involves a
failure of incorrigibility.
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Drawing on further kinds of failure of transparency, I
will now make two more objections to using R against absent
qualia. In the first case, I will provide a kind of
transparency failure which, like misconfirmation,
contradicts R's requirement of comprehensive
distinguishability of alternative qualia without
jeopardizing our ability to know the qualia we have.
However, it differs from misconfirmation in how it
reconciles such knowledge with the indistinguishability of
alternatives. In the second case, the transparency failure
does not contradict R but rather the further premise that we
know our mental states. Thus, we are in no position to use
R to support K, since doing so requires the truth of both R
and R's antecedent, the claim of knowledge.
Complexity. It would seem possible to lack knowledge
about the qualitative character of a visual appearance just
because of the complexity of the appearance.
Case 2. Missing Waldo. A subject is presented with two
pictures of the kind found in picture books like
Where's Waldo?17 These books are filled with very
complex cartoon drawings, and the puzzle for the reader
is to locate the cartoon character Waldo in the
drawings. In the case at hand, Waldo is the only
figure in the drawings with any purple. In one
picture, his watchband is purple; however, in the
other, his watchband is red. Other than this one
17. Martin Handford, Where9s Waldo? (New York: Little,
Brown, 1987).
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difference, the pictures are identical. There are
enough nearby colors on the color spectrum like blue
and red that the purple is of little help to the
subject in locating Waldo or seeing that the pictures
differ. The subject notices the purple on the one
picture but never notices its absence on the other.
The subject never finds Waldo.
Here is a case in which it is does not seem transparent to
the subject that the picture lacking purple does lack it,
even though the subject's visual field, while the subject
stares at the picture, lacks the phenomenal property of
being purple. At the same time, there would seem to be no
barrier to the subject's noticing purple in the picture that
has it that the subject is unable to distinguish the picture
that lacks it. Thus, contrary to R, the subject may know
that his visual field has phenomenal purple even though, due
to this failure of transparency from complexity, he is
unable to distinguish from it the case of a visual field
lacking phenomenal purple. For he may be having such a
visual field without believing himself to be.
One way of rejecting these intuitions is to hold that
it is not determinate that a subject's visual field is as of
purple 9/ as of red at Waldo's watchband until the subject
notices. Again, I grant that we should allow the
possibility of deciding a posteriori after sufficient data
collection and theory construction that, all things
considered, such a thing is indeterminate until the subject
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notices. The anti-skepticism argument against absent
qualia, however, requires a priori, or at least common
sense, reasons for rejecting the Waldo intuitions, but
common sense supports these intuitions. One can surely
imagine being made to notice the red watchband and sincerely
saying, "That's it--that's what made it look different!'"Il
Subthreshhold phenomenal change. Now consider the
following sort of phenomenon.
Case 3. Pain Change. A subject is introduced to pain
from an external pain machine that can be increased in
intensity. Intuitively, we know that increases in
intensity correlate with increases in level of pain.
However, it is observed that there are increases in the
cause's intensity that are not noticed. They fall
below a increase-rate theshhold required for being
noticed. With each subthreshhold increase, a subject
will attest to no change, even though cumulatively the
increases eventually cause severe discomfort and the
kinds of behavior associated with it."
It may sometimes be natural in such a case to say that there
are phenomenal increases in the subject's pain even though
the subject does not believe there to be. One might well be
troubled morally by having increased the pain machine's
output even if the subject professes not to notice an
18. Ned Block suggested this example to me.
19. For discussion of this case, see Parfit, Reasons
gad Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 78-
79, and R. M. Hare, "Pain and Evil," Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vll. 38 (1964).
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increase in pain. This sort of case is a counterexample to
R's consequent: one is unable to distinguish no increase in
pain from a subthreshhold increase. Here, however, we do
not ascribe to ourselves the knowledge either. Thus, R
survives the example. But the Knowledge Premise does not.
Thus, again, the case for K, and against absent qualia, is
undermined.
Thus, R can be used to discredit the possibility of
absent qualia. I sometimes know a state of mine has a
certain phenomenal property even though I do not, because of
these failures of transparency, have comprehensive evidence
for the property that distinguishes the state I have from
every state lacking the property. The relevant alternatives
I must discriminate it from in order to know the phenomenal
property to be instantiated are fewer than this. And even
when R is true, there are times, as perhaps in the case of
subthreshhold pain change, when R's antecedent is false, and
again the requirement of comprehensive evidence fails.
Thus, the conjunction of R and the proposition that we do
know our qualia entails that our knowledge requires
distinguishing that is in fact irrelevant to having
knowledge. If ruling out the possibility of absent qualia
requires that my knowledge of phenomenal properties must be
grounded on evidence so comprehensive that the number of
relevant alternatives is the maximum conceivable, then the
case against absent qualia collapses.
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V. Reliabilism, Relevance and Saving the Argument
Can R be improved? Is there any way out of these
difficulties for the defender of an argument against the
possibility of absent qualia based on a threat of
skepticism? Just as reliabilist intuitions about the
compatibility of knowledge of the external world with the
possibility of error undermined the epistemological
principles we considered prior to introducing R, so further
reliabilist intuitions have undermined R itself. It may
help to begin with those intuitions.
What constraints does a plausible reliabilist account
place on a principle like R? There are many reliabilist
proposals about the nature of justified belief and
knowledge, and they differ along a number of dimensions.'
I shall not try here to adjudicate among them; instead, I
shall review several issues that are pertinent to the
reliabilist analysis of the special case of our knowledge of
our qualitative mental states.
Any account of knowledge must recognize that many cases
of knowing that entail knowing which.2" My knowing that my
friend will meet me in Harvard Square entails my knowing
20. Alvin Goldman reviews the literature on this
approach in his Epistemology and Cognition (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard, 1986), esp. chs. 3, 5.
21. See Alvin Goldman, "Discrimination and Perceptual
Knowledge," Journal gf Philosophyv_ 73 (1976), pp. 771-791.
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which square Harvard Square is. The knowledge-producing
mechanisms to which the reliabilist draws our attention are
mechanisms by which I know which things my knowledge is
about. If I know which things satisfy a predicate, I can
distinguish those things which do from many alternatives to
them. A reasonable requirement, then, on the reliabilist's
account of my knowing that something is psi is that my
knowing-producing mechanisms distinguish something's being
psi from relevant alternatives to something's being psi. My
belief that my friend will meet me in Harvard Square is
knowledge only if the mechanism producing this belief in me
reliably distinguishes being in Harvard Square from being in
relevantly alternative locations.
By way of illustration, contrast this condition on
knowledge with the weaker condition I previously discarded,
which I will call the Maximal Evidence Principle.
The Maximal Evidence Principle
For all p , if S knows that is true, then S has
evidence that distinguishes the truth of p from any
possible case of p's not being true.
For me to know that my friend will meet me in Harvard
Square, the Maximal Evidence Principle requires that I
distinguish the event of my friend's meeting me in Harvard
Square from all possible alternatives to that event. This
includes such alternatives as my friend's being ill and
staying home, my friend's meeting me in Inman Square, and my
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friend's meeting me at my home. The Maximal Evidence
Principle does not, however, require me to distinguish the
Harvard Square meeting from a meeting in a square that looks
almost like Harvard Square, so long as meeting at such a
location is not a possible way for it to fail to be true
that my friend meets me in Harvard Square. But the
"relevant alternatives" condition might well require this.
And it seems right to. It is a plausible condition on my
knowledge that I know which square Harvard Square is.
Knowing which could require a capacity to distinguish it
from relevant alternatives similar in appearance even if our
meeting in a lookalike square is not a possible way for my
friend and me to fail to meet in Harvard Square.22
R is actually consistent with these reliabilist
intuitions, and it thus has much going for it. Unlike the
Maximal Evidence Principle, R employs the stronger "relevant
alternatives" condition. It employs a maximal criterion of
relevance: knowledge of having a phenomenal property
requires one to distinguish having it from every possible
case of not having it. Thus, R does not make the mistake of
restricting relevant alternatives to actual alternatives.
In this, R is unlike the reliabilist principle which
Shoemaker, for example, sees as a possible threat to the
22. See Goldman, "Discrimination and Perceptual




To see this mistake, consider the following case.
Case Ae. Accidentally Accurate ain BReport. Consider
again the mechanism which causes me to say, "I am in
pain," on the basis of an expectation of pain and a
sensation of cold or pain. Imagine a possible world in
which the mechanism does not come into use very often
but, on those rare occasions when it does, gets the
sensation correct--I am in pain. Now, imagine that
this is accidental, the result of some fortuitous
correlation between sensations of cold and the absence
of phenomenal expectations of various sorts, including
expectations of pain. It is in this way by accident
that the mechanism gets my pain-states correct; there
turn out to be no opportunities for it to get them
wrong.
Although the mechanism reliably allows me to distinguish
between pain and the alternatives to it actualized in this
possible world, the mechanism does not give me knowledge.
This lack of knowledge becomes evident when I move to nearby
worlds where the fortuitous correlation no longer holds.
There, I cannot on the basis of this mechanism distinguish
anymore between genuine pain and relevant alternatives such
as those sensations of cold which trigger my reports of
pain. It is for this reason that the belief-producing
mechanism does not give me knowledge. It is a mere accident
23. Shoemaker, "Absent Qualia Are Impossible," 9gp
ait., p. 596.
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that I am correct in the actual world. For there to be
knowledge of pain, the relevant alternatives such a
mechanism must reliably distinguish from my genuine pains
must go beyond actual states to include such counterfactual
states as those I undergo in these nearby worlds.
Despite these virtues of R--its respect for relevant
alternatives and its treatment of counterfactual states as
relevant--R remains inadequate as a condition on knowledge.
Again, R makes all alternatives relevant, and that is too
many. We presently lack a theory of relevance, but I have
already said enough to suggest some alternatives that are
not among them. The case of misconfirmation, for example,
shows that it is irrelevant to my knowledge of my pain that
I distinguish between sensations of pain and any and all
sensations of cold which would trigger avowals of pain.
Anyone who argues that the argument I have been criticizing
can be saved by modifying R has to show that were there, by
hypothesis, to be any ersatz pains, they would be among the
relevant alternatives covered by the modified R. That is,
they must be among the relevant alternatives to my actual
phenomenal states that I must be able to distinguish my
actual states from in order to have know of my actual
states. I do not have any argument that this cannot be
done, but it seems clear that nobody as yet has met this
burden of placing ersatz states among these relevant
alternatives.
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We have no guarantee that ersatz pains themselves are
not simply among the counterexamples to R. Granted, they do
not fall into the paradigms of counterexamples we have
examined so far. They do not involve the same sort of
abnormal belief-causing processes misconfirmation does.
What makes them ersatz is that they are functionally
isomorphic to genuine states; thus they are parts of
otherwise normal, belief-causing processes. Nor are they
experiences that match the other paradigm, ones which, due
to complexity or change that falls below a threshhold, we
are unaware of the phenomenal properties of. For ersatz
pains are not experiences; nor are they necessarily aspects
of complex mental states or subthreshhold phenomenal
changes. Still, even though ersatz states do not fall into
these paradigms, it is unclear why we should deny the
possibility of further paradigms of counterexamples to R.
The initial, robust intuition expressed through R is after
all unsound. There may, of course, be special cases of R
which one cannot give up--for example, the special case of R
according to which my knowledge of having a longstanding
pain requires the possibility of my distinguishing having it
from the alternative of having a longstanding feeling of
cold. But I see no reason to believe that the intuitions
governing such special cases generalize to cover absent
qualia. Only if they do would we have reason to place
ersatz states, were there any, among the relevant
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alternatives which knowledge of qualia guarantees
distinguishability of.
CHAPTER SEVEN QUALIA AND CONTENT
There are thus no general epistemological principles
guaranteeing that we can always distinguish our normal
qualitative states from nonqualitative states. Nor is there
reason to believe that we can distinguish normal states by
such principles from a subset of nonqualitative states which
would include ersatz pains, if there were any. Anti-
skepticism arguments against the possibility of absent
qualia which depend on such general epistemological
principles therefore fail.
I shall argue in Chapter Eight that even without such
general principles, we can nevertheless distinguish our
genuine states from ersatz counterparts on other grounds.
However, I shall go on to argue that this is consistent with
the existence of enough absent-qualia states to undermine
functionalism. The reason for this is that not all absent-
qualia states threaten the kind of skepticism their
functionalis,. critics have alleged.
To make this plausible, I shall devote most of the
present chapter and Chapter Eight to reviewing and rejecting
an objection to the functionalist account superficially
similar to mine. After showing what it wrong with the
superficially similar objection, I shall use the lessons
developed to create at the end of Chapter Eight a different,
more successful objection.
The superficially similar objection is that it is
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enough to forestall the functionalist critic that we
distinguish absent-qualia states that share the
fonqualitative causes and effects of genuine states. The
objector claims that this leaves room for detectable
qualitative differences between the two sets of states by
way of the beliefs they cause. In the present chapter, I
examine and reject the notion that it would be enough for
this to occur that the respective beliefs differed polely in
their wide contents. This means returning to the question I
began examining in the fourth and fifth chapters, that of
how qualitative beliefs get the contents they have.
I. The First Objection: The Conee-Shoemaker Version
Recall the specific anti-skepticism argument against
the possibility of absent qualia due to Sydney Shoemaker and
Earl Conee. As Conee reconstructs Shoemaker's original
argument, recall that there are two premises and a
conclusion, derived by modus tollens.
Conee's Reconstruction of the Anti-Skepticism Argument
(EP) If ersatz pain is possible, then it is not
possible to distinguish cases of genuine pain from
cases of ersatz pain.
(K) It is possible to distinguish cases of genuine
pain from cases of any possible state lacking
qualitative character.
Ergo, ersatz pain is not possible.
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Conee argues that premise K is defensible. Although I
refuted his argument in the previous chapter, I shall assume
here provisionally for the sake of argument that there is
some much weaker version of K that would produce a logically
valid argument and is defensible. This would push the
burden of the modus tollens argument onto EP, according to
which the existence of absent qualia would make it
impossible to distinguish genuine from ersatz pains on the
basis of the presence or absence of qualitative character.
It is with EP that Conee finds fault. I will call the kind
of case he makes against EP "the First Objection."
For EP to be defeated, the presence of the qualitative
character of pain must m]• a difference in the causal
capacities of pain, a difference that would enable us to
distinguish genuine pains from ersatz cases. But what could
this difference be?
The First Objection, as I have indicated, supposes that
it is a difference in the beliefs they cause. Ordinarily,
if I distinguish two things, it is in virtue of the beliefs
caused by them differing. Can the beliefs caused by two
functionally equivalent states differ, however? In a sense,
yes. Recall Earth and Twin Earth. Assume that I have a
doppelganger on Twin Earth who has functionally equivalent
beliefs to mine. He believes he is sitting in front of a
word processor; I believe I am sitting in front of one. No
difference yet. But he believes he had a glass of XYZ this
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morning, I believe I had a glass of H.0, even though we each
formulate our recollections with the word "water." Here we
do have a difference, one in virtue of the different
Russellian propositions expressed by each of us in reporting
our beliefs, or as I will say here, in virtue of the
different wide contents of the respective beliefs.1
Now imagine a person Smith who feels a genuine pain, g,
with qualitative character, c, and then undergoes an ersatz
pain, g, with no qualitative character. By introspecting
the genuine pain's character, c, Smith could come to know:
(Bg) The state I am in which I believe to be pain
presents this character to introspection (making
direct reference to c).
Can Smith accomplish something similar with his hypothetical
ersatz pain? Can he know that his ersatz state presents
some character to introspection? Conee writes: "Giving
attention to a mental state one is in, attempting to
introspect some qualitative character, and failing to find
any, is a mental process that includes experience of a
certain phenomenal character--one has the seeking-and-
finding-no-feeling sort of experience." Call this an
experience of character n. While in n, Conee asserts, Smith
could introspect and come to know:
1. Of course, there is also the wide-content difference
in his beliefs being about him, my beliefs being about me.
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(Be) The state I am in which I believe to be pain
presents this character to introspection (making
direct reference to n).
Conee argues: "Suppose that Smith introspects these
things and that as a result he gains beliefs constituting
knowledge of Bg and Be. Generating these two different
items of knowledge is a causal difference between g and e.
By knowing Bg and Be, Smith distinguishes the genuine case
of pain from the ersatz."
If he is correct, this is a counterexample to EP, since
according to EP the possibility of ersatz pain precludes a
causal difference enabling one to distinguish between it and
genuine pain. And with such a refutation of EP, the
conclusion of the modus tollens argument, that ersatz pain
is not possible, would also be refuted.2
Conee's case rests in part on what the functionalist is
committed to concerning functional definitions of phenomenal
states. The functionalist claims not just that mental
states can be interdefined but that phenomenal character can
be explained away. That means that any functional
definition which refers in any way to phenomenal character
can only be provisional. The functionalist must in
principle be able to produce functional definitions that
eliminate explicit reference to phenomenal states
2. Conee, g., cit., pp. 354-356.
_ _
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altogether. Thus, the anti-functionalist has only to show
the possibility of an ersatz state that satisfies a
nonqualitative functional characterization of a genuine
state.
Conee's argument tries to exploit this fact. It may
seem that the relation between pain and pain-belief is too
close and the character of some pain-belief too phenomenal
to allow the possibility of a state that would cause genuine
pain-belief but itself have no phenomenal character. An
ersatz state characterized nonqualitatively, one might
believe, would allow more room. Conee's point is that to
defeat functionalism it is enough that it be possible to
produce functional isomorphs of pain and pain-belief that
are qualia-free in certain ways. It would be enough to
produce a qualia-free isomorph of pain that has causal
relations with a state isomorphic to pain-belief but
directed toward the qualia-free state in the way pain-belief
is directed toward pain.
Conee contends that this is enough to defeat the anti-
skepticism argument. With their functional equivalence, the
two beliefs would be similar enough to preserve the
ersatzness of the ersatz state. But with their wide-content
difference, they would be different enough to distinguish
genuine from ersatz. His claim is that it is possible to do
this within the constraint against skepticism because the
very qualitative difference between the two beliefs, one
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genuine and the other qualia-free, makes it possible to
distinguish them.
II. Why the First Objection Won't Work--A Summary
In this section I will summarize my counterargument to
the First Objection before going on to set out my
counterargument is considerably more detail. At the end of
this section I will set out the substance of the Second
Objection, which I will defend in more detail at the end of
the chapter.
My argument against the First Objection, in summary, is
that there is no ersatz state having an effect like belief
in Be that could both distinguish the ersatz state from a
genuine counterpart while, at the same time, preserving the
functional isomorphism between the ersatz and genuine
states. The reason is this. Any belief like Be in virtue
of which such distinguishing could, by hypothesis, occur
would require mental processing that would have to go
outside the set of normal effects of the genuine state, thus
upsetting the functional isomorphism between it and any
hypothetical ersatz state causing such a distinguishing
belief.
My counterargument to the First Objection is general.
There is no way to repair the First Objection by identifying
a different pair of hypothetical effects of genuine and
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ersatz pains which would escape the difficulties on which my
counterargument is based and distinguish the genuine from
the ersatz pains. For the proponent of the First Objection
is committed to claiming not only that Smith's a-related
belief, Be, can distinguish genuine pain from ersatz pain
but also that it ma§ distinguish the two. Even if there
were another pair of beliefs caused by Smith's genuine pain
and his hypothetical ersatz pain which escaped the
difficulties created by the beliefs Bg and Be, still these
difficulties would be enough to undermine the First
Objection. For if there is at all to exist an ersatz
counterpart to genuine pain such as Smith's state a, there
has to be a distinguishing counterpart to his belief in Bg,
like Be. And I argue there cannot be one.
Now, it obviously would not help the First Objection to
construe Bg and Be, Smith's two beliefs in virtue of which
he is supposed to distinguish genuine from ersatz pains, as
wholly nonqualitative beliefs. Smith's genuine pain, g, and
a, Smith's hypothetical ersatz pain, have all their causal
relations in common to nonqualitative beliefs, other direct
nonqualitative effects and any indirect effects of those
beliefs and other direct effects. The ersatz state A and
its nonqualitative effects will cause or prevent
nonqualitative beliefs of a given type under any
circumstances g and its nonqualitative effects would. Thus,
there would be nothing between belief in Bg and belief in Be
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to distinguish g and e if these beliefs were wholly
nonqualitative.
But it also will not help to adopt a certain false
picture of what would make these two beliefs qualitative
beliefs--that is, of what would make them the kinds of
beliefs that would make it possible to distinguish g and g.
According to this picture, which I examine in the next
section, what makes them qualitative beliefs, and thus the
kinds of effects of g and g that would make it possible to
distinguish g and g, is that their referring expressions are
satisfied by qualitative characters. On this picture,
qualitative beliefs are just like nonqualitative beliefs
except that their referring expressions are satisfied by
qualitative characters. *Thus, it is possible to distinguish
g and g, on this picture, because the two respective effects
of g and e, namely Bg and Be, differ in wide content. The
former is satisfied by c, the phenomenal character of
Smith's genuine pain, the latter by n, the hypothetical
phenomenal character of Smith's hypothetical ersatz pain.
If it were as simple as this, there would be a way out
of the difficulties that I describe below that make it
impossible both to make room for a distinguishable
qualitative difference between the effects of g and e and to
preserve the functional isomorphism among the nonqualitative
effects of g and £. But it is not as simple as this. For I
will argue that if belief in Bg and belief in Be differed
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only in what satisfied their referring expressions, it would
be possible to know when they did differ only so long as
there were some other way to distinguish the referents. The
difference in referents between Bg and Be would not be
enough by itself to distinguish g from g, genuine from
ersatz, which the First Objection requires.
It may seem to help the proponent of the First
Objection to make the referring expressions contained in the
two beliefs demonstratives and the reference to their
objects direct. It does help, I will argue, but still, only
if there is something else besides the difference in
referents that distinguishes the beliefs.
There is something else. It is this. In demonstrative
reference to qualitative character we humans pick it out
qualitatively--from the inside, in virtue of what it is like
to have mental states with it. We do not pick it out in
virtue of public aspects of the qualitative character, such
as physical or functional properties, as other creatures
might. This, then, is how the proponent of the First
Objection would have to distinguish g from e through Bg and
Be, if g and e could be distinguished. If there is a
difference between the beliefs Bg and Be that makes possible
distinguishing a from e beyond the mere difference in
referents, it is this. The phenomenal characters of a and g
are both picked out qualitatively and the picking-out of g's
character differs qualitatively from the picking-out of e's
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character.
But I argue that it is not possible to distinguish them
this way. In general, the ways qualitative characters get
picked out insure that there are qualitative aspects to
qualitative beliefs beyond their wide contents. But these
further qualitative aspects, because of differing causal
relations to them, upset any possible functional isomorphism
between a genuine state and any hypothetical ersatz state
one might try to construct. This makes ersatz counterparts
with qualitative causal relations impossible.
There are two reasons for this. First, suppose that
there were a state e distinct from g in Conee's way--because
Be was distinguishable from Bg. To construct such a
hypothetical e, I will argue, we would be forced to choose
between an unacceptible epiphenomenality, in virtue of which
qualitative states lack nonqualitative effects, and an
impossible irrationality, one that would have to fix false
beliefs in the face of conclusive evidence of their falsity.
The problem arises because certain nonqualitative
effects that an e would have that would have no counterparts
among g's effects. Normally, for example, states like e and
Be would cause perplexity. By hypothesis, Be reflects
Smith's experience that there is a state he simultaneously
kel~Iexsa to painful and feels to be painless. But neither g
nor its immediate effects, like belief in Bg, cause such
perplexity. Thus, I argue, either belief in Be cannot have
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the normal effect of prompting perplexity, or it has that
effect at the same time it fills the functional causal role
of belief in Bg, its counterpart among genuine pain's
effects. In the first case, the result would be
unacceptible epiphenomenality, in virtue of which
qualitative states have no nonqualitative effects.
In the second case, the result would be the impossible
irrationality referred to. In order to maintain the
functional isomorphism of e with g, belief in Be must have
spurious effects in nonqualitative belief, namely those of
belief in Bg, belief in painfulness. But whatever processes
fix these spurious beliefs would conflict with the
counterveiling evidence of the normal nonqualitative beliefs
caused by a painless state. This would lead not to an
acceptible form of irrationality but to an impossible state,
for the latter, nonspurious beliefs would undercut the
processes fixing the former, spurious ones. If it were
possible to overcome the counterveiling evidence of the
nonspurious beliefs somehow, it would only be so by use of
processes outside the functional causal role that q and e
share, processes that would not fit the template of causes
and effects that g and its effects must conform to.
Second, I argue, if Smith's hypothetical state of
belief Be were to exist, it could not have intensional
content at all, and thus it could not constitute a kind of
knowledge through which Smith could distinguish e from g.
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This is because the demonstrative term "that character,"
which purportedly picks out e's phenomenal character, in
fact cannot pick out a demonstratum at all. Suppose that a
demonstratum could be picked out in one of the following two
ways--either through an introspective search or in virtue of
a demonstratum just, so to speak, "calling attention to
itself." But a "location problem," as I dub it, makes it
impossible to find the term's referent through an
introspective search, since there is no counterpart search
which is part of g's functional role. This problem, I will
argue, precludes assigning the term a referent directly.
The belief Bg gets a referent this way, in virtue of c, g's
character and Bg's referent, calling attention to itself by
filling a specific region of phenomenal space and by
standing out in contrast to its phenomenal background. But
e has no such qualitative character that could do this.
For there to be such a functional fit between them, g
and e would need to have a relationship analogous to that
which phenomenal states have in cases of spectrum inversion.
In inversion cases, however, counterpart phenomenal states
are functionally equivalent and differ only in qualitative
character. By contrast, g and any hypothetical ersatz state
like a would differ in more respects.
Both of these problems--the epiphenomenality-
irrationality problem and the location problem--work against
the existence of a and Be for the same kind of reason. No
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ersatz state could both conform to the template of normal
effects and effects of effects of a genuine state like g
and, at the same time, be distinguishable introspectively
from that state in virtue of a qualitative difference
between the states. There would be side effects running
outside the functional template.
All these difficulties depend on functional differences
in the qualitative ways g and e would be picked out. There
would be no such difficulties if e could be distinguished
from g nonqualitatively, merely in virtue of a difference in
referents among the beliefs they cause. That is the appeal
of trying to distinguish 9 this latter way, but as I have
previously claimed and will argue in more detail below, it
is not possible to distinguish e from g in this way either.
For these reasons, the First Objection is unsuccessful.
However, a related Second Objection is available that
suffers none of the problems that defeat the First
Objection. The Second Objection is successful.
Consider Smith's nonsentient, homunculus-headed
doppelganger, an entity all of whose mental states lack
qualitative content. Between Smith and his doppelganger,
distinguishing of the weak sort required by the anti-
skepticism argument is only possible in Smith. The
doppelganger could not distinguish, since the doppelganger,
being nonsentient, could not possibly pick out the qualia-
free contents of its states within the constraints of the
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functional isomorphism to Smith it by definition has. In a
word, it's a zombie at best and doesn't know anything. Now
compare Smith and the doppelganger. In Smith, K is true"--
the presence or absence of the qualitative character of pain
most certainly makes it possible to distinguish cases of
genuine pain from cases of any possible state lacking
qualitative character. For as I have argued in the previous
sections, Smith's genuine pain states cause qualitative
pain-knowledge but no ersatz pains are available to him to
produce anything that he could confuse with genuine pains.
(This is so even if, as I argued in chapter six, there is no
more general epistemological principle of transparency
supporting K.) The existence of the doppelganger does not
contradict K, since its states do not have raw feels to be
distinguished from the absence of the qualitative character
of pain and its ersatz states cause nonqualitative
pain-belief-like states that do not constitute knowledge at
all. But these facts are compatible with the possibility of
ersatz pains, since the doppelganger by definition has them.
Thus, the possibility of ersatz pain does not entail,
contrary to the functionalist, the inability to distinguish
ersatz from genuine states.
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III. Distinguishing Ersatz States by the Wide Content
of Beliefs about Their Qualitative Character
I shall now consider at greater length the first option
discussed in the previous section for characterizing
qualitative beliefs. That is the option of construing them,
to use the rough approximation there, as wholly
nonqualitative but for the satisfaction of their referring
expressions by the raw feels of real phenomenal states.
With this first option, then, Bg and Be would differ,
roughly, only in the referents of their referring
expressions and would have no qualitative character except
that of the referents. This option would provide a
qualitative difference between g and e, but it would do so
without the difficulty with the side-effects of qualitative
character. Thus, it would provide support for the First
Objection to the anti-absent-qualia argument.
How could Bg and Be differ only in their referents? I
called this a rough approximation of the option. That is so
because Bg and Be surely must differ in some other respect
in order to differ in their referents. I glance over to a
glass of clear liquid sitting near my word processor and
say, "I had a glass of that stuff this morning." My Twin-
Earth doppelganger makes a similar glance and utters a
similar-sounding sentence. The beliefs he and I express
differ in their referents, water and XYZ, but this is so
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only because there are further differences--for example, in
their demonstrations (my finger versus his), in their
relations to previous samples of clear liquid, and so on.
One natural way to make the distinction is to say that
what is "in the head" on these two occasions is the same and
that what differs is what is "outside the head." Among the
things "in the head" in virtue of which the beliefs are
similar are their syntactic structures, their constituents,
and their causes and effects. Among the things "outside the
head" in virtue of which they differ are the two referents--
the water and the XYZ--and my two different relations to
them.
In an important way, however, my beliefs about the
water and his about XYZ fail to parallel Bg and Be. By
hypothesis, Bg and Be, unlike the first two beliefs, dg
differ in what is "in the head." Thus, I shall not discuss
what is "inside" or "outside" Smith's head. Instead, I
shall characterize this first proposal this way: that
because the qualitative character of their referents is the
only qualitative aspect of Bg and Be, the wide-content
difference between Bg and Be is the only qualitative
difference between them. If this were the only qualitative
difference, there would be no qualitative side-effects to
picking out their referents to upset their functionalism
isomorphism and make absent qualia impossible. This is what
might make this proposal attractive to the defender of the
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First Objection.
I shall now provide two reasons why this proposal would
fail to make of Bg and Be effects that could distinguish
their hypothetical causes, g and g.
I shall call referential relations to the qualitative
characters or raw feels of g and a--that is, c and, by
hypothesis, n--that would fit such an account as this
simple. A simple referential relation would pick out
qualitative referents for Bg's and Be's demonstratives
nonqualitatively. Thus, as I have said, it would do so
without the complicating side-effects of picking them out
qualitatively that give rise to the "epiphenomenality-
irrationality" and the "location" problems.
Now, let us look for a moment at a way, one I will
reject, in which one might interpret the demonstratives of
Bg and Be to have simple referential relations to the
qualitative characters that are supposed, by hypothesis, to
satisfy them. According to this interpretation, first
suggested by Stephen Schiffer, demonstratives are a
disguised form of definite description, one expressing
individual concepts. Say, for example, that Tom believes
(1) true of some cup, by the very words of (1).
(1) That cup is red.
According to the view under consideration, Tom's belief is
identical to some belief that could be expressed in words
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that replace (1)'s subject with a definite description, one
which expresses an individual concept entirely through
general terms and the logically proper "I" and "now." Thus,
it has been suggested that (2) expresses the same belief as
(1).
(2) The only object which I am now looking at which
appears to me to be a cup is red."
None of the authors who have taken this view have
discussed what one should do with demonstrative beliefs
about bodily sensations, such as Bg and Be. Let us
speculate about what proponents of the view could say. It
need not be a true account; the question before us is
whether any such account as this would be adequate for
distinguishing Bg from Be and refuting Shoemaker's argument.
What we need is a belief that bears the same relation to Bg
or Be that (2) bears to (1). Let me propose (3) as a belief
that proponents of the descriptivist account of
demonstrative belief might take to be fill that role.
(Bg) The state I am in which I believe to be pain
presents to introspection this character (by
hypothesis, making reference to c, or in the case
of Be, to n).
3. Schiffer's view is set out in "The Basis of
Reference," Erkenntnis (1978), pp. 171-206. For criticisms
of it, see the next section. Beliefs identical to (1) and
(2) are discussed in Kent Bach, "Dfe r_ Belief and
Methodological Solipsism," in Andrew Woodfield, ed., Thouaht
and Obiject (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), p. 140.
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(3) The state I am in which I believe to be pain
presents to introspection the character which I am
introspectively attending to now (by hypothesis,
making reference to c, or in the case of Be, to
n).
If Bg or Be is construed to express a meaning like that
expressed by (3), then the wide-content difference between
Bg and Be, I shall now argue, cannot by itself distinguish g
from e.
First, suppose that Bg is semantically equivalent to
(3) or something like it. Unless there is a further piece
of knowledge beyond Bg by which Smith can identify the
character which he is attending to as the particular
qualitative character it is, not by some further description
but directly, then there would be no way for Smith to
distinguish g from e on the basis of Bg and Be. For there is
by g's very definition nothing between the two beliefs to
distinguish them by way of descriptions. Their functional
equivalence connects them to the same descriptions.
Suppose that Smith knows (3) to be true and knows it to
be true in the very words of (3). Suppose he knows that the
state he is in which he believes to be pain has the
qualitative character he is contemporaneously directing his
attention to. He does not yet, however, know that the state
he is in which he believes to be pain has any particular
qualitative character--this one or that one--unless he also
knows of some particular tbi gone or that gne that it ia the
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one he is contemporaneously directing his attention to. For
it is contingent of any particular qualitative character
that it is the character that Smith is directing his
attention to contemporaneously (from Smith's point of view,
now), and it is a substantial piece of further knowledge for
Smith that c or n fits that description.
There is a further problem. Descriptions containing
psychological terms, like the description in (3), cannot
provide distinguishing beliefs, and it is hard to see how to
improve on them. Suppose that there exists an ersatz pain
of the form Smith is supposed to undergo and that he directs
his attention to his bodily sensations to search for the
character of the state causing his pain behavior. Suppose
that he picks out a qualitative character that makes Be true
in virtue of some description, like that in (3) or by
employing some other psychological relation besides that of
attending to describe the character. Either he must employ
a further description to place the character in the
psychological relation (for how does it get to be true that
Smith attends, for example, to that qualitative character?)
or there must be some reason that attending differs from
believing in taking one directly to an object, without any
description.'
But neither option--that of a further description or
4. For more on this dilemma, see Brian Loar, Mind ad
Meaning (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p.
104, and Austin, o*. cit., esp. pp. 38-39.
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that of a psychological difference--is satisfactory for
distinguishing e from g in virtue of Be and Bg. For any
further description, on the one hand, there would remain the
further knowledge of what the description was satisfied by.
Say his search leads Smith to the phenomenal location of the
genuine pain counterpart. If it makes sense to characterize
Smith's attending to the raw feel at that location as by
description, this would be so without his knowing which raw
feel it is. For attending to it by description, if there
were such a thing, would require attending to it in virtue
of its satisfying some description. If some piece of
knowing something about it is a case of knowing under some
description about its being attended to, then there will
always be the further knowledge of its being the thing
attended to. This is knowledge de re. Without this latter,
there would be no distinguishing of the sort the First
Objection requires.
But on the other hand, any psychological difference
between attending and believing will still require a direct
psychological relation to n, the hypothetical ersatz
character. That will create the other set of problems--the
location problem and the epiphenomenality-irrationality
problem--that we have been looking to the simple referential
relation between Bg and c and between Be and n to alleviate.
To make our knowledge of qualia depend upon direct
attendings or any other direct psychological connection
259
would be to require the kinds of mental processing that
would upset the intended functional isomorphism between the
genuine pain and the hypothetical ersatz counterpart. To
attend to Q's character n directly, for example, would
surely require a search for qualia for which there is no
counterpart with the genuine state g or its character c.
IV. Direct Demonstrative Reference and Qualitative Belief:
Two Incorrect Accounts
Smith's beliefs in Bg and in Be are not merely in
causal and referential relations with c, the qualitative
character of g, and n, the hypothetical qualitative
character of e. Rather, Conee writes, they are also in
relations of direct reference. If my arguments are correct,
Conee is right to stipulate them to be relations of direct
reference. Only with knowledge by direct reference beyond
that expressed by nonqualitative descriptions could one hope
to find, if there were one at all, a qualitative difference
in effects that could distinguish g from g.
By making this stipulation, Conee means at the very
least to rule out any account according to which Smith fixes
the reference of the demonstrative expression "that
character" entirely through the mediation of some definite
description, as was entertained in the last section. How
then does the reference of the expression "that character"
get fixed? I will not construct a full-blown theory of
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direct reference, or of the related notion of de re belief.
There are many accounts and each is controversial. It is
adequate to look at several alternatives to determine if
there is a defensible interpretation of Smith's situation
fulfilling Conee's goals.
I shall argue in the remainder of this essay that there
is not. In this section, I argue that beliefs making direct
reference to qualitative character and occurring in normal
human beings like ourselves and almost normal ones like
Smith require qualitative aspects beyond their qualitative
wide contents. If a difference between Smith's two beliefs
beyond the wide-content difference made it possible to
distinguish his genuine and ersatz states, it would be in
virtue of the qualitative characters of the states being
picked out qualitatively. And it would be in virtue of the
picking out of one differing qualitatively from the picking
out of the other. But since, as I argue in Chapter Eight,
direct reference employs not the finesse of descriptive
reference but force, and force has side-effects, there could
be no e functional equivalent to genuine pains.
First, I shall consider two accounts that would lead to
the conclusion that both beliefs Bg and Be must have
qualitative aspects beyond their qualitative wide contents.
I use several previous thought experiments to show that
these accounts are false. Then, I argue that direct
demonstrative beliefs about qualitative character must have
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qualitative aspects beyond their qualitative wide contents
when, like Bg and Be, they occur in humans like Smith or in
other nonhuman sentient creatures capable of distinguishing
qualia.
Bach's account. Consider a position advanced by Kent
Bach.5 Bach opens his argument by properly criticizing the
account of direct reference put forth by Stephen Schiffer,
discussed above.6 Schiffer's view, as Bach notes, can be
interpreted as the view that the mode of presentation under
which a perceptual belief comes to be about some object is
an individual concept as expressed by a definite description
containing "I" and "now."
Bach and Schiffer agree that there are modes of
presentation, but on Bach's alternative account to
Schiffer's, modes of presentation are viewed as "percepts"
rather than individual concepts. "Intuitively," Bach
writes, "the trouble with Schiffer's view is that to believe
something of an object one is perceiving does not require
thinking of it under any description at all, for it is
already singled out for one perceptually.... The content of
a perceptual belief, like that of any de re belief, is not a
proposition expressed by a closed sentence. Rather, its
content is expressed by an open sentence with the percept
functioning as a mental indexical."'
5. In Bach, gy. cit., pp. 139-149.
6. In Schiffer, gn. Qit.
7. Bach, p. LiZ., pp. 143-146.
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To explicate this, Bach introduces the schema "A4s"
to represent a person s's being in a certain type of
perceptual state of being "appeared, to -ly," where MIn
ranges over sense modalities (visual, tactile, olfactory,
etc.) and "If" ranges over manners of appearance. It is a
schema to represent the contents of perceptual states.
According to Bach's account, "the conceptual content of
[a's] belief, as expressed by the open sentence 'x is G',
applies to an object only if there is an object which is
perceptually causing s to be in a perceptual state with
content 'Afjg', in which case the belief is about that
object."8 For someone to have a perceptual belief, then,
that person must be, according to Bach, appeared to
visually, tactually, olfactorily, or by some other sense
modality in which there is qualitative content.
Bach does not mention pain-beliefs or other
introspective, phenomenal beliefs, but if Bach's account
were true and could be extended to phenomenal beliefs, then
this would constitute a picture of how there might be
qualitative aspects to Smith's Bg and Be beyond the
qualitative characters in their wide contents. But while it
normally holds of perceptual beliefs, neither is Bach's
account necessarily true of the perceptual beliefs it is
intended to cover nor would it be necessarily true of
introspective, phenomenal beliefs like pain-beliefs.
8. Ibid., p. 146.
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If absent qualia are possible, then somebody might have
a perceptual belief without there being qualitative
character to that belief or to any of its states. Even if
there are no absent qualia states, we might imagine somebody
deprived of visual and auditory abilities to identify
objects in her surroundings. Despite this handicap, imagine
that she is able to reliably make true assertions about
remote objects that seem to express perceptual beliefs about
those objects. Or imagine a machine that is complex enough
to be ascribed beliefs about its surroundings on the basis
of its measurements of its surroundings. These two cases
are more extreme than actual cases of blindsight and
artificial intelligence but neither case is unimaginable.
Both the person and the machine might make what seem to be
demonstrative references to objects and substances in the
environment seeming to express de re beliefs even though
there is nothing qualitative to the demonstrations, whether
in any modes of presentation or in any other aspects of the
demonstrations.
As for the case of phenomenal beliefs like pain-
beliefs, recall Marcy (from Chapter Five, section five),
whose reports of her pains are unconnected to phenomenal
evidence of being in pain. Let's imagine that she also does
this for others--suppose she is wired up to them in a way
that provides her with the ability to demonstratively refer
to their pains. Suppose also that she refers
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demonstratively to the character of their pains and does so
without feeling any pain. Here, then, we have a case,
although quite odd, of a belief with qualitative character
in its wide content but without further qualitative aspects.
Conee's account. Conee asserts that any belief that
uses a constant to refer to a token qualitative character or
state is a "qualitative belief" and thus governed by the
same principles governing other qualitative states. Since
the beliefs Bg and Be have demonstrative expressions as
constituents, and these expressions are constants, it is
supposed to follow that Bg and Be are "qualitative" in
Conee's sense.
But recall Jones (from the previous chapter), who can
identify the token qualitative characters of his states not
on the basis of appearance but on the basis of physical
parameters, using a "cerebroscope" that allows him to
observe and decipher his own brain states. He can refer to
the token qualitative characters demonstratively, and he can
express beliefs whose contents contain demonstrative
references to the token qualitative characters, on the basis
of observing his "cerebroscope." Again, one can imagine
having demonstrative beliefs about features of one's
internal qualitative states without being presented with the
features qualitatively.'
9. For Conee's discussion, see Conee, gp. gjt., pp.
348-349.
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The term "qualitative belief" is supposed both to pick
out a belief that presents qualitative features
qualitatively--as Conee wants Bg and Be to do in order to
distinguish g from 9 for Smith
--and pick out a belief that employs constants to refer to a
token qualitative state or feature. But Jones' beliefs show
that the term could conceivably be unable to do both.
V. A Sound Argument
Despite these fanciful cases, what cannot occur are
oeliefs just like Smith's direct, demonstrative beliefs
which have no qualitative aspects beyond the raw feels to
which they refer.
Smith's beliefs are very different from the states I
just discussed which, by contrast, do lack qualitative
aspects beyond the raw feels to which they refer. If my
previous arguments are sound, then it is conceivable that a
nonsentient mechanism, or Marcy or Jones, might be able to
pick out c and n in some nonqualitative way. The
nonsentient mechanism might have belief-like states about c
and n, let us suppose, not inferentially through these raw
feels' satisfying physico-functional descriptions but rather
through their being picked out more directly than that. The
device might be caused to refer by interacting in the right
causal way with c and n. Marcy might similarly "just know"
266
that some state had c or n; Jones might know it
cerebroscopically. But Smith, a mostly normal sentient
creature except for his ersatz states, does not identify c
and n in a nonqualitative way. Smith picks out c and (if he
does at all) n in ways different from those of the
nonsentient mechanism or Marcy or Jones. Smith picks them
out qualitatively. In a normal Smith, there would be
qualitative aspects to any direct, demonstrative belief of
his to the effect that he was undergoing a mental state with
some particular raw feel, such as c or n.
Only if Smith has in bIs head apparatus that picks out
qualitative features on the basis of nonqualitative
properties of them (or like Marcy's, on the basis of po
properties of them) would Smith's beliefs directly refer to
qualitative features while lacking other qualitative
aspects. But Smith--like you and I and anyone else
biologically similar to us--does not have such apparatus.
We do not seem, phenomenologically, to have de _e beliefs
whose only qualitative features are their referents. By
itself, this is all right, since psychology has discovered
all kinds of mental states that we never thought we had.
The trouble here is that such beliefs would constitute a
possible source of skepticism about something that seems
indubitable.
Recall Kaplan's picture of demonstrative reference,
which I discussed in Chapter Five and which supports these
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intuitions. According to it, reference to qualia or any
other demonstratum requires what I previously labeled as a
scene of which the demonstratum is a part, a directing
intention, and an externalization of the directing
intention, such as a pointing. In the normal, first-person
case of direct reference to the raw feel of a pain, where
the demonstrator and the audience are identical and there is
no explicit pointing, this would involve situating the
referent at a phenomenal location against a phenomenal
background and picking it out from its background. As I
argued in Chapter Five, this is done in virtue of phenomenal
properties of the referent. Even the causal story about
such a belief with which the functionalist would begin would
be heavily loaded with phenomenal language, the
functionalist's hope being that such language could
ultimately be dispensed with by reduction.
From Kaplan's picture, it is natural to conclude that
there are two ways in which Smith's beliefs Bg and Be have
qualitative aspects beyond the qualitative characters to
which they refer. One we might call intrinsic. In virtue
of their intrinsic qualitative aspects, Bg and (if such a
belief were really possible) Be would, let us say,
incorporate c and n into themselves. Bg and Be would not
only have c and n as demonstrata but as constituents. They
would produce direct psychological effects in virtue of the
qualitative character of the states whose character they
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were about. In both these ways, they would differ from
belief-like simulations of Bg and Be that have raw feels
like c and n as demonstrata but pick the raw feels out by
nonqualitative properties of them. In these simulations,
the demonstrata would not be constituents, and they would
not necessarily produce effects qualitatively.
The other way in which Smith's beliefs Bg and Be have
qualitative aspects beyond the qualitative characters to
which they refer I will call relational. In demonstrating c
to oneself, according to Kaplan's picture, one would pick c
out from a background, and doing that would require relating
c to some of the other qualia at phenomenal locations around
it. Introspecting Bg, then, one would introspect the
qualitative aspects of locating c.
One final issue. Both these ways in which Bg and Be
have qualitative aspects beyond the raw feels to which they
refer introduce their own special problems when we try to
think how Bg and Be could be isomorphic.
So far I have shown that beliefs that normally refer
demonstratively to raw feels or qualitative character--that
is, in normal, sentient beings like Smith--do so in virtue
of qualitative aspects of the beliefs beyond that of the raw
feels or qualitative characters to which they refer. It
does not seem to follow directly from this that beliefs in
normal, sentient humans like Smith that differ in
qualitative demonstrata must differ in other qualitative
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aspects as well. It might conceivably be the case, for
example, that certain types of "inverted spectrum" cases
could be set up in such a way that demonstrative reference
to a qualitative state and its qualitative inverse were
structurally similar. And they might be similar enough so
that, although there would be qualitative aspects to the
demonstrative beliefs about the states beyond the
qualitative aspects of the states themselves, the beliefs
would differ qualitatively only in their referents.
Obviously, it would help the First Objection if between
Bg and Be there were a weak kind of distinguishability of
the sort one would find in the spectrum inversion examples,
a sort of distinguishability strong enough, however, to
defeat the functionalist's argument. Nevertheless, I will
argue in Chapter Eight that Bg and Be are not like this.
Because of what the demonstrative references in Bg and Be
are like and because of the complexities in the Be case,
there are more differences. Thus, for some ersatz pain to
be distinguishable from its genuine counterpart along the
lines that the First Objection entertains, it must cause a
belief that differs in two respects from some counterpart
belief caused by the genuine states. First, the ersatz-
caused belief must differ from its counterpart in
qualitative referents. And second, the two beliefs must
have and differ in qualitative aspects beyond that of their
referents, aspects in virtue of which they pick out their
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referents.
But, as I have previously stated in summarizing the
overall argument against the First Objection, this latter
kind of difference creates its own difficulties for the
First Objection, and in Chapter Eight I will set these out
in more detail.
CHAPTER EIGHT DISTINGUISHING QUALIA QUALITATIVELY
We have been examining a counterargument to the absent-
qualia argument against functionalism. According to this
counterargument, anyone rejecting functionalism by allowing
the possibility of absent qualia is committed to hopeless
skepticism about the qualitative character of our mental
states. The counterargument claims that this opponent of
functionalism leaves phenomenal states and any qualia-free
functional duplicates they might conceivably have
indistinguishable.
The First Objection, you will recall, is that we can
sufficiently distinguish genuine from absent-qualia states
to forestall the functionalist critic. It is said to be
enough that we distinguish absent-qualia states that share
the nonqualitative causes and effects of genuine states and,
the First Objection claims, that leaves room for qualitative
differences between the two sets of states in the contents
of the beliefs they cause.
The problem, I have argued, is that there would need to
be qualitative aspects to whatever demonstrative beliefs are
caused by the two sets of states over and beyond the
qualitative aspects of their demonstrata if a subject could
distinguish the absent-qualia states from the genuine states
in virtue of the beliefs. But there could only be further
qualitative aspects to the beliefs of an appropriate sort if
the beliefs differed in these further aspects, and differed
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in ways that upset the supposed functional isomorphism
between the genuine states and any hypothetical absent-
qualia states.
As I stated earlier in summarizing the counterargument
to the First Objection, there are two kinds of difficulties.
One kind is the focus of sections one and two. The second
difficulty, which I earlier labeled the Location Problem, I
will review in the third and fourth sections. In the fifth
and final section, I will offer my own objection to the
anti-skepticism argument, the Second Objection, and indicate
why it escapes the problems of the First Objection.
I. Distinguishing Ersatz States Qualitatively:
Initial Difficulties
Recall the first problem. If some hypothetical ersatz
pain e of Smith's were distinguishable from some genuine
pain g of his in virtue of different demonstrative beliefs
Be and Bg about the raw feels of e and g, respectively,
these beliefs would have nonqualitative effects such as his
reports about what was felt. These effects would be
identical. In the case of e, these nonqualitative effects
would include tendencies to say things like "Pain here"
which would be contradicted by the painlessness that Smith
would be directly aware of, as Fig. 5 illustrates.
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g Direct awareness e Direct awareness
of painfulness of painlessness
Other Non-Q Other Non-Q
effects -Bg effects -Be
NQ, ...,NQk NQ, ...,NQk
"Pain here" "Pain here"
Fig. 5 Ersatz and Genuine Pains Cause Statement "Pain Here"
Normally, direct awareness of this sort associated withae
would also have nonqualitative effects, including tendencies
to make statements like, "No pain here."
Now, imagine that Be, the demonstrative belief about
e's character, produces the nonqualitative effects it shares
with g and with Bg independently of e's character and its
own character. Imagine, for example, that this is because e
produces the effects it shares with a merely in virtue of
physical manipulation of Smith and not in virtue of anything
phenomenally present or absent in e nor anything else Smith
is directly aware of. In this, g would differ from g, as
illustrated by Fig. 6.
a Direct awareness e Direct awareness
of painfulness of painlessness
Other Non-Q 4 Other Non-Q
effects 'Bg 4 effects -Be ?
NQ, ... ,NQk NQ,, .. NQk
"Pain here" "Pain here"
Fig. 6 How the Ersatz Differs from the Genuine State
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Unlike what we are imagining the hypothetical ersatz state e
to do, the genuine pain g presumably does not diverge
between any psychological effects it causes in virtue of its
qualitative character--what Smith is directly aware of by
his having g--and the psychological effects it causes in
virtue of physical manipulation of Smith. For e to
accommodate such a divergence, on the other hand, Smith
would have to be capable of undergoing a very abnormal
psychological condition. Conee portrays that condition in
the following words.
But e is a very strange state--ersatz pain.... Yet the
state is not pain because it does not feel any way at
all. This lack of feeling also has its inevitable
epistemic impact. Very peculiar.... Also, notice that
the possibility of ersatz pain does not imply that the
beliefs engendered by ersatz pain are rational. The
state is by definition one that can cause false beliefs
about the presence of qualitative character. Yet
anyone subjected to such a state would be aware of the
qualitative facts of the matter by direct experience,
too. So direct awareness and the causal properies of
ersatz pain would work together to bring about a
bizarre combination of beliefs. Smith's epistemic
condition is highly peculiar. But nothing here
establishes its impossibility.1
Conee never explicitly states why he takes this to be a
condition of irrationality. Actually, what Conee writes is
1. Conee, og. cit., pp. 358-359.
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Option 2. True Irrationality
Fig. 7 The Epiphenomenality and Irrationality Options
compatible with two options for how to understand Smith's
condition, which I illustrate in Fig. 7. On the one hand,
there might be a condition of epiphenomenality, in virtue of
which Smith's direct awareness of e's and Be's painlessness
would lack nonqualitative psychological effects in him
altogether. In this case, Smith might still be rational
since he might have no beliefs of the form and not-p. On
the other hand, we can also imagine a condition of true
irrationality, one in which Smith's direct awareness of his
painlessness while in q and Be does produce nonqualitative
effects in his belief and produces beliefs that directly
contradict those produced by e and shared with g.
Neither option is possible, however, contrary to what
Conee asserts. The kind of epiphenomenality required by the




entertained in the second option is self-defeating. Smith
would have to be, as the result of g, subject to the
fixation of false beliefs in the face of his belief, caused
by his direct awareness, that he was painless, but he could
not be this way within the confines of how e is defined.
Consider Option 1 more closely. The argument against
the epiphenomenality it appeals to--against the possibility
that Smith's direct awareness of his painlessness while
undergoing e has not nonqualitative psychological effects--
is straightforward. Assume for the sake of argument it is
otherwise. In that case there would exist a possible
qualitative state that had no nonqualitative psychological
effects whatever. Although such a state could be known
qualitatively, it could not be the object of nonqualitative
knowledge. Thus, no expressions of belief could be true of
it; in fact, no beliefs at all could even be expressed about
it. This seems absurd. For we do not know what it would be
like for there to be a kind of qualitative mental state of
which no expressible knowledge was in principle possible.
Of course, there are qualitative states about which many of
us, as a matter of fact, lack certain kinds of expressible
knowledge; among such states are those we train painters,
musicians and wine-tasters to become more sensitive to. But
surely Smith's direct awareness of his painlessness is
robust, not at all like those states. Moreover, it begs the
question against functionalism to assume that there are
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qualitative states about which we of necessity have no
expressible knowledge.
Some kinds of epiphenomenality have had defenders, such
as that associatea with dual-aspect theories, according to
which phenomenal properties are epiphenomenal with respect
to physical properties. But the possibility of qualitative
states lacking nonqualitative effects is very different.
Dual-aspect epiphenomenalism is at least superficially
compatible with qualitative knowledge, since it is
consistent with the view that phenomenal properties,
although epiphenomenal, supervene on the physical-functional
properties sufficient for such knowledge. The kind of
epiphenomenality illustrated in Fig. 7, however, does not
even have this much favoring it. For it is hard to see how
there could be qualitative knowledge of being in a state
that one was, by hypothesis, directly aware of the
phenomenal character of without there also being
nonqualitative dispositional aspects of the knowledge beyond
its qualitative aspects. This is a lesson of the private
language argument, but one need not accept its common
behaviorist formulations to understand the lesson.2 And
without even knowledge of what one is supposed to be
2. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophica.
Investigations (New York: Macmillan, 1968), pp. 88ff.;
Norman Malcolm, "Wittgenstein's Philosophical
Investitions," in V. C. Chappell, T Philosophy okb aHind
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962); Saul Kripke,
Wittcenstein gon Rules ga_ Private Language (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982).
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directly aware of in the state, a truly absurd skepticism of
the sort Shoemaker envisions and criticizes would, in fact,
confront us.
If this is not a realizable option and we are to
develop a scenario for g's producing in Smith the
nonqualitative effects of genuine pain independently of any
direct awareness of his painlessness, then we must turn to
the irrationality option. In such a case, Smith's direct
awareness of his painlessness would produce its own set of
nonqualitative effects alongside the nonqualitative effects
already produced by e. But this result would not be any
more possible than the previous option. Many of the
nonqualitative effects e shares with the genuine pain g
express belief in painfulness. But whatever mental
processes produce spurious belief of this sort would be
interrupted by the overwhelming, counterveiling evidence
from direct awareness of painlessness and from the normal
nonqualitative beliefs caused by such direct awareness.
This would not be an acceptible irrationality but an
impossible state in which the latter, nonspurious beliefs
would undercut the processes fixing the former, spurious
ones. And if it were possible to overcome the
counterveiling evidence of the nonspurious beliefs somehow,
this would become so only by use of processes outside the
functional causal role that g and § share, processes that
would not fit the template of causes and effects that a and
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its effects must conform to.
Some of the effects of genuine pain are like reflexes.
Automatically, Smith in pain winces and tries to be rid of
the source. It is possible to imagine reflex-like responses
such as these being produced not by pain but by the ersatz
state e, yet surviving the counterveiling evidence of
painlessness in direct awareness. The state q simply
excites those centers of the nervous system responsible for
such reflex-like behavior. But this behavior alone is not
enough to single out pain from certain feelings of cold,
itchiness or other discomfort. For Smith to be undergoing a
true ersatz pain, one satisfying a functional definition of
pain, Smith's state must produce effects much more complex
than reflexes. What might make it plausible, though false,
that Smith were in pain would be his propositional
attitudes. These might include his tendencies to ascribe a
location to his state, to associate it with a shape and
boundaries, to characterize it by type and severity, to
compare it to other mental states, and to continuously
monitor it for changes in all these respects. But it is not
plausible that Smith could be producing all these
nonqualitative aspects of propositional attitudes on the
basis of an ersatz state at the very same time that he was
directly aware of his painlessness and producing on that
basis a parallel and contradictory set of propositional
attitudes.
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For example, one of the normal effects of having a
genuine pain is being prompted to utter, with sincerity and
conviction, sentences like, "I hurt." The details of how
that takes place are mysterious, but whatever they are, g by
hypothesis simulates the nonqualitative aspects. It is not
enough for e merely to cause Smith to parrot the words; he
must understand and mean them. And he must say them for the
very same reasons--or at least for functionally equivalent
reasons--for which he says them when prompted by real pain.
How could it be possible for Smith to do that at the very
same time he was prompted by awareness of the absence of
pain to say, "I don't hurt"? Even if a hypothetical ersatz
pain were to set off the kind of alarm in Smith real pain
does, provoking him to wince and have other pain-related
reflexes, it could hardly, for example, create in him any
conviction or sincerity in his avowals of pain. He would by
hypothesis attribute to his ersatz pain the same location g
had, but when he would search that location he would find
nothing. If his direct awareness of this absence of pain
were to have its normal effects, then it would have to
undermine any conviction Smith might have tended to have
that he really were in pain, and moreover, to rob his
avowals of some of their sincerity. But then, & would no
longer simulate the causal role of g. Sincerity and
conviction have their own nonqualitative effects--including
tendencies to avow sincerity and conviction--and, because of
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the impact of direct awareness, there would be no e that had
all the effects of this kind that g has.
II. Assimilating Absent Qualia Cases to Spectrum Inversion
It may seem that we could alleviate these difficulties
if e would produce its nonqualitative effects not
independently 2_ Smith's direct awareness of its
painlessness but rather partly il virtue of it. This option
is diagrammed in Fig. 8.
Fig. 8 Option 3: Qualia Inversion
Option 3 takes absent qualia cases to be like the standard
cases of spectrum inversion but with two important
differences. The first concerns what is switched. In the
standard thought experiments about spectrum inversion, the
presence of a simple phenomenal quality is made
intrapersonally or interpersonally to assume the normal
functional causal role of the presence of a second simple









is made to assume the normal causal role of the presence of
the first. Here, by contrast, it is the absence of one
phenomenal quality which is made to assume the normal
functional causal role of the presence of a second:
painlessness is made to have the effects of painfulness.
The second difference concerns how much is switched. Here,
unlike what one finds in the standard thought experiments
about spectrum inversion, one finds only what I will call a
partial inversion. One phenomenal quality assumes the
normal functional role of a second but the second keeps its
normal functional role: both painlessness and painfulness
assume the same functional role, the role normally had by
painfulness.
As Shoemaker has shown, it takes considerable work to
develop thought experiments about spectrum inversion that
meet obvious counterexamples.3 The published speculations
about absent qualia do not even hint about how such
counterexamples could be met if absent qualia cases were to
be construed like cases of spectrum inversion, much less
with these differences.
Obvious counterexamples appear very formidable.
Consider one kind of difficulty with standard models of
spectrum inversion. Pre-reflectively, we can imagine a
color inversion of blue and red, say, because we can imagine
3. Sydney Shoemaker, "The Inverted Spectrum," JLurna1
oL Philosophy (1981).
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blue images doing all the causal work of red images and red
images doing all the causal work of blue images. On
reflection, however, we might develop a nagging suspicion
that some of the features of red images are not causally
interchangeable with corresponding features of blue images.
A mutual substitution, for example, might fail to preserve
"betweenness" and "distance" relationships among color
appearances: we might be prone to say certain things about
the color spectrum with the two colors out of their normal
places that we might not be prone to say of it in the normal
case.
Shoemaker rightly points out that many philosophical
points about spectrum inversion need rely only on the mere
conceptual possibility that there are colors--though perhaps
not red and blue--where there are no such differences
between the normal and the inverted cases.4 However, the
situation is different in the case of Option 3. It really
does make a difference whether we can have the mixing up of
direct awareness and nonqualitative effects contemplated
there or whether it is just an illusion that we can. For if
we cannot mix the two things up, then this exhausts the
options and no way remains to create an ersatz state a that
is both functionally equivalent to g and can be
4. Sydney Shoemaker, "Functionalism and Qualia,"
Philosophical Studies (1975), and reprinted in his Identity,
cause sad Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1984); in the latter, see p. 196.
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distinguished from it through Be. And, in fact, we cannot.
There are insuperable difficulties with Option 3
corresponding to each of the two ways it differs from
standard models of spectrum inversion.
First, the fact that it is painfulness and painlessness
that we are "inverting" with Option 3 means that there will
be difficulties like the failures of "betweenness" and
"distance" comtemplated above with red and blue.
Painfulness and painlessness are not remotely similar enough
to think that they could exchange function roles. Say, for
example, that g, Smith's genuine pain, is a mild but sharp
pain, located in the big toe of his left foot near the
surface of the skin. That representation of his bodily
condition presents Smith with a range of data about himself
and produces its effects in him in virtue of the details in
the data. There is in e no comparable collection of data.
Smith's direct awareness of his painlessness has no
comparable detail; and even if he were to focus his direct
awareness on his left foot, no such detail or anything
isomorphic to it would appear. There is thus no way that e,
Be or the direct awareness associated with them could
produce effects like those of g if these effects must emerge
in virtue of the qualitative character of Smith's
experience.
Second, there is a problem in the supposition that
Option 3 is a case of what I called partial invcrion, with
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both g and P producing the same effects in virtue of
different phenomemal character. For Smith's direct
awareness, while he has a genuine pain like g, is of
nonuniformity of feeling in his left foot; this direct
awareness and any work that his imagination might put it to
will produce nonqualitative effects in cognition and
behavior. These effects would differ from those g and e
would, by hypothesis, produce in virtue of the phenomenal
feel of his left foot; since both painlessness and
painfulness produce the normal effects of painfulness, it
would functionally be for Smith as if there were uniform
pain in his left foot. But this would make Smith's direct
awareness of nonuniformity to his feelings there
epiphenomenal, as I have argued an impossibility. Thus,
there could not be an ersatz state like e as contemplated by
Option 3.
These three options exhaust the conceivable ways that a
hypothetical state like V might through Be produce the
effects that they share with g and Bg. Yet none of them are
real possibilities, and we must conclude that there could
not exist in Smith such a state as e distinguishable from a.
III. The Location Problem
Now I want to look at a different set of problems. The
difficulties I just discussed are difficulties that anybody
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would encounter trying to make sense of the notion of absent
qualia. The problems that I am about to review in this
section, which in my summary of the argument in Chapter
Seven I collectively referred to as the location problem,
are special problems that arise when one tries to make sense
of our having knowledge of and referring to our absent
qualia. They are problems for the anti-functionalist whose
argument requires that we could distinguish absent qualia
states from genuine ones, since that would require that we
could know of and refer to distinguishing features of our
absent qualia states and I will argue we cannot.
What qualitative character is belief in Be supposed to
refer to? How does it refer? I shall assume that if
knowing Be and Bg is to distinguish the ersatz pain e from
the genuine pain g, then n, the feature of e by which Be
distinguishes it from g, must have at least the following
two properties:
(1) g's character n is to be discovered in the
concrete raw feel of some stretch of Smith's
experience rather than in something Smith merely
imagines feeling or merely conceptualizes; and
(2) Be refers to n in virtue of some means or other of
directing Smith's attention to n.
If Bg and Be are to do the distinguishing they are required
to do, then, in support of condition (1), they must do so by
incorporating different concrete aspects of the experience
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Smith undergoes while in the genuine and the ersatz states.
What he merely imagines or conceptualizes feeling and does
not really feel could not play the required role in
distinguishing ersatz from genuine pain unless there were
also a more direct way of doing the distinguishing, that of
(so to speak) grasping and showing the distinguishing
feeling directly. For referring devices that picked out
only in virtue of what Smith imagines or conceptualizes
could only place the distinguishing feeling in a type.
Unless there were a more direct way of picking out the
distinguishing feeling there would always be the question of
whether the type did actually include the specific feeling.
In support of condition (2), Bg and Be can constitute
bits of knowledge only if Smith is aware of concrete pieces
of his experience as the specific raw feels he takes to be
possessed by the states he believes to be pain. It is not
enough for them merely to be lurking in experience. They
must deliberately enter Smith's thinking in the special way
appropriate to reference.
I shall argue that for these requirements of
distinguishing to be satisfied, there would have to be
qualitative aspects to Smith's mental processes that here,
as before, would produce nonqualitative effects upsetting
the functional isomorphism of any hypothetical ersatz pain a
to the genuine pain g.
Difficulties with satisfying these two conditions
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within the constraints of the functional causal role e by
definition possesses are nicely illustrated by the candidate
for e's character proposed by Conee. Think of a, as I have
previously suggested, as a purely mechanical state of
Smith's brain, which when prompted by pain's normal causes,
spews out pain's normal effects with the maximum possible
conformity to g's functional causal role. Belief in Be,
according to Conee, is about the phenomenal character of
"the seeking-and-finding-no-feeling sort of experience."
This experience, he asserts, is included in the mental
process of "[g]iving attention to a mental state one is in,
attempting to introspect some qualitative character, and
failing to find any"; assume that e somehow prompts this
mental process. It is while in e that Smith, Conee writes,
"could introspect and come to know" Be, making "direct
reference" to the peculiar phenomenal character of the
seeking-and-finding-no-feeling experience. Somehow what
Smith makes direct reference to gets incorporated into Be's
content.
Clearly, there are problems with Conee's exposition.
The most glaring one is that there could not possibly be any
experience of "seeking-and-not-finding" causally related to
e or to belief in Be. The states g and a must share a
functional causal role, and so too must the beliefs Be and
Bg. But neither pair can share a role if e and belief in Be
are to be causally linked to a "seeking-and-not-finding"
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experience, since g and belief in Bg are not linked to such
an experience or any mental processes, qualitative or
nonqualitative, normally associated with such an experience.
It is not just that Conee has made a bad choice of
words to describe the experience. Neither can there be any
wider mental process of "giving attention to a mental state
one is in, attempting to introspect some qualitative
character, and failing to find any" for the experience to be
included in. Smith's normal pain-state g is not causally
related to any such mental process: when smith is in the
genuine state g, he does not "attempt to introspect" the
qualitative character of g, as he might for some problematic
state like e. Thus, the functionally equivalent e cannot be
related to an "attempt to introspect" either. Nor, when
Smith is in e, would he "give attention" to e in anythina
like the way he "gives attention" to g, since, by
hypothesis, there is in e nothing for Smith to attend to,
given e's lack of qualitative character. Thus, another
failure of functional equivalence.
Finally, let us imagine, to the extent that it is
possible to imagine this, that Smith in e were to go through
mental processes of the ygry _mg kinds that he would
normally go through while in real pain except for a sinale
difference--that of there being while undergoing e no
feeling of pain. I will call any ersatz pain that fits this
description a virtual pain. The idea of what Smith would
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"normally" go through in real pain is an informal one but it
excludes from the domain of virtual pains any ersatz pains
associated with epiphenomenality or irrationality (like
those I entertained in the last section), since normal pains
are not. Now, even if g were a virtual pain, would it be
accurate in such a case to describe what happens to Smith in
e as his (to use Conee's characterization) "failing to find"
qualitative character? There is something that he would, by
hypothesis, fail to find--namely, g or the qualitative
character of g. But there is no obvious reason for
supposing that he would inevitably fail to find "any"
qualitative character, as Conee writes. One part of
focussing one's attention introspectively upon a qualitative
mental state like pain is focussing upon a phenomenal
location. One need not focus upon it as a particular
phenomenal location; it is enough to focus at that location.
At the same phenomenal location where he experiences g's
qualitative character, Smith in e would ordinarily find, if
the only difference for him when in e were the absence of
g's character, not, as Conee's characterization has it, a
complete absence of qualitative character. Instead, there
would be a presence of qualitative character, but of other
sorts than g's. For example, there might be proprioceptive
feelings connected with the sense of movement and the so-
called position sense (the quality of experience by which a
person with eyes closed knows where parts of the body are in
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space) and perhaps also feelings of heat, of tenseness, of
muscle fatigue, and so forth. We can conceive of cases of
complete absence of qualitative character, as when one loses
a limb and then does not even have the ghostly continuing
feelings there that some amputees report but has, instead,
no feeling at all. But these cases are not like the case of
e.
It may seem that the problem is of Conee's own making,
that the descriptions of the experience whose character
belief in Be refers to and of the mental process it is
included in are unnecessarily inflated beyond the functional
causal role g and a are supposed to share. But that is not
so. There is an obviousness and reasonableness about these
descriptions. While in g, Smith has no pain. His knowledge
of that would seem to involve a univerally qgantified kind
of knowledge. I suggest that the belief Be, which is
causally associated, does as well. To see this, first
consider English sentences of the form "I have a pain." Let
us assume that they are elliptical and can be expanded into
sentences like (A).
(A) I have a pain at location L.
Constants that occupy the referential position filled in (A)
by "L" purport to refer to phenomenal locations in Smith;
even if we are uncertain about the ontological status of
phenomenal locations, it is still safe to say that Smith
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represents to himself his pain status by beliefs of the form
of (A). Assume that Smith has feelings of some sort or
other at all the normal places in, say, the big toe of his
right foot. There thus exist some true beliefs or other of
the form of (A), where the noun phrase and the constant are
replaced by expressions purporting to refer to qualia and
locations in Smith's big toe on his right foot. Now, the
sentence "I have no pain," by contrast, can be expanded into
(A').
(A') ( V L ) (I have a pain at L )
Knowledge of (A'), even restricted to some region of Smith's
body, requires quantified knowledge about a set of
locations. Such universally quantified knowledge cannot be
obtained by acquaintance without knowledge by acquaintance
of each of those locations.
Now, the case of Smith's hypothetical belief Be would
need to be similar. Not only would Be need to be causally
associated with knowledge like that Smith would express by
(A') but the reference of Be to the qualitative character of
not feeling pain at any phenomenal location entails Smith's
having knowledge by acquaintance of at least some feature or
other at each location. By contrast to this, Smith's
knowledge of what he feels while in g, such as his knowledge
of Bg, does not entail any universally quantified knowledge
about a set of locations, nor is it causally associated in
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the way Be is with any other universally quantified kind of
knowledge. There is thus, on these present assumptions
about how one might produce a state like e, a big difference
between g and a and between knowledge of Bg and knowledge of
Be. It is so big that it is difficult to see how belief in
Be, on these assumptions, could refer to the sort of thing
Be is supposed to and remain functionally equivalent to Bg.
Consider this objection: "You ignore the fact that a
and e need only share nnqualitative causal relations. This
leaves room among the qualitative causal relations they do
not share for a 'big difference' in mental processes that
gives P a knowable qualitative character while keeping it
functionally equivalent to g. After all, searching
phenomenal locations for a qualitative character is a
qualitative mental process." The objector, however, ignores
the fact that such allowably different qualitative causal
relations as the objector insists on would normally
themselves have nonqualitative effects and produce a failure
of functional equivalence.
IV. Might There Be Ersatz Pains with Abnormal
Causes and Effects?
Let me pursue the objector's suggestion further. Could
we perhaps suspend some of the present assumptions about how
one might produce a state like £? So far I have assumed
that Smith in e would be pretty normal except for his having
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this pain-like state, which lacks the feel of pain but is
itself otherwise like a normal pain. What if we look at
more abnormal cases? What if there were a case in which the
qualitative mental processes associated with reference to
&'s qualitative character n, which I have been describing as
search-like and thus outside e's causal role, did not have
the causal relations to nonqualitative effects normally
associated with reference to qualitative character? Is this
possible? If it were, then the search-like mental processes
Smith needs to refer to n might do their work outside a's
causal role without upsetting e's isomorphism to g.
I shall now argue that this is not possible. First,
let us review the paradigm of Smith's searching out and
finding e which I have been assuming so far. In Fig. 9, I
set out diagrams of how we might understand g as a normal
case of pain and of how we might understand e as a case of
virtual pain.
Fig. 9 Normal Pain and Virtual Pain
Direct non- Direct non-
qualitative*-g NO SEARCH qualitative- e NO SEARCH
effects i - effects 4
.e4 fIt
Other 4 Other w 4
qualitative Bg qualitative Be?--Does Be refer?
effects 4 effects 4
4 4 NO FURTHER 4 4 NOFURTHER
Indirect INDIRECT Indirect INDIRECT
nonqualitative NONQUALITATIVE nonqualitative NONQUALITATIVE
effects EFFECTS effects EFFECTS
Normal Pain Option 4. Virtual Pain
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If Smith is asked, "Do you have pain in your right leg?", he
will most likely try to answer the question by directing his
attention to his leg. If he is in g, no search will
normally be needed to answer the question. Assuming a is
intense and distinct enough to make itself known easily,
attending to his leg will be enough for Smith to realize he
has pain in the big toe of his right foot. If he is in e,
by contrast, his attention will not immediately be drawn to
anything in introspection, even though he takes himself to
be in pain. How then can Smith, in virtue of believing Be,
point out to himself some raw feel in himself as the
phenomenal character of the state he takes to be pain? Raw
feels are for the most part at phenomenal locations; not
only is there no obvious candidate in introspection for gf's
specific raw feel at any specific location but Smith does
not even have access to any property of e that would
distinguish e introspectively from most other mental states.
Smith would have to undergo some further mental process of
collecting evidence about e if he were ostend to himself
some raw feel as p's specific raw feel; however, this would
be incompatible with construing e as a virtual pain, one
differing from some normal pain only in its lack of
qualitative character.
Obviously, Smith cannot conduct a reportable search
through phenomenal locations in his leg, either; otherwise,
e would not be functionally equivalent to g. This leaves
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several apparent alternatives. Two of them I set out in
Fig. 10.
Direct nrn- Search at all
qualitative•- - locations inside












Direct rnon- Sea at all
qualitative - -' iocaticns inside
effects . 4 direct awareness
, 4 for pain
Otherw 4 1 44









Fig. 10 Options 5 & 6: Introxspectable Searches and Ineffability
Option 5 exploits the idea that e's functional equivalence
to g could be maintained if the search that fixes Be's
reference to e's character were ineffable, without
nonqualitative effects. But this is not a real alternative.
Earlier I argued against the related idea that smith's
direct awareness of the painlessness of his ersatz pains
would not interfere with their functional causal role in
relevant ways because his awareness could be epiphenomenal.
The argument here against Option 5 is similar and just as
straightforward. The introspective access which Smith would
normally have to any search throughout phenomenal locations
of his body for evidence for fixing his reference to l's
character would be robust, the kind of thing Smith could
think about out loud or to himself. For example, the
_ __ _ __ _
297
product of the search which Conee entertains Smith carrying
out is, by hypothesis, a failure to find, which would appear
to be reportable. While we do sometimes seem to check our
direct awarenesses for their contents automatically, in ways
that turn up results without our quite being able to say
how, it is impossible to make sense oi such a thing in this
case. How can we understand Smith's running through i
direct awareness in a search of the sort appropriate to his
taking some specific raw feel to be e's raw feel without
there being some effect among his intentional states? It
would certainly beg the question against functionalism just
to assume we can understand that.
Also untenable is the idea which I have labeled Option
6, that e's functional isomorphism could be maintained even
if the hypothetical search for g's character produced non-
isomorphic effects. This will not work because g, by
hypothesis, produces the search; any non-isomorphic,
nonqualitative effects would be indirect effects of e and
would contradict the requirement that all of e's indirect
effects be part of the functional role it shares with g.
The functional definition determining g would thus not be
the best one possible.
What if the reference-fixing search for g's character
were to take place outside Smith's awareness altogether? In
that case, there would be no ineffable qualitative effects
from e, nor would there be extra psychological effects to
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upset e's isomorphism to g. This is Option 7, diagrammed
below in Fig 11.
Direct non- Search outside
qualitative* - direct awareness
effects r4 for pain
.4 at any location
Other 4




nonqualitative NO FURTHER INDIRECT
effects PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS
Fig. 11 Option 7: Search Outside Awareness
Suppose that this works as follows. Inside Smith's head
there is a machine--say a souped-up cerebroscope.
Unbeknownst to him, the machine looks for pain and feeds its
negative results into the process that makes him believe
that the state he thinks is pain feels like n.
But this will not work either. How could Smith know
that something feels like t.i character--n--unless he had
conscious access to the hypothetical search that n is part
of? In the story under examination, Smith distinguishes §
from g in virtue of an aspect of the overall experience he
has while undergoing A, something he can point out to
himself. There would be no way to point out something like
the phenomenal character of a "seeking-and-not-finding" sort
of experience unless Smith had before his mind such an
experience, the experience of a search. It makes no sense
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to suppose that he could run through a search, so to speak,
cerebroscopically, outside awareness, and in virtue of that
jfl Jkno its phenomenal character. For to know tt, by
way of a singular proposition, is to point out something
that depends for its existence on acquaintance with how it
is an aspect of the wider course of experience, and a merely
cerebroscopic search would not provide Smith with this wider
acquaintance. It would be as if one could ivst know what
the surface color appearance of an apple was like without
any acquaintance with the apple's surface.
By way of concluding my counterargument to the First
Objection, let me examine one kind of response to it.
Throughout, it may seem that the problems I have cited turn
on the particular examples I have used, and that these
problems could be eliminated by producing different
examples. So imagine that instead of Bg and Be we try to
distinguish g and e by way of Ag and Ae.
(Ag) At the phenomenal location where I believe I am in
pain I find this character in introspection (making
direct reference to its character, partly that of
feeling painful).
(Ae) At the phenomenal location where I believe I am in
pain I find this character in introspection (making
direct reference to its character, partly that of
feeling painless).
Here, no search of the sort entertained for Be is required.
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Smith does not have to look for phenomenal character 'o have
some seeking-and-not-finding experience. It is enough
simply to inspect one phenomenal location, the one where he
thinks he is having the pain. Since the extra
nonqualitative effects of a search no longer appear, it may
seem that we have escaped the sorts of difficulties
associated with them.
My reply is that even if the appeal to a search is
extreme, it emphasizes a general problem associated with
reference to any qualitative character that would be
sufficient to distinguish an ersatz from a genuine state.
In general, any reference to raw feels adequate for
distinguishing an ersatz state by way of some effect in
Smith's beliefs like Be or Ae would be fixed by a process of
referring that would have different nonqualitative effects
from the process of referring in the case of a counterpart
genuine-state belief.
Say, to take another extreme case, that we tried to
distinguish a pain in the big toe of Smith's left foot from
an ersatz counterpart by two beliefs that each referred to
the entire phenomenal feel of his left leg. It will not do
to ostend the respective feels by Smith's attending to the
feel of just a part of his left leg--as one might do in
ostending an elephant by attending to part of it, say its
left leg. For one could not distinguish the elephant from a
weird hybrid that had elephant-like legs beneath the body of
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a zebra just by ostending a leg. Similarly, Smith could not
distinguish the feel of his entire left leg from the feel of
a leg phenomenally the same but except for a pain by
attending to the part of the phenomenal feel separate from
the pain. Only by attending to that aspect of the leg in
virtue of which there is a difference could Smith hope to
distinguish the feel of his painful leg from the feel of a
painless one. But the mean of picking out the one raw feel
will differ from the means of picking out the other when the
feels to be distinguished are regions of feeling that differ
only by the presence and absence of some qualitative
property. The difference is reflected in the common-sense
metaphors we associate with the two ways of picking out. In
the case where the qualitative property is present, it is as
if the attention is attracted by a magnet, fastened to some
region of phenomenal space along the contours of the image
or feeling that occupies it. In the case where the
qualitative property is absent, it is as if attention
requires effort, needing a focussing of attention in order
to attend to one phenomenal region that does not
substantially differ from its neighboring regions.
V. The Second Objection
I will now turn from the unsuccessful First Objection
to what I labeled in the summary in section two as the
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Second Objection. This too is an attack upon the
functionalist's case against the possibility of absent
qualia, but unlike the First Objection, it is successful.
Although related, it is also different from the First
Objection in important ways. It suffers none of the
problems that defeat the First Objection, in fact exploiting
the failure of the latter to make its case.
In this final section I review why it is that the First
Objection fails. Shoemaker is also correct that it fails to
make room for the possibility of ersatz states in sentient
creatures like Smith but for the wrong reasons, and I
compare his reasons with the right ones. Then I spell out
the Second Objection. I argue that the First Objection
fails because the side-effects that create difficulties in
constructing ersatz states only arise in a creature with
qualitative states. If we consider instead creatures that
are qualia-free, as we do in the Second Objection, there are
no opportunities for such side-effects to arise.
My case against the First Objection establishes that
the functionalist is correct in claiming that ersatz pain is
not possible in a sentient and sapient creature like Smith.
Even given a weak sort of distinguishing, one that does not
even require the capacity to compare, no ersatz pain in
Smith could be distinguished from genuine pains. But it is
plausible to think, as the functionalist insists, that Smith
would need to be able at least weakly to distinguish any
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ersatz pain he would have for him to be able to have them.
Still, even though those functionalists who argue like
Shoemaker does are right about this, they are right for the
wrong reasons. Shoemaker argues that any feature purported
to be a reliable indicator distinguishing between genuine
and ersatz qualitative states would never be able to do so.
He contends that if some proposed functional definition
detailing the functional causal role the states were
supposed to share were to omit the feature, that would
merely mean that the proposed functional definition was not
the best one possible, not that the feature was a
distinguishing feature. This leaves any hypothetical
ersatz-state subject in the same epistemological relation to
his or her ersatz state as the genuine-state subject is in
to his or her genuine state. The two states would have the
very same functional causal roles and there would thus be no
reliable indicators to distinguish them. Thus he or she is
in no position to know of being in an ersatz state or a
genuine state. Since we always Lo know that, the argument
goes, ersatz states in ua must be impossible.5
Shoemaker's premise that a hypothetical difference
between ersatz and genuine states can always just be "added"
to any functional causal role they purportedly share,
however, is misguided. Just as we can conceive of two
5. Shoemaker, "Absent Qualia Are Impossible," oQp. giL,
pp. 589-590.
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functionally isomorphic states that have different
qualitative features--with one red and the other some
spectral inverse like green, for example--we can conceive,
prima facie, of two functionally isomorphic states, one
having and the other lacking qualitative character. There
is nothing in the concept of functional isomorphism that
rules out that conceivable possibility. Moreover, we can
conceive of the qualitative member of the pair as causing
one set of appropriate effects, the qualia-free member
causing appropriate but different effects, at least without
initial contradiction. Shoemaker's premise that
hypothetical differences can be "added" to any purportedly
shared functional causal role to eliminate any appearance of
differences is true only where the differences are
indisputably nonqualitative. If, by contrast, they would be
qualitative, it would be question-begging just to assume
that they could be just "added". We have Conee's reasons
for thinking otherwise.
It is not Shoemaker's question-begging reasoning about
these matters but rather the set of difficulties emerging
from the location-problem argument and the other arguments
of this chapter which confirms Shoemaker's negative
conclusion about absent qualia in a sentient and sapient
creature like Smith. Ersatz states are not possible in
Smith because, for one thing, he cannot locate them given
the constraints of the causal roles they would have, and
305
thus he cannot refer to them or know of them. For Smith to
undergo ersatz states, they must have the same relations to
states of knowledge that their genuine counterparts do.
Since they cannot, they cannot exist in Smith or any other
creature capable of knowing its own qualitative states. It
is for this reason, as we have seen, that there are no
beliefs like the qualitative belief in Be and no
nonpropositional mental states like £ that are possible for
Smith and creatures like him to have.
Nevertheless, although Shoemaker is correct, and Conee
is wrong, about this relation among ersatzness, sentience
and sapience, Shoemaker and Conee both seem to be
unjustifiably confident about a further claim: that if
ersatz states are not possible in creatures like Smith, they
are not possible at all. But neither writer gives a direct
argument for this principle.
This further claim is in fact refutable. It is because
of that that the Second Objection is possible. The Second
Objection makes its case for the possibility of ersatz
states not on the basis of sentient creatures like Smith but
on the basis of qualia-free creatures.
The Second Objection invites us, just as the First
Objection does, to try to imagine a state that, like j,
satisfies the best possible functional description of
genuine pain while lacking qualitative character. The
Second Objection, however, invites us to imagine such a
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thing being realized not in a sentient and sapient creature
like Smith, as the First Objection did, but in a nonsentient
entity. What is required is some entity close enough to
Smith in functional organization that, even though it might
not be functionally isomorphic through and through, it has
enough isomorphism (among pain's normal effects, for
example) to realize at least one state functionally
equivalent to pain. But let us suppose that it lacks
qualitative character throughout--in all its states. Even
though such an entity would lack all qualitative character,
this presents no obstacle to its realizing what I defined as
nonqualitative functional characterizations of genuine
qualitative states like pain, descriptions formulated purely
in nonqualitative terms. Nothing in my counterargument to
the First Objection conflicts with the existence of this
kind of ersatz state. For all the problems I cited arise
from side-effects that could not appear in a creature
without qualitative states.
Now, the existence of such an entity as this
constitutes a counterexample to EP, the premise attacked
unsuccessfully by the First Objection. For if g is possible
it js possible even though, as K asserts and contrary to
EP's consequent, the presence or absence of qualitative
character makes a difference that distinguishes genuine pain
from ersatz pain. It makes a very obvious difference even
though, as I argued in Chapter Six, there is no general
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epistemological principle supporting K. If the
counterargument to the First Objection is correct, we know
whenever we are having genuine pains that we are having them
rather than ersatz pains. We know this in virtue of the
presence of the qualitative character of the genuine pain,
together with an a priori argument that ersatz pains are not
possible in somebody who has the genuine states they would
be ersatz counterparts to. In creatures like Smith and the
rest of us who feel pain, ersatz pains do not conform to the
functional template of causes and effects of genuine states.
They create too many difficulties with nonqualitative side-
effects. In entities that do not feel pain or have any
other states with qualitative character, there are no such
problematical side-effects. In them, ersatz pains are
possible, even though in ja it is always possible to
distinguish being in a genuine state from being in an ersatz
state. Thus, Shoemaker's EP is false, and the anti-
skeptical argument against the possibility of absent qualia
which depends upon EP is defeated.
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